nature of plaintiffs claim in New York

1991It is clear that no action has been properly commenced where either service of the summons or the substance and content of the summons are not in compliance with the statutory mandate. "[T]he statutory dictates are clear — what is required for the commencement of an action is the proper service of a summons, and the summons, when unaccompanied by a complaint, must itself or by an attachment furnish to the defendant what has been described by the Judicial Conference (in its Annual Report recommending insertion of the prescriptive word 'shall’ in CPLR 305, subd [b]) as 'at least basic informatio

1991It is clear that no action has been properly commenced where either service of the summons or the substance and content of the summons are not in compliance with the statutory mandate. "[T]he statutory dictates are clear — what is required for the commencement of an action is the proper service of a summons, and the summons, when unaccompanied by a complaint, must itself or by an attachment furnish to the defendant what has been described by the Judicial Conference (in its Annual Report recommending insertion of the prescriptive word 'shall’ in CPLR 305, subd [b]) as 'at least basic informatio

2000Finally, as to the factor of prejudice resulting from the delay, we find that as a result of the more than one-year delay in giving notice to OTB and the nature of plaintiffs claim, OTB has been substantially hindered in its investigation (see, De Jesus v County of Albany, 267 AD2d 649, 651 , supra).

1993Comm. v Koch, 150 AD2d 269, 271 , lv denied 75 NY2d 705 ).

1989Consequently, the "complete absence of the notice requirements contained in CPLR 305 (subd [b]) is a jurisdictional defect which renders the summons insufficient not only for the purposes of taking a default judgment, but also to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and commence the action” (Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 AD2d 504 , affd 63 NY2d 635 ; see also, Farkas v Tarrytown Lbr., 133 AD2d 251 ; Viscosi v Merritt, 125 AD2d 814 ; Rowell v Gould, Inc., 124 AD2d 995 ).

1989Consequently, the "complete absence of the notice requirements contained in CPLR 305 (subd [b]) is a jurisdictional defect which renders the summons insufficient not only for the purposes of taking a default judgment, but also to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and commence the action” (Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 AD2d 504 , affd 63 NY2d 635 ; see also, Farkas v Tarrytown Lbr., 133 AD2d 251 ; Viscosi v Merritt, 125 AD2d 814 ; Rowell v Gould, Inc., 124 AD2d 995 ).

1989Consequently, the "complete absence of the notice requirements contained in CPLR 305 (subd [b]) is a jurisdictional defect which renders the summons insufficient not only for the purposes of taking a default judgment, but also to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and commence the action” (Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 AD2d 504 , affd 63 NY2d 635 ; see also, Farkas v Tarrytown Lbr., 133 AD2d 251 ; Viscosi v Merritt, 125 AD2d 814 ; Rowell v Gould, Inc., 124 AD2d 995 ).

1989Consequently, the "complete absence of the notice requirements contained in CPLR 305 (subd [b]) is a jurisdictional defect which renders the summons insufficient not only for the purposes of taking a default judgment, but also to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and commence the action” (Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 AD2d 504 , affd 63 NY2d 635 ; see also, Farkas v Tarrytown Lbr., 133 AD2d 251 ; Viscosi v Merritt, 125 AD2d 814 ; Rowell v Gould, Inc., 124 AD2d 995 ).

1986However, since the purpose of the notice is simply to provide the defendant with " 'at least basic information concerning the nature of plaintiffs claim and the relief sought’ ” (id., quoting Twenty-third Ann Report of NY Judicial Conference, at 273 [1978]), absolute precision is not necessary (see, Premo v Cornell, 71 AD2d 223 ).