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5 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1970–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sharrow v. Dick Corp.green2 sentences2004Although New York has not adopted a statute similar to rule 606 (b), state common law “is consonant with its underlying principles.” (Sharrow v Dick Corp., 86 NY2d 54, 61 [1995] [citations omitted]; see People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569 [2000]; People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388 [1979].) The policy considerations underlying this rule are to insure the finality of verdicts, prevent juror harassment by disappointed litigants or their attorneys, and encourage “frankness and freedom of discussion and conference” among the jurors. 2004(Sharrow v Dick Corp., 86 NY2d at 61 .) This is not the first time that a court has been confronted with the issue of whether to consider juror testimony upon allegations of misconduct involving the use of alcohol. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maraghgreen1 sentence2004Although New York has not adopted a statute similar to rule 606 (b), state common law “is consonant with its underlying principles.” (Sharrow v Dick Corp., 86 NY2d 54, 61 [1995] [citations omitted]; see People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569 [2000]; People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388 [1979].) The policy considerations underlying this rule are to insure the finality of verdicts, prevent juror harassment by disappointed litigants or their attorneys, and encourage “frankness and freedom of discussion and conference” among the jurors. | 1 | 1 |
Tanner v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995In rejecting the use of the evidence, the Court identified three important policies to be furthered: ensuring the finality of verdicts, preventing juror harassment by disappointed litigants or their attorneys, *61 and encouraging "frankness and freedom of discussion and conference” among the jurors (id., at 267-268; see also, Tanner v United States, 483 US 107, 120 ; see generally, Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U Colo L Rev 57 [1993]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Varsity Transit, Inc. v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence2011Even if the instant motion were to be interpreted as falling within the rule, two exceptions to the general rule have been recognized allowing successive motions: where new evidence has been discovered after the making of the prior motion, and where other sufficient cause has been shown (see Varsity Tr. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 300 AD2d 38 [1st Dept 2002]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2004Although New York has not adopted a statute similar to rule 606 (b), state common law “is consonant with its underlying principles.” (Sharrow v Dick Corp., 86 NY2d 54, 61 [1995] [citations omitted]; see People v Maragh, 94 NY2d 569 [2000]; People v Brown, 48 NY2d 388 [1979].) The policy considerations underlying this rule are to insure the finality of verdicts, prevent juror harassment by disappointed litigants or their attorneys, and encourage “frankness and freedom of discussion and conference” among the jurors. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
McDonald v. Pless
green
1 sentence1995The policy considerations underlying this rule were first expressed by the United States Supreme Court in McDonald v Pless ( 238 US 264 ) when it addressed the admissibility of juror evidence impeaching, posttrial, a quotient verdict. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. . Benham
green
1 sentence1981The abhorrence, reflected in Ruloff(supra), of convicting someone of murder when in fact the “victim” was still alive was recognized by the Legislature in its enactment of section 1041 of the Penal Law (not re-enacted in 1967) (formerly Penal Code, § 181) which set forth a strict requirement that in every murder and manslaughter case there must be direct proof of the death and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the killing by the defendant (see People v Benham, 160 NY 402, 425 , supra). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Servis v. . Servis
neutral
1 sentence1970Significant in this connection is the language of the Court of Appeals in Servis v. Servis ( 172 N. Y. 438 ), an alienation of affections action brought before such actions were abolished (172 N. Y., at pp. 442-443): “Of the absolute right of a father to furnish money for the support of a son who has, for reasons good or bad, determined to abandon his wife, there is of course no doubt — a right that he may exercise without being subjected to respond in damages to the deserted wife provided its exercise be not part of a general scheme having for its object the alienation of the husband’s affect | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.