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6 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
President of Middlebury College v. Central Power Corp.green2 sentences2017See, e.g., President & Fellows of Middlebury Coll. , 101 Vt. at 336 , 143 A. at 388 ("[I]t is the well-settled law of this State that property already appropriated to a public use cannot be taken for another public use without legislative authority, either express or implied."). 2017See, e.g., President & Fellows of Middlebury Coll. , 101 Vt. at 336 , 143 A. at 388 ("[I]t is the well-settled law of this State that property already appropriated to a public use cannot be taken for another public use without legislative authority, either express or implied."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Olivergreen2 sentences2017Therefore, because we must consider the common law that was in effect when the Legislature passed the statute, State v. Oliver , 151 Vt. 626 , 627, 563 A.2d 1002 , 1003 (1989), intervenors argue that § 110 effectively codified this Court's early articulation of the doctrine, which did not contain the material-impairment limitation that the Board applied. 2017Therefore, because we must consider the common law that was in effect when the Legislature passed the statute, State v. Oliver , 151 Vt. 626 , 627, 563 A.2d 1002 , 1003 (1989), intervenors argue that § 110 effectively codified this Court's early articulation of the doctrine, which did not contain the material-impairment limitation that the Board applied. | 2 | 2 |
Langle v. Kurkulgreen1 sentence2016“The common law is changed by statute only if the statute overturns the common law in clear and unambiguous language, or if the statute is clearly inconsistent with the common law, or the statute attempts to cover the entire subject matter.” Villeneuve v. Powers, 158 Vt. 330, 332 (1992) (quoting Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 516 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. LaClairgreen1 sentence2016See Int’l Water Co., 161 Vt. at 585; City of Montpelier, 143 Vt. at 293 ; Swanton Village, 131 Vt. at 322 ; 18 Taxpayer claims that Swanton recognizes only that “municipally owned property is de facto devoted to a public use,” and that the City’s argument “fails as a matter of grammar.” Burlington’s Mot. for Partial Summ. | 1 | 1 |
Stiles v. Village of Newportgreen2 sentences2016Thus, it appears the extra comma was added inadvertently years later in Swanton. 23 In re Estate of Taft, 110 Vt. 266, 273 (1939); In re Downer’s Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 174 (1928); Styles, 76 Vt. 154 (1904). 2016See Styles, 76 Vt. at 163–64. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Downer's Estategreen2 sentences2016One of the earlier cases cited in Swanton states the same public use principle, but without the comma: “[I]t is not the policy of the state to subject its own property, nor that of its municipalities which is devoted to a public use, to a general property tax.” In re Downer’s Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 174 (1928). 2016Thus, it appears the extra comma was added inadvertently years later in Swanton. 23 In re Estate of Taft, 110 Vt. 266, 273 (1939); In re Downer’s Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 174 (1928); Styles, 76 Vt. 154 (1904). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Taftgreen1 sentence2016Thus, it appears the extra comma was added inadvertently years later in Swanton. 23 In re Estate of Taft, 110 Vt. 266, 273 (1939); In re Downer’s Estate, 101 Vt. 167, 174 (1928); Styles, 76 Vt. 154 (1904). | 1 | 1 |
Villeneuve v. Powersgreen1 sentence2016“The common law is changed by statute only if the statute overturns the common law in clear and unambiguous language, or if the statute is clearly inconsistent with the common law, or the statute attempts to cover the entire subject matter.” Villeneuve v. Powers, 158 Vt. 330, 332 (1992) (quoting Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 516 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Norwegian Township v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment Appealsgreen1 sentence2016See Norwegian Twp., 74 A.3d at 1129–31; Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 585 Pa. at 669 ; Deromedi, 45 P.3d at 1153–54; Cheyenne, 484 P.2d at 709 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Wilmington ex rel. Water Department v. Lord
neutral
2 sentences2017Id. at 409 . 2017Id. at 409 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 166 . 2017Id. at 166 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Dunn
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 151 , 112 A. at 226-27 ; see also President & Fellows of Middlebury Coll. v. Cent. 2017Id. at 151 , 112 A. at 226-27 ; see also President & Fellows of Middlebury Coll. v. Cent. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield
green
2 sentences2013We express no opinion on that question, which is not before us. [9] It could be argued that the public-use requirement has equally little application to certain non-profit organizations dedicated to charitable uses that benefit discrete segments of the public, but that issue is not before us, and we therefore express no view on the matter. [10] The trial court here, as noted earlier, found no evidence to suggest “that the doors of the church were not open to anyone who wished to attend,” and thus in essence applied to the church a presumption that it benefited an “indefinite class.” Although w 2013We express no opinion on that question, which is not before us. [9] It could be argued that the public-use requirement has equally little application to certain non-profit organizations dedicated to charitable uses that benefit discrete segments of the public, but that issue is not before us, and we therefore express no view on the matter. [10] The trial court here, as noted earlier, found no evidence to suggest “that the doors of the church were not open to anyone who wished to attend,” and thus in essence applied to the church a presumption that it benefited an “indefinite class.” Although w | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Swanton Village v. Town of Highgate
green
1 sentence2016See Int’l Water Co., 161 Vt. at 585; City of Montpelier, 143 Vt. at 293 ; Swanton Village, 131 Vt. at 322 ; 18 Taxpayer claims that Swanton recognizes only that “municipally owned property is de facto devoted to a public use,” and that the City’s argument “fails as a matter of grammar.” Burlington’s Mot. for Partial Summ. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Little Rock v. McIntosh
green
1 sentence2016For instance, City of Little Rock v. McIntosh, 319 Ark. 423 (1995) dealt with Ark. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Cheyenne v. Board of County Commissioners
green
1 sentence2016See Norwegian Twp., 74 A.3d at 1129–31; Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 585 Pa. at 669 ; Deromedi, 45 P.3d at 1153–54; Cheyenne, 484 P.2d at 709 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells
green
2 sentences2016While 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) contains an explicit and total public use exemption under the default taxation scheme, and the predecessor to that statute dates back to the 1780s, see 24 MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 2003 VT 70, ¶ 12 , 175 Vt. 382 , the court deems that of limited relevance in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent recognition of the public use requirement as a general principle in 1904. 2016While 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4) contains an explicit and total public use exemption under the default taxation scheme, and the predecessor to that statute dates back to the 1780s, see 24 MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 2003 VT 70, ¶ 12 , 175 Vt. 382 , the court deems that of limited relevance in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent recognition of the public use requirement as a general principle in 1904. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
AIG Insurance Management Services, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes
neutral
1 sentence2016Cf. AIG, 2015 VT 137 , ¶ 18 n.2. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v. Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals
green
1 sentence2016See Norwegian Twp., 74 A.3d at 1129–31; Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 585 Pa. at 669 ; Deromedi, 45 P.3d at 1153–54; Cheyenne, 484 P.2d at 709 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Deromedi
green
1 sentence2016See Norwegian Twp., 74 A.3d at 1129–31; Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 585 Pa. at 669 ; Deromedi, 45 P.3d at 1153–54; Cheyenne, 484 P.2d at 709 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Montpelier v. Town of Berlin
green
1 sentence2016See Int’l Water Co., 161 Vt. at 585; City of Montpelier, 143 Vt. at 293 ; Swanton Village, 131 Vt. at 322 ; 18 Taxpayer claims that Swanton recognizes only that “municipally owned property is de facto devoted to a public use,” and that the City’s argument “fails as a matter of grammar.” Burlington’s Mot. for Partial Summ. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Jolley Associates
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.