public use requirement in Texas

2016See, e.g., City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 808 .

2016See, e.g., City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 808 .

2002See Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 707 S.W.2d at 284 .

2002See Tarrant Appraisal Dist . , 707 S.W.2d at 284 .

2024As our Supreme Court has stated, “these provisions require the municipality to demonstrate: (1) it intends to put the property to public use (the public use requirement); and (2) the condemnation is necessary to advance or achieve that public use (the necessity requirement).” City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766 , 772–73 (Tex. 2012).

2014Gov’t Code Ann. § 251.001(a) (West 2013) (setting forth requirements for exercise of eminent domain by municipality); Whittington, 384 S.W.3d at 772 (recognizing the public use requirement and the necessity requirement legislatively imposed on municipalities via local government code section 251.001).

2016See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 , 1130–31 (C.D.

2016See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1130-31 (C.D.Cal. 2001). .

2015I also find the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London30 factually and legally distinguishable.31 In Kelo, a city authorized a private nonprofit entity to condemn property as part of an economic revitalization plan.32 The city claimed and the Court accepted that the public-use requirement was met because the plan would enhance the overall 28 Gragg, 151 S.W .3d at 550. 29 399 S.W .3d 532, 537 (Tex. 2013). 30 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 31 Kelo was a federal takings case, but we have recognized that federal and Texas takings jurisprudence are generally consistent.

2015I also find the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London30 factually and legally distinguishable.31 In Kelo, a city authorized a private nonprofit entity to condemn property as part of an economic revitalization plan.32 The city claimed and the Court accepted that the public-use requirement was met because the plan would enhance the overall 28 Gragg, 151 S.W .3d at 550. 29 399 S.W .3d 532, 537 (Tex. 2013). 30 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 31 Kelo was a federal takings case, but we have recognized that federal and Texas takings jurisprudence are generally consistent.

2006The public use requirement was addressed by the supreme court in Davis v. City of Lubbock , 326 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1959), which involved constitutional challenges to a statute allowing use of the power of eminent domain for urban renewal.

2004The public use requirement was addressed by the supreme court in Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38 , 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959), which involved constitutional challenges to a statute allowing use of the power of eminent domain for urban renewal.

2022I, § 17(a)–(b) (“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . . ‘[P]ublic use’ does not include the taking of property . . . for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.”); see also Tex. Rice I, 363 S.W.3d at 194-95 (noting that the Texas Constitution’s public-use requirement safeguards private property rights). 2 across the property as evidence of the value of the easement that the pipeline company seeks to condemn.

2021Permian further asserted that it had “adequately” produced documentation to 3 See Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline–Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012) (articulating a “common carrier” test to determine the public use of a pipeline under the Texas Natural Resources Code whereby “a reasonable probability must exist that the pipeline will at some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to parties other than the carrier”). 4 show its compliance with the public use

2015See Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 820–21; 13 See also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex. 2005) (“The missing piece in the evidence here is proof that the City knew the plans it approved were substantially certain to increase flooding on the Wilsons’ properties.

2012See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 , 820–21 (Tex. 2009); Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 . “[A] compensable taking occurs ‘only if property is damaged or -7- 04-12-00284-CV appropriated for or applied to public use.’” Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 554–55).

2000West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. at 978 (cited with approval in Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d at 83 ) Anderson, 985 S.W.2d at 565 ; Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co., 653 S.W.2d at 474 . “[W]here the Legislature declares a particular use to be a public use the presumption is in favor of this declaration, and will be binding upon the courts unless such use is clearly and palpably of a private character.” West, 238 S.W. at 978 .

2000“It is equally well settled that the question of whether the use for which private property is taken is a public use is a judicial question, to be determined in the courts, although where the Legislature declares a particular use to be a public use the presumption is in favor of this declaration, and will be binding upon the courts unless such use is clearly and palpably of a private character.” West, 238 S.W. at 978 .

2026B Chapter 21, Subchapter A provides that a district court may decide “all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages,” in a suit involving a claim for property “occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority”: A district court may determine all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages, in any suit: (1) in which this state, a political subdivision of this state, a person, an association of persons, or a corporation is a party; and (2) that involves a claim for property or for damages to property oc

2026Post at 18–20 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing City of San Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 434 (1897)).

2026It expressly authorized district courts to “determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase.”53 The State and the dissent reduce this to jurisdictional language.54 However, the authorization to “determine all issues” does not only appear in the jurisdictional 49 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023). 50 Id. at 187. 51 We have not been asked to determine whether the public-use requirement is self-executing.

2026It expressly authorized district courts to “determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase.”53 The State and the dissent reduce this to jurisdictional language.54 However, the authorization to “determine all issues” does not only appear in the jurisdictional 49 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023). 50 Id. at 187. 51 We have not been asked to determine whether the public-use requirement is self-executing.

2013See Satterlee, 576 S.W.2d at 779 .

2012See Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. 2004); TEX .

2007See K Seafood Co. v. City ofFreeport, 346 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898 (S.D.

2000See Hays County Appraisal Dist ., 973 S.W.2d at 423 .