public use clause in Ohio

2023Chapter 163, even though “economic factors may be considered in determining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that the appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the government and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” Norwood, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2008Norwood v. Homey , 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 , ¶ 80. {¶ 101} In Houck , landowners brought an action against the county park district to quiet title based on adverse possession of abandoned railroad property.

2023Nevertheless, the Revised Code defines “public use.” “R.C. 163.01(H)(1) first defines ‘public use’ by negation”—that is, the Revised Code defines that “a ‘[p]ublic use’ does not include any taking that is for conveyance to a private commercial enterprise, for economic development, or solely for the purpose of increasing public revenue, unless the property is conveyed or leased to” “[a] public utility, municipal power agency, or common carrier.” Ohio History Connection, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4345, at ¶ 43 ; R.C. 163.01(H)(1)(a).

2023Lake No. 2003-L-145, 2005-Ohio-4046, ¶ 28 , quoting State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 (1968). {¶116} Based on our conclusion that the prior public use doctrine applies to the facts and circumstances of this case (and our decision to remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether Columbia Gas’s proposed easement will destroy -61- Case No. 14-22-13 and 14-22-14 the existing public use of the protected property), Hornschemeier’s testimony is relevant to whether Columbia Gas’s proposed easement will destroy the existing public use of the protected property.

2015See Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 178, 181 , 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); South-Western City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Kinney, 24 Ohio St.3d 184, 187 , 494 N.E.2d 1109 (1986). {¶ 31} The exemption allowed by R.C. 3313.44 depends upon stated conditions; compliance with R.C. 3313.17 is not one of those conditions.

2015See Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 178, 181 , 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); South-Western City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Kinney, 24 Ohio St.3d 184, 187 , 494 N.E.2d 1109 (1986). {¶ 31} The exemption allowed by R.C. 3313.44 depends upon stated conditions; compliance with R.C. 3313.17 is not one of those conditions.

2006(Fla.1975), 315 So.2d 451, 456-458 (holding that the economic benefit that would come from an appropriation of land for a parking garage and a shopping mall did not satisfy the public-use requirement despite potential economic benefits and holding that any public benefit from construction of the garage was incidental and insufficient to justify the use of eminent domain); Little Rock v. Raines (1967), 241 Ark. 1071, 1083-1084 , 411 S.W.2d 486 (holding that a proposed taking for an industrial park did not satisfy the public-use clause); Opinion of the Justices (1957), 152 Me. 440, 447 , 131 A.2

2006(Fla.1975), 315 So.2d 451, 456-458 (holding that the economic benefit that would come from an appropriation of land for a parking garage and a shopping mall did not satisfy the public-use requirement despite potential economic benefits and holding that any public benefit from construction of the garage was incidental and insufficient to justify the use of eminent domain); Little Rock v. Raines (1967), 241 Ark. 1071, 1083-1084 , 411 S.W.2d 486 (holding that a proposed taking for an industrial park did not satisfy the public-use clause); Opinion of the Justices (1957), 152 Me. 440, 447 , 131 A.2

2006Such a law would be a flagrant abuse of legislative power, see Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 388, 1 L.Ed. 648 , and to give deference to it would be a wholesale abdication of judicial review.

2006Such a law would be a flagrant abuse of legislative power, see Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 388, 1 L.Ed. 648 , and to give deference to it would be a wholesale abdication of judicial review.

2006Kelo confirmed this view for purposes of federal constitutional analysis, id., 545 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 , despite the fact that many legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of the eminent-domain power in such circumstances, see Kelo v. New London (2004), 268 Conn. 1, 132-133 , 843 A.2d 500 . {¶ 61} Inherent in many decisions affirming pronouncements that economic development alone is sufficient to satisfy the public-use clause is an artificial judicial deference to the state’s determination that there was sufficient public use.

2006Kelo confirmed this view for purposes of federal constitutional analysis, id., 545 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 , despite the fact that many legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of the eminent-domain power in such circumstances, see Kelo v. New London (2004), 268 Conn. 1, 132-133 , 843 A.2d 500 . {¶ 61} Inherent in many decisions affirming pronouncements that economic development alone is sufficient to satisfy the public-use clause is an artificial judicial deference to the state’s determination that there was sufficient public use.

2006Kelo confirmed this view for purposes of federal constitutional analysis, id., 545 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 , despite the fact that many legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of the eminent-domain power in such circumstances, see Kelo v. New London (2004), 268 Conn. 1, 132-133 , 843 A.2d 500 . {¶ 61} Inherent in many decisions affirming pronouncements that economic development alone is sufficient to satisfy the public-use clause is an artificial judicial deference to the state’s determination that there was sufficient public use.

2006In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the appellate court engaged in a limited independent analysis, noting that “[w]here the exercise of eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the United States Supreme Court has never held a compensated taking to be prohibited by the public-use clause.” 161 Ohio App.3d 316 , 2005-Ohio-2448 , 830 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 43 , citing Hawaii Hous.

2006In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the appellate court engaged in a limited independent analysis, noting that “[w]here the exercise of eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the United States Supreme Court has never held a compensated taking to be prohibited by the public-use clause.” 161 Ohio App.3d 316 , 2005-Ohio-2448 , 830 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 43 , citing Hawaii Hous.

2006Kelo confirmed this view for purposes of federal constitutional analysis, id., 545 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 , despite the fact that many legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of the eminent-domain power in such circumstances, see Kelo v. New London (2004), 268 Conn. 1, 132-133 , 843 A.2d 500 . {¶ 61} Inherent in many decisions affirming pronouncements that economic development alone is sufficient to satisfy the public-use clause is an artificial judicial deference to the state’s determination that there was sufficient public use.

2006Kelo confirmed this view for purposes of federal constitutional analysis, id., 545 U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 , despite the fact that many legal commentators have expressed alarm at the potential abuse of the eminent-domain power in such circumstances, see Kelo v. New London (2004), 268 Conn. 1, 132-133 , 843 A.2d 500 . {¶ 61} Inherent in many decisions affirming pronouncements that economic development alone is sufficient to satisfy the public-use clause is an artificial judicial deference to the state’s determination that there was sufficient public use.

2006Bruestle v. Rich (1953), 159 Ohio St. 13 , 50 O.O. 6 , 110 N.E.2d 778 , and suggested that the taking is proper even when the city transfers the appropriated property to a private party for redevelopment, AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157 , 553 N.E.2d 597 , we have never been asked whether a city may appropriate property that the city determines is in an area that may deteriorate in the future. {¶ 9} We hoM that although economic factors may be considered in determining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that the a

2006Bruestle v. Rich (1953), 159 Ohio St. 13 , 50 O.O. 6 , 110 N.E.2d 778 , and suggested that the taking is proper even when the city transfers the appropriated property to a private party for redevelopment, AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157 , 553 N.E.2d 597 , we have never been asked whether a city may appropriate property that the city determines is in an area that may deteriorate in the future. {¶ 9} We hoM that although economic factors may be considered in determining whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that the a

2006Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 , 104 S.Ct. 2321 , 81 L.Ed.2d 186 . {¶ 65} In addressing the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s Constitution, we are not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution, Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 479-480 , 684 N.W.2d 765 , and we decline to hold that the Takings Clause in Ohio’s Constitution has the sweeping breadth that the Supreme Court attributed to the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause in Midkijf, which presented a novel use of eminent-domain law.

2006Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 , 104 S.Ct. 2321 , 81 L.Ed.2d 186 . {¶ 65} In addressing the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s Constitution, we are not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution, Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 479-480 , 684 N.W.2d 765 , and we decline to hold that the Takings Clause in Ohio’s Constitution has the sweeping breadth that the Supreme Court attributed to the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause in Midkijf, which presented a novel use of eminent-domain law.

2006Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 , 104 S.Ct. 2321 , 81 L.Ed.2d 186 . {¶ 65} In addressing the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s Constitution, we are not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution, Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 479-480 , 684 N.W.2d 765 , and we decline to hold that the Takings Clause in Ohio’s Constitution has the sweeping breadth that the Supreme Court attributed to the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause in Midkijf, which presented a novel use of eminent-domain law.

2006Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 , 104 S.Ct. 2321 , 81 L.Ed.2d 186 . {¶ 65} In addressing the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s Constitution, we are not bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal Constitution, Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 479-480 , 684 N.W.2d 765 , and we decline to hold that the Takings Clause in Ohio’s Constitution has the sweeping breadth that the Supreme Court attributed to the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause in Midkijf, which presented a novel use of eminent-domain law.

2006(Fla.1975), 315 So.2d 451, 456-458 (holding that the economic benefit that would come from an appropriation of land for a parking garage and a shopping mall did not satisfy the public-use requirement despite potential economic benefits and holding that any public benefit from construction of the garage was incidental and insufficient to justify the use of eminent domain); Little Rock v. Raines (1967), 241 Ark. 1071, 1083-1084 , 411 S.W.2d 486 (holding that a proposed taking for an industrial park did not satisfy the public-use clause); Opinion of the Justices (1957), 152 Me. 440, 447 , 131 A.2

2006(Fla.1975), 315 So.2d 451, 456-458 (holding that the economic benefit that would come from an appropriation of land for a parking garage and a shopping mall did not satisfy the public-use requirement despite potential economic benefits and holding that any public benefit from construction of the garage was incidental and insufficient to justify the use of eminent domain); Little Rock v. Raines (1967), 241 Ark. 1071, 1083-1084 , 411 S.W.2d 486 (holding that a proposed taking for an industrial park did not satisfy the public-use clause); Opinion of the Justices (1957), 152 Me. 440, 447 , 131 A.2

2006Poletovm had found a generalized economic benefit in the transfer of private property to a private entity sufficient to satisfy the public-use requirement. 410 Mich, at 634 , 304 N.W.2d 455 .

2006Poletovm had found a generalized economic benefit in the transfer of private property to a private entity sufficient to satisfy the public-use requirement. 410 Mich, at 634 , 304 N.W.2d 455 .

2003(Emphasis added.) Britt v. Columbus (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 1 , 67 O.O.2d 1 , 309 N.E.2d 412 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 13} Worthington thus correctly argues that Blue Ash is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.

2003(Emphasis added.) Britt v. Columbus (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 1 , 67 O.O.2d 1 , 309 N.E.2d 412 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 13} Worthington thus correctly argues that Blue Ash is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.

2003Regional Water & Sewer Dist. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 92 , 711 N.E.2d 1003 .

2003Regional Water & Sewer Dist. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 92 , 711 N.E.2d 1003 .

2003Co. (1998), 124 N.M. 640 , 954 P.2d 72 ; Naiman, Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property: The Paramount Public Use Doctrine (1990), 17 B.C.EnvtLAffairs L.Rev. 893, 896; Arena, The Accommodation of “Occupation” and “Social Utility” in Prior Public Use Jurisprudence (1988), 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 233. {¶ 11} Worthington asserts that the constitutional status of home rule precludes application of the prior public use doctrine to preclude it from taking property within its boundaries through eminent domain.

2003Co. (1998), 124 N.M. 640 , 954 P.2d 72 ; Naiman, Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property: The Paramount Public Use Doctrine (1990), 17 B.C.EnvtLAffairs L.Rev. 893, 896; Arena, The Accommodation of “Occupation” and “Social Utility” in Prior Public Use Jurisprudence (1988), 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 233. {¶ 11} Worthington asserts that the constitutional status of home rule precludes application of the prior public use doctrine to preclude it from taking property within its boundaries through eminent domain.