stand in his own defense in Pennsylvania

1980See Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461 , 309 A.2d 591 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554 , 307 A.2d 255 (1973).

1980See Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461 , 309 A.2d 591 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554 , 307 A.2d 255 (1973).

2022Therefore, [Clagon] claimed he could not have been involved in the Meikle murder in the early morning hours of March 28th. 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). ... [Clagon] took the stand in his own defense during the trial of his case.

2019Smith took the stand in his own defense, testifying that he never touched the victim, never sent the alleged inappropriate text messages to the victim, and that Detective Brophy took his statement, without first Mirandizing6 Smith, ____________________________________________ 5 Specifically, and quite graphically, the texts stated that Smith “wanna [sic] lick that pussy.” 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -2- J-S24010-19 and told Smith that if he did not sign the statement implicating him in the crimes, the victim and her younger siblings were going to be taken away from their mother

2012In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 [ 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1982) the Court held that when a defendant has been arrested but not yet Mirandized and later takes the stand in his own defense, the Fifth Amendment is not violated when the government cross-examines him concerning his post-arrest silence.

2012In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 [ 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 ] (1982) the Court held that when a defendant has been arrested but not yet Mirandized and later takes the stand in his own defense, the Fifth Amendment is not violated when the government cross-examines him concerning his post-arrest silence.

1996The fact that appellant did not take the stand in his own defense further bolsters his claim that there is a reasonable possibility that this error might have contributed to the verdict. [ Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978)].

1996The fact that appellant did not take the stand in his own defense further bolsters his claim that there is a reasonable possibility that this error might have contributed to the verdict. [ Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978)].

1977For example, the case of Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 274 , 370 A. 2d 298 (1977), where defendant was convicted of third degree murder and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: “Assuming that defendant’s arrest was without probable cause [and his subsequent confession was tainted as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’], we are of the opinion that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Defendant] took the stand in his own defense and his trial testimony reiterated the facts of his confession. . . . ‘This court has consistently held that when a defendant takes the stand and reiterates

1977For example, the case of Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 274 , 370 A. 2d 298 (1977), where defendant was convicted of third degree murder and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: “Assuming that defendant’s arrest was without probable cause [and his subsequent confession was tainted as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’], we are of the opinion that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Defendant] took the stand in his own defense and his trial testimony reiterated the facts of his confession. . . . ‘This court has consistently held that when a defendant takes the stand and reiterates

2024Rather, the defendant in Conner “took the stand in his own defense and, in an attempted display of candor, revealed his past criminal record including the four invalid convictions.” Id. at 83-84 .

2021Absent such evidence, [Appellant] is incapable of establishing the lack of any type of “cooling off” period that is required in order to establish a basis for voluntary manslaughter Busanet, supra, Sanchez, supra. [Appellant’s] claim must therefore fail. *** Contrary to the situation in DiVentura, [Appellant] in the instant case did not take the stand in his own defense and did not assert any facts that would lead this Court to the conclusion that a manslaughter charge would be appropriate.

2019As such, no relief is due on Appellant’s third sufficiency challenge.6 See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303 , 860 A.2d 102 (2004) (finding Farquharson inapplicable where the testimony of the victims regarding “the crucial events” of the crime was consistent and largely corroborated by other evidence). ____________________________________________ 5 Appellant presented no defense witnesses at trial, and he did not take the stand in his own defense. 6 We note that the claims set forth in Appellant’s third sufficiency claim are intertwined with those presented in his weight of the evidence cla

2019As such, no relief is due on Appellant’s third sufficiency challenge.6 See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303 , 860 A.2d 102 (2004) (finding Farquharson inapplicable where the testimony of the victims regarding “the crucial events” of the crime was consistent and largely corroborated by other evidence). ____________________________________________ 5 Appellant presented no defense witnesses at trial, and he did not take the stand in his own defense. 6 We note that the claims set forth in Appellant’s third sufficiency claim are intertwined with those presented in his weight of the evidence cla

2018Counsel stated that she “believe[d] [Appellant was] making a knowing, intelligent, [and] voluntary waiver of his right to take the stand in his own defense.” Id.

2013In a footnote to this sub-claim, Appellant also asserts the following: "Mr. Blanarik also could not (and did not) provide [Appellant] with a candid and informed discussion about his legal options and strategies prior to the murder trial, including the advantages and disadvantages of going to trial compared to negotiating or accepting a plea, and the pros and cons of taking the stand in his own defense.” Id. at 70 n. 29.

2009Id., at 197 , 662 A.2d at 614 ; see also Chmiel, at 507, 738 A.2d at 422 . ¶ 11 Giving great deference to Appellant’s right against self-incrimination, the trial court exercised its discretion wisely to permit the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant’s previous admissions to the psy *150 chiatric expert witnesses only as impeachment evidence if Appellant took the stand in his own defense at his second trial.

2009Id., at 197 , 662 A.2d at 614 ; see also Chmiel, at 507, 738 A.2d at 422 . ¶ 11 Giving great deference to Appellant’s right against self-incrimination, the trial court exercised its discretion wisely to permit the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant’s previous admissions to the psy *150 chiatric expert witnesses only as impeachment evidence if Appellant took the stand in his own defense at his second trial.

2007Id., 476 F.2d at 616 .

2007Id., 476 F.2d at 616 .

1993It is also well settled that a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant’s failure to take the stand in his own defense. 3 Id.

1979Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252 , 299 A.2d 590 (1973); cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 , 93 S.Ct. 2775 , 37 L.Ed.2d 404 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 449 Pa. 45, 295 , A.2d 328 (1972).

1979Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252 , 299 A.2d 590 (1973); cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 , 93 S.Ct. 2775 , 37 L.Ed.2d 404 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 449 Pa. 45, 295 , A.2d 328 (1972).