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5 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Bieleygreen2 sentences2011In that regard, it has been observed that “by effectively nullifying the will to the extent required to give the child his intestate share, the statute stands as a striking exception to the law’s strong disposition to avoid intestacy whenever possible” (Matter of Wilkins, 180 Misc 2d 568, 571 [1999]; see Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d 520, 525 [1998] [referring to well-estáblished axiom of testamentary construction that the testator is presumed to have intended to dispose of the whole estate by will, and did not intend intestacy as to any part of it]). 1999It is also observed that, by effectively nullifying the will to the extent required to give the child his intestate share, the statute stands as a striking exception to the law’s strong disposition to avoid intestacy whenever possible (see, e.g., Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d 520, 525 ; Matter of Dammann, 12 NY2d 500, 504-505 ; Schult v Moll, 132 NY 122, 125 ) and as such is a telling expression of this State’s public policy in this regard. | 1 | 2 |
In re the Estate of Wilkinsgreen1 sentence2011In that regard, it has been observed that “by effectively nullifying the will to the extent required to give the child his intestate share, the statute stands as a striking exception to the law’s strong disposition to avoid intestacy whenever possible” (Matter of Wilkins, 180 Misc 2d 568, 571 [1999]; see Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d 520, 525 [1998] [referring to well-estáblished axiom of testamentary construction that the testator is presumed to have intended to dispose of the whole estate by will, and did not intend intestacy as to any part of it]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schult v. . Moll
green
1 sentence1999It is also observed that, by effectively nullifying the will to the extent required to give the child his intestate share, the statute stands as a striking exception to the law’s strong disposition to avoid intestacy whenever possible (see, e.g., Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d 520, 525 ; Matter of Dammann, 12 NY2d 500, 504-505 ; Schult v Moll, 132 NY 122, 125 ) and as such is a telling expression of this State’s public policy in this regard. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In re the Estate of Dammann
green
1 sentence1999It is also observed that, by effectively nullifying the will to the extent required to give the child his intestate share, the statute stands as a striking exception to the law’s strong disposition to avoid intestacy whenever possible (see, e.g., Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d 520, 525 ; Matter of Dammann, 12 NY2d 500, 504-505 ; Schult v Moll, 132 NY 122, 125 ) and as such is a telling expression of this State’s public policy in this regard. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Torres v. Southside Hospital
green
1 sentence1987It should be noted that the striking of this defense does not constitute a ruling on the merits, but is rather a procedural direction that the claim that a complaint fails to state a cause of action may not be interposed in an answer (see, Torres v Southside Hosp., supra; see also, Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:38, at 13 [1987 Supp Pamph]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Karpas v. Bandler
green
1 sentence1965However, since the facts with respect to plaintiff’s awareness of the arrangement and whether it acted in good faith are clearly not within the knowledge of the defendant, summary judgment or the striking of a defense may not be granted (Karpas v. Bandler, 218 App. Div. 418 ; Verity v. Peoples State Bank of Baldwin, 1 A D 2d 833; Be France v. Oestrike, 8 A D 2d 735; Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 180 Misc. 624 , affd. 267 App. Div. 812 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1965However, since the facts with respect to plaintiff’s awareness of the arrangement and whether it acted in good faith are clearly not within the knowledge of the defendant, summary judgment or the striking of a defense may not be granted (Karpas v. Bandler, 218 App. Div. 418 ; Verity v. Peoples State Bank of Baldwin, 1 A D 2d 833; Be France v. Oestrike, 8 A D 2d 735; Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 180 Misc. 624 , affd. 267 App. Div. 812 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1965However, since the facts with respect to plaintiff’s awareness of the arrangement and whether it acted in good faith are clearly not within the knowledge of the defendant, summary judgment or the striking of a defense may not be granted (Karpas v. Bandler, 218 App. Div. 418 ; Verity v. Peoples State Bank of Baldwin, 1 A D 2d 833; Be France v. Oestrike, 8 A D 2d 735; Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 180 Misc. 624 , affd. 267 App. Div. 812 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Deyo v. . Morss
neutral
1 sentence1957Furthermore, leave to amend may be obtained not only as part of the order of dismissal but also upon an application after the dismissal of the cause of action or the striking of a defense (Deyo v. Morss, 144 N. Y. 216 ). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Gillette v. Allen
green
1 sentence1957By permitting the amended answer to remain at present, the defenses as alleged are not passed upon as to form or substance (Gillette v. Allen, 269 App. Div. 441 ; Lazarus v. Rice, 268 App. Div. 985 , motion for leave to appeal denied 269 App. Div. 684 ). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Lazarus v. Rice
neutral
1 sentence1957By permitting the amended answer to remain at present, the defenses as alleged are not passed upon as to form or substance (Gillette v. Allen, 269 App. Div. 441 ; Lazarus v. Rice, 268 App. Div. 985 , motion for leave to appeal denied 269 App. Div. 684 ). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Lazarus v. Rice
neutral
1 sentence1957By permitting the amended answer to remain at present, the defenses as alleged are not passed upon as to form or substance (Gillette v. Allen, 269 App. Div. 441 ; Lazarus v. Rice, 268 App. Div. 985 , motion for leave to appeal denied 269 App. Div. 684 ). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.