stand in his own defense in New York

2009At trial, the defendant took the stand in his own defense, and the People asked him about prior convictions for marijuana possession, assault, and battery, pursuant to a pretrial Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]).

2000(People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974].) The People sought to question the defendant for impeachment purposes, should he choose to take the stand in his own defense, regarding his prior convictions, which included a prior felony conviction in Federal court.

1986Accordingly, its ruling will not be disturbed (see, People v Williams, 56 NY2d 236 ; People v Rahman, 46 NY2d 882 ).

1981Nor can such error be considered harmless, where its effect was to cause the defendant to refrain from taking the stand in his own defense, and he was the only source of his defense (cf. People v Rahman, 46 NY2d 882 ).

2018As an ordinary defense, alibi must be disproved by the People beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v Victor , 62 NY2d 374, 378 [1984]), and where, as here, a defendant "takes the stand in his own defense and testifies that he was elsewhere at the time the [*3] crime was committed, the testimony is legally sufficient to raise an alibi defense, and the defendant is entitled to an alibi charge upon his request" ( People v Brown , 30 AD3d 609 , 610 [2006], citing People v Warren , 76 NY2d 773, 775 [1990]).

2018However, as a general rule, a court, sitting as the trier of fact, is presumed, "by reasons of . . . learning, experience and judicial discipline, [to be] uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and of making an objective determination based upon appropriate legal criteria" ( People v Moreno, 70 NY2d at 406 ).

2017In fact, the clear import of his affidavit is that trial counsel prevailed upon him to drop the idea of taking the stand in his own defense — which, as previously noted, would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Carpenter, 52 AD3d at 729 ). 3 While defendant alleges that his attorney said that he would “leave the case” if defendant insisted on testifying, I am not aware of any authority holding that a lawyer acts improperly by advising the client that the lawyer will seek leave to withdraw if the client insists upon pursuing a course that the lawyer believes to be se

2017In fact, the clear import of his affidavit is that trial counsel prevailed upon him to drop the idea of taking the stand in his own defense — which, as previously noted, would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel ( see People v Carpenter , 52 AD3d at 729 ) [FN4] .

2015We disagree and *1136 determine that the court soundly exercised its discretion in fashioning an order that would provide the People with opportunities to challenge defendant’s veracity and demonstrate his willingness to place his own interests above those of society, while minimizing any undue risk of prejudice (see People v Olson, 110 AD3d 1373 , 1375-1376 [2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1023 [2014]; People v Kirton, 36 AD3d 1011, 1013 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 947 [2007]; People v Hunter, 273 AD2d 500, 502 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 935 [2000]).

2013Defendant nevertheless denied having attacked the victim, testifying that he never laid a hand on her. -2- 172 KA 11-02614 Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 ).

2006Where, as here, the defendant takes the stand in his own defense and testifies that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed, the testimony is legally sufficient to raise an alibi defense, and the defendant is entitled to an alibi charge upon his request (see People v Warren, 76 NY2d 773, 775 [1990]; People v Edwards, 3 AD3d 504 [2004]).

2002Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the People and indulging in all reasonable inferences in their favor, we find a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury, namely, that defendant, as a principal and/or as Buckley’s accomplice, intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim and that death resulted (see id.; see also People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 ; People v Schermerhorn, 125 AD2d 729 , lv denied 69 NY2d 955 ).

2000In Loper v Beto ( 405 US 473 [1972]), upon taking the stand in his own defense, the defendant’s general credibility was impeached with his prior convictions.

2000Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Thompson, 72 NY2d 410, 413 ) and considering “whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial * * * and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime [s] charged” (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [citation omitted]), we are satisfied that the element of forcible compulsion was satisfied.

1990Testimony elicited in rebuttal must be relevant to the character trait put in issue by the defendant (People v Fay, 270 App Div 261 , affd 296 NY 510 , affd 332 US 261 ; Fisch, Evidence § 178, at 104 [2d ed 1977]).

1990By taking the stand in his own defense and by introducing evidence of his reputation for truth and veracity, a defendant does not place his general character in issue (People v Hinksman, 192 NY 421, 432-436 ).

1990Testimony elicited in rebuttal must be relevant to the character trait put in issue by the defendant (People v Fay, 270 App Div 261 , affd 296 NY 510 , affd 332 US 261 ; Fisch, Evidence § 178, at 104 [2d ed 1977]).

1990Testimony elicited in rebuttal must be relevant to the character trait put in issue by the defendant (People v Fay, 270 App Div 261 , affd 296 NY 510 , affd 332 US 261 ; Fisch, Evidence § 178, at 104 [2d ed 1977]).

1990The prosecutor properly directed the jury’s attention to the critical issues of credibility, suggested how to evaluate the divergent testimonies of the respective witnesses, and challenged defendant’s credibility, never exceeding the bounds of rhetorical comment permitted by People v Galloway ( 54 NY2d 396 ).

1986There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court failed to balance the probative value of permitting the defendant to be cross-examined concerning a prior manslaughter conviction if he chose to take the stand in his own defense against its prejudicial effect (see, People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 ).

1986Accordingly, its ruling will not be disturbed (see, People v Williams, 56 NY2d 236 ; People v Rahman, 46 NY2d 882 ).

1984The importance of defendant’s testimony far outweighs the value of the auto theft convictions in impeaching defendant’s credibility (see People v Johnson, supra).

1984In any event, the prosecutor in this case was permitted to examine defendant about the underlying facts and circumstances of his reckless endangerment conviction on the issue of credibility when he took the stand in his own defense (People v Cook, 37 NY2d 591 ).

1982Contrary to defendant’s contention, a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense fully .waives his rights against self incrimination (People v Tice, 131 NY 651 ; People v Moore, 42 AD2d 268 ).

1982Under these circumstances, the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to proclaim his innocence or outrage was thus permissible (see People v Trybus, 219 NY 18,24 ).

1982Contrary to defendant’s contention, a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense fully .waives his rights against self incrimination (People v Tice, 131 NY 651 ; People v Moore, 42 AD2d 268 ).