judicial restraint dictates that we decide doctrine in Virginia

2026See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392 , 396 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). -5- Subsequently, the defendants filed a plea in bar arguing that Miles’s remaining claims were barred by sovereign immunity.

2026See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 396 (2020) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting White, 293 Va. at 419)). - 10 - transaction transferring all or substantially all of the LLC’s assets outside of the ordinary course of business could be performed without the consent of members owning over half of the company.

2026“Wills are most frequently contested by beneficiaries who claim the document itself is invalid, either because the testator executed it without the requisite formalities, lacked the 13 “[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)).

2026Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 375 , 380 (2019) 4 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 5 The court observed that while defense had several potential issues for cross-examination, nothing about the identification justified suppression. 6 Tinker did not object to the in-court identification at trial. 7 “The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 624 n.4 (2010)).

2026Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 375 , 380 (2019) 4 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 5 The court observed that while defense had several potential issues for cross-examination, nothing about the identification justified suppression. 6 Tinker did not object to the in-court identification at trial. 7 “The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 624 n.4 (2010)).

2026“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4 (2010)).

2023See Nunez v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 152, 157 (2016) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest ground available.’” (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4 (2010))).

2021See Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases on the best and narrowest grounds available.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Nunez v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 152, 157 (2016) (emphasizing that “judicial restraint” counsels this Court to assume legal principles without deciding them). -7- When a party argues on appeal that a trial court erred in denying a motion to continue, this Court applies a “two-pronged test” asking whether “the court abused its discretion” and whether the party “was prejudiced by the

2022Reversed and remanded. 8 The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases “on the best and narrowest grounds available.” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4 (2010) (quoting Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

2017The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases " 'on the best and narrowest grounds available.' " McGhee v. Commonwealth , 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4, 701 S.E.2d 58 , 61 n.4 (2010) (quoting Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union , 498 U.S. 517 , 531, 111 S.Ct. 913 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

2025Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)).

2023Here, our conclusion that the good faith exception applied to the warrant constitutes the best and narrowest grounds on this issue. 3 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). -6- (1984)).

2024Co., LLC, 294 Va. 416, 423 (2017) (finding only one assignment of error dispositive and declining to address the others because “the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))).

2024Co., LLC, 294 Va. 416, 423 (2017) (noting that only one assignment of error was dispositive, and declining to address others because “the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). - 13 -

2024“A fundamental and longstanding precept of this doctrine is that ‘unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue’ should be avoided.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203 (2002)).

2022See Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196-97 (2015) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’ A fundamental and longstanding precept of this doctrine is that ‘unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue’ should be avoided.” (first quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4 (2010); then quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203 (2002))); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.

2025See generally Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251 , 258 n.2 (2019) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). - 13 - Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 195, 200 (2003)). “‘[W]hen provocation reasonably produces fear’ or anger, causing ‘one to act on impulse without conscious reflection,’ no malice exists.” Washington, 75 Va. App. at 619 (alteration in original) (quoting Rhodes, 41 Va. App. at 200 ).

2023Here, we decline to decide whether appellant was at fault in “bringing on the difficulty.” Appellant has failed to show that the jury erred in finding that he did not reasonably fear death or great bodily harm, or that he was in imminent danger. -9- (quoting Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 195, 200 (2003)). “[It] excludes malice when provocation reasonably produces fear [or anger] that causes one to act on impulse without conscious reflection.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Rhodes, 41 Va. App. at 200 ).

2025“If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

2023“If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Id. (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

2025The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases “on the best and narrowest grounds available” and avoid “unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue.” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (citations omitted); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (noting the “obligation of the Judicial Branch to avoid deciding constitutional issues needlessly”).

2015A fundamental and longstanding precept of this doctrine is that "unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue" should be avoided. **197 Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172 , 203, 563 S.E.2d 695 , 715 (2002) ; see Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 , 417, 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) (noting the "obligation of the Judicial Branch to avoid deciding constitutional issues needlessly"); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.

2024This waiver principle applies to “exactly the same evidence,” “evidence dealing ‘with the same subject,’” “evidence fairly considered to be ‘of the same character,’” and “evidence ‘similar to that to which the objection applies.’” Id. (quoting Isaac v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 255, 264 (2011)).

2019Independent of the limitations on the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, “[u]nder Virginia law, a litigant waives an objection to evidence when he introduces ‘evidence dealing with the same subject as part of his own case-in-chief.’” Isaac v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 255, 260 (2011) (quoting Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69, 79 (2005)).

2022Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)); see also Zebbs v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 368 , 378 n.9 (2016) (recognizing that addressing issues that are not necessary to resolve a case “would be to offer an advisory opinion, which we are not empowered to do”).

2021The Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly cabined the scope of appellate decisions, stating that “[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)); see also Zebbs v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 368 , 378 n.9 (2016) (recognizing that addressing issues that are not necessary to resolve a case “would be to offer an advisory opinion, which we are not empowered to do”).

2019See, e.g., Dietz v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 123, 134 (2017) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). -8- simply not entitled to the same level of protection during what is clearly the sentencing portion of the revocation proceeding.

2018See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 , 799 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2017) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 , 776 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2015))); accord Dietz v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 123, 134 , 804 S.E.2d 309, 315 (2017) (holding that conviction for unlawfully communicating with a child under Code § 18.2-374.3(B) did not require further proof that defendant violated Code § 18.2-370 (taking indecent liberties with a minor), and thus affirming conviction on “narrower lega

2018See Commonwealth v. White , 293 Va. 411 , 419, 799 S.E.2d 494 , 498 (2017) (recognizing that "the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases 'on the best and narrowest grounds available' " (alteration and citation omitted) ); see also Shareholder Representative Servs. v. Airbus Americas, Inc ., 292 Va. 682 , 689, 791 S.E.2d 724 , 727 (2016) (concluding that a dispositive assignment of error obviates any need to address other assignments of error).

2018See Commonwealth v. White , 293 Va. 411 , 419, 799 S.E.2d 494 , 498 (2017) (recognizing that "the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases 'on the best and narrowest grounds available' " (alteration and citation omitted) ); see also Shareholder Representative Servs. v. Airbus Americas, Inc ., 292 Va. 682 , 689, 791 S.E.2d 724 , 727 (2016) (concluding that a dispositive assignment of error obviates any need to address other assignments of error).

2023Thus, we “need not address” Coates’s “abuse-of-discretion argument because we find no merit in his claim of prejudice.” Bolden, 49 Va. App. at 290 ; see also Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4 (2010))).

2021See Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases on the best and narrowest grounds available.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Nunez v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 152, 157 (2016) (emphasizing that “judicial restraint” counsels this Court to assume legal principles without deciding them). -7- When a party argues on appeal that a trial court erred in denying a motion to continue, this Court applies a “two-pronged test” asking whether “the court abused its discretion” and whether the party “was prejudiced by the

2026See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))); see also Theologis v. Weiler, 76 Va. App. 596 , 603 (2023) (explaining that this Court looks to resolve cases on the “fewest grounds”). -9- Under the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968), a police officer who has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous may conduct “a limited search for weapons.” In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

2026Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 289-91 (1921)).

2026See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))); see also Theologis v. Weiler, 76 Va. App. 596 , 603 (2023) (explaining that this Court looks to resolve cases on the “fewest grounds”). -9- Under the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968), a police officer who has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous may conduct “a limited search for weapons.” In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

2025Generally, “[w]here law enforcement officers illegally search private premises or seize property without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the illegally seized evidence will be excluded from evidence [in a criminal prosecution].” Colaw v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 806, 810 (2000).

2025A. Standard of Review “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we ‘consider the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).

2025See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392 , 396 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). - 17 - 290 Va. at 531 , which holds that “a defendant ‘must be present on his arraignment, when any evidence is given or excluded, when the jury is charged, when the trial court wishes to communicate with the jury in answering questions by [it], and when the jury receives further instructions,’” Remington, 262 Va. at 360 (alteration in original) (quoting Palmer v. Com

2025Indeed, where a prospective juror’s bias against the accused remains apparent and unresolved on the record, “however willing the juror might be to trust himself, the law will not trust him.” Breeden, 217 Va. at 298 (citations omitted).13 In light of the totality of his responses throughout the voir dire, this one leading question by the circuit court in an attempt to rehabilitate Juror P. does “not create confidence in this juror’s ability to sit impartially and fairly in judgment on appellant.” Bradbury, 40 Va. App. at 183 (citing Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 773 (1924)).14 13 The Co

2025A. Standard of Review “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we ‘consider the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).

2025See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392 , 396 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). - 17 - 290 Va. at 531 , which holds that “a defendant ‘must be present on his arraignment, when any evidence is given or excluded, when the jury is charged, when the trial court wishes to communicate with the jury in answering questions by [it], and when the jury receives further instructions,’” Remington, 262 Va. at 360 (alteration in original) (quoting Palmer v. Com