policy considerations underlying rule in California

2016(Id. at p. 343; see People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 , 514–515, fn. 10; Gutierrez v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 153, 169 .) Here, none of the threshold requirements were met, save identity of parties.

2015(Id. at p. 343; see People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 , 514–515, fn. 10; Gutierrez v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 153, 169 .) Here, none of the threshold requirements were met, save identity of parties.

2016(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 .) Even when all these threshold requirements are met, the doctrine may not be applied if the policy considerations underlying the doctrine—“preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation”—are outweighed by other factors, such as fairness.

2015(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 .) Even when all these threshold requirements are met, the doctrine may not be applied if the policy considerations underlying the doctrine—“preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation”—are outweighed by other factors, such as fairness.

2014No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental 8 processes by which it was determined.” However, “[b]y its very language, this section applies only to postverdict inquiries into how error or misconduct had affected the juror in reaching the verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 838 .) The court in People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466 (Cleveland) stated: “Many of the policy considerations underlying the rule prohibiti

2014No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental 8 processes by which it was determined.” However, “[b]y its very language, this section applies only to postverdict inquiries into how error or misconduct had affected the juror in reaching the verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 838 .) The court in People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466 (Cleveland) stated: “Many of the policy considerations underlying the rule prohibiti

2021“As with other general equitable principles, application of the equitable tolling doctrine requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against the effect upon the important public interest or policy expressed by the … limitations statute.” (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 321 .) Moreover, equitable tolling should not apply if it is “inconsistent with the relevant statute.” (United States v. Beggerly (1998) 524 U.S. 38, 48 .) We give a broad reading to the elements of California’s equitable tolling doctrine, based on the policy

2021“As with other general equitable principles, application of the equitable tolling doctrine requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against the effect upon the important public interest or policy expressed by the … limitations statute.” (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 321 .) Moreover, equitable tolling should not apply if it is “inconsistent with the relevant statute.” (United States v. Beggerly (1998) 524 U.S. 38, 48 .) We give a broad reading to the elements of California’s equitable tolling doctrine, based on the policy

2021Perhaps, if a plaintiff delayed filing the second claim until the statute on that claim had nearly run, even after crediting the tolled period, his conduct might be considered unreasonable. [Citation.] Or if the plaintiff deliberately misled the defendant into believing the second claim would not be filed, that action might be deemed to constitute bad faith.” (Collier, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) Collier described the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of equitable tolling, stating: “First, it secures the benefits of the statutes of limitation for defendants without imposing

2014No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental 8 processes by which it was determined.” However, “[b]y its very language, this section applies only to postverdict inquiries into how error or misconduct had affected the juror in reaching the verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 838 .) The court in People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466 (Cleveland) stated: “Many of the policy considerations underlying the rule prohibiti

2001Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1373 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 424 ; Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 389 , 133 Cal.Rptr. 83 ; see 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 7.12, pp. 720-721 and cases cited fn. 12.) Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., supra , is the seminal case which articulates the policy considerations underlying the rule, which relate to the uniquely personal nature of the attorney-client relationship. ( Fireman's Fund Ins.

2001Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1373 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 424 ; Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 389 , 133 Cal.Rptr. 83 ; see 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 7.12, pp. 720-721 and cases cited fn. 12.) Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., supra , is the seminal case which articulates the policy considerations underlying the rule, which relate to the uniquely personal nature of the attorney-client relationship. ( Fireman's Fund Ins.

2001Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg, supra, at p. 1379, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 424 ; Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1023 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 637 .) In Goodley the client assigned her rights against her attorneys for their negligence in handling her divorce.

2001Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg, supra, at p. 1379, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 424 ; Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1023 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 637 .) In Goodley the client assigned her rights against her attorneys for their negligence in handling her divorce.

1982(See id., at pp. 351-352.) Both this court and the legal commentators have recognized that a plaintiff’s assumption of risk may operate as a complete or partial bar to recovery in a strict liability action. 8 (Daly v. General Motors, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 733 ; Luthringer v. Moore, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 499, quoting from Rest., Torts, § 523; Rest.2d Torts, § 523; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 722, pp. 3012-3013; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 68, p. 456.) The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of strict liability in this state are not so significant as to

1980Schomer cites Albertini v. Schaefer (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 822 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 98 ], a 1979 case, which discussed slander per se and stated: “Words which fall within the purview of Civil Code section 46 are deemed to constitute slander per se [citations] with the effect that the utterance of such words is actionable without proof of special damage. [Citation.]” (Italics added.) (Id., at p. 829.) The policy considerations underlying the presumption of damages in slander per se cases are still valid today.

1980Schomer cites Albertini v. Schaefer (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 822 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 98 ], a 1979 case, which discussed slander per se and stated: “Words which fall within the purview of Civil Code section 46 are deemed to constitute slander per se [citations] with the effect that the utterance of such words is actionable without proof of special damage. [Citation.]” (Italics added.) (Id., at p. 829.) The policy considerations underlying the presumption of damages in slander per se cases are still valid today.

1976Against these policies is balanced the policy of providing reasonably prompt and effective judicial protection to important legal rights.” (Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact (1960) 70 Yale L.J. 175 . 207.) 4 Although the Holderbv decision describes the exhaustion doctrine as applicable to a “plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an organization of which he is a member” ( 45 Cal.2d at p. 846 ), the policy considerations underlying the rule (see fn. 3, ante) make it clear that the exhaustion doctrine is equally applicable to an applicant for membership who ha

1971(See Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. at p. 131 ; Robinson v. Robinson, supra, 198 Cal.App.2d at pp. 194-195.) The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of finality of judgments are today at least as important as, if not more important than, ever.