prosecutor compounded error in New York

2016Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief (see CPL 60.35 [2]), telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct con

2016Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief (see CPL 60.35 [2]), telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct con

2016Moreover, during summation, the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly using the prior inconsistent statement as evidence in chief (see CPL 60.35 [2]), telling the jury that when that witness previously spoke to the police, to an assistant district attorney, and to the grand jury, “on each of those occasions, she said what it is she saw and who it is that she saw do it,” and urging the jury to find “she was not telling you the truth when she said that I now am telling you I did not see who did it, that it was too dark.” Later, the prosecutor went one step further, stating, in direct con

1981Further, after improperly questioning defendant about his use of aliases on occasions which had no relevance to the case at bar (see People v Jimenez, 79 AD2d 1012 ), the prosecutor compounded this error by addressing the defendant as “Mr. Defendant”, and when defense counsel objected, offering the explanation that “I don’t know what his name is.” Most disturbing are the prosecutor’s repeated attempts to cross-examine the defendant about alleged prior immoral acts which were very similar to the crime charged, without having obtained an advance ruling from the trial court, when the prosecutor h

1981Further, after improperly questioning defendant about his use of aliases on occasions which had no relevance to the case at bar (see People v Jimenez, 79 AD2d 1012 ), the prosecutor compounded this error by addressing the defendant as “Mr. Defendant”, and when defense counsel objected, offering the explanation that “I don’t know what his name is.” Most disturbing are the prosecutor’s repeated attempts to cross-examine the defendant about alleged prior immoral acts which were very similar to the crime charged, without having obtained an advance ruling from the trial court, when the prosecutor h

1979Such tactics may not be used by a prosecutor as a means of discrediting either the accused or an alibi witness, either upon cross-examination or during the People’s summation, and may be grounds for reversal of a conviction and the granting of a new trial (see People v Hamlin, 58 AD2d 631 ; People v Smoot, 59 AD2d 898 ).

1979Such tactics may not be used by a prosecutor as a means of discrediting either the accused or an alibi witness, either upon cross-examination or during the People’s summation, and may be grounds for reversal of a conviction and the granting of a new trial (see People v Hamlin, 58 AD2d 631 ; People v Smoot, 59 AD2d 898 ).

1977Further, during summation, the prosecutor compounded this error by improperly vouching for his own witnesses (see People v Figueroa, 38 AD2d 595 ).

1977Lastly, in his charge to the jury, the Trial Judge erroneously referred to the composition of the Grand Jury and the number of votes needed to return an indictment (see People v Fortt, 35 NY2d 921, 922 , revg 42 AD2d 859 on. the dissenting memorandum of Justices Martuscello and Shapiro; People v Williams, 57 AD2d 876 ).

1977Lastly, in his charge to the jury, the Trial Judge erroneously referred to the composition of the Grand Jury and the number of votes needed to return an indictment (see People v Fortt, 35 NY2d 921, 922 , revg 42 AD2d 859 on. the dissenting memorandum of Justices Martuscello and Shapiro; People v Williams, 57 AD2d 876 ).

1977Lastly, in his charge to the jury, the Trial Judge erroneously referred to the composition of the Grand Jury and the number of votes needed to return an indictment (see People v Fortt, 35 NY2d 921, 922 , revg 42 AD2d 859 on. the dissenting memorandum of Justices Martuscello and Shapiro; People v Williams, 57 AD2d 876 ).

1976Although timely objection to the errors was not taken, we deem the errors to have been prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial and, in the interest of justice, the judgment should be reversed (see People v Kelly, 12 NY2d 248, 250 ).