public use requirement in New Jersey

2013Moreover, as we explained, if the prior public use doctrine does not apply, “no comparative evaluation of two public uses, one existing and one proposed, need be undertaken in order to determine which should prevail as the paramount use.” Id. at 273 , 225 A.2d 130 .

2013Moreover, as we explained, if the prior public use doctrine does not apply, “no comparative evaluation of two public uses, one existing and one proposed, need be undertaken in order to determine which should prevail as the paramount use.” Id. at 273 , 225 A.2d 130 .

2013In order to create certainty, this Court crafted the prior public use doctrine, which operates to “den[y] exercise of the power of condemnation where the proposed use will destroy an existing public use or prevent a proposed public use unless the authority to do so has been expressly given by the Legislature or must necessarily be implied.” Ibid.

2012That doctrine precludes the “exercise of the power of condemnation where the proposed use will destroy an existing public use or prevent a proposed public use unless the authority to do so has been expressly given by the Legislature or must necessarily be implied.” Id. at 579 , 120 A.2d 593 .

2013Both because, at the time the railroad sought to take the property, it was not zoned for use as a parking facility, and because the subsequent rezoning of the property provided “no evidence indicating that any State or local entity was willing to enter into an agreement with Intermodal to develop the property as a commuter parking lot[,]” id. at 118-19 , 35 A.3d 726 , the Appellate Division agreed that Intermodal could not invoke the prior public use doctrine.

2013Both because, at the time the railroad sought to take the property, it was not zoned for use as a parking facility, and because the subsequent rezoning of the property provided “no evidence indicating that any State or local entity was willing to enter into an agreement with Intermodal to develop the property as a commuter parking lot[,]” id. at 118-19 , 35 A.3d 726 , the Appellate Division agreed that Intermodal could not invoke the prior public use doctrine.

2008It relies on the language and grammatical construction of the statute, which states: “[T]he property of the State of New Jersey; and the property of the respective counties, school districts and taxing districts used for public purposes ... shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter.” Rutgers argues that the semi-colon after “State of New Jersey” suggests that the public use requirement does not apply to state property, but only to counties, school districts and taxing districts, citing State v. Eatontown Bor., 366 N.J.Super. 626 , 841 A.2d 990 (App.Div.2004).

2008It relies on the language and grammatical construction of the statute, which states: “[T]he property of the State of New Jersey; and the property of the respective counties, school districts and taxing districts used for public purposes ... shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter.” Rutgers argues that the semi-colon after “State of New Jersey” suggests that the public use requirement does not apply to state property, but only to counties, school districts and taxing districts, citing State v. Eatontown Bor., 366 N.J.Super. 626 , 841 A.2d 990 (App.Div.2004).

2008See, e.g., Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A. 2d 160, 169 (D.C.2007) (allowing a condemnee to plead claims that the government's asserted public use for his property was pretextual, noting Kelo's admonition that government may not "`take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit'") (quoting Kelo, supra, 545 U.S. at 478 , 125 S.Ct. at 2661 , 162 L.Ed. 2d at 450 ); Mayor of Baltimore v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222 , 916 A. 2d 324, 334 (2007) (rejecting a city's exercise of "quick take" condemnation powers for redevel

2008See, e.g., Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A. 2d 160, 169 (D.C.2007) (allowing a condemnee to plead claims that the government's asserted public use for his property was pretextual, noting Kelo's admonition that government may not "`take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit'") (quoting Kelo, supra, 545 U.S. at 478 , 125 S.Ct. at 2661 , 162 L.Ed. 2d at 450 ); Mayor of Baltimore v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222 , 916 A. 2d 324, 334 (2007) (rejecting a city's exercise of "quick take" condemnation powers for redevel

2002The public use doctrine "refers not alone to adjacent property owners, nor to the inhabitants of a particular political subdivision, but to the whole people." Ibid.

1997The rule applies equally where the purpose of the lease involves the admission of the public two or three at a time, as in the ease of a small beauty shop, or a doctor’s office. [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 comment d (1965) J In Trondle v. Ward, 129 N.J.L. 179 , 28 A.2d 509 (E. & A.1942), the court next applied the public use analysis to decide whether the landowner was liable for injuries sustained by a paid hotel guest of the tenants as the result of a latent defect in the leased premises.

1997The rule applies equally where the purpose of the lease involves the admission of the public two or three at a time, as in the ease of a small beauty shop, or a doctor’s office. [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 comment d (1965) J In Trondle v. Ward, 129 N.J.L. 179 , 28 A.2d 509 (E. & A.1942), the court next applied the public use analysis to decide whether the landowner was liable for injuries sustained by a paid hotel guest of the tenants as the result of a latent defect in the leased premises.

1997In Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364 ,168 A 612 (E. & A.1933), the court applied the public use exception to a bathing pavilion owned by the City of Asbury Park and leased to an individual who, in turn, leased one of the bath-houses to the plaintiff.

1997See, e.g., Johnson v. Zemel, 109 N.J.L. 197 , 160 A. 356 (Sup.Ct.1932) (applying the public use analysis to a boxing arena); Martin v. Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364 , 168 A. 612 (E. & A.1933) (applying the analysis to a bathing pavilion); LaFreda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489 , 15 A.2d 798 (E. & A.1940) (applying the analysis to a doctor’s office); Trondle v. Ward, 129 N.J.L. 179 , 28 A.2d 509 (E. & A.1942) (applying the analysis to a hotel); Marx v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 6 N.J.Super. 39 , 69 A.2d 748 (App.Div.1949) (applying the analysis to a gasoline filling station).

1997See, e.g., Johnson v. Zemel, 109 N.J.L. 197 , 160 A. 356 (Sup.Ct.1932) (applying the public use analysis to a boxing arena); Martin v. Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364 , 168 A. 612 (E. & A.1933) (applying the analysis to a bathing pavilion); LaFreda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489 , 15 A.2d 798 (E. & A.1940) (applying the analysis to a doctor’s office); Trondle v. Ward, 129 N.J.L. 179 , 28 A.2d 509 (E. & A.1942) (applying the analysis to a hotel); Marx v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 6 N.J.Super. 39 , 69 A.2d 748 (App.Div.1949) (applying the analysis to a gasoline filling station).

1997See, e.g., Johnson v. Zemel, 109 N.J.L. 197 , 160 A. 356 (Sup.Ct.1932) (applying the public use analysis to a boxing arena); Martin v. Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364 , 168 A. 612 (E. & A.1933) (applying the analysis to a bathing pavilion); LaFreda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489 , 15 A.2d 798 (E. & A.1940) (applying the analysis to a doctor’s office); Trondle v. Ward, 129 N.J.L. 179 , 28 A.2d 509 (E. & A.1942) (applying the analysis to a hotel); Marx v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 6 N.J.Super. 39 , 69 A.2d 748 (App.Div.1949) (applying the analysis to a gasoline filling station).

1997For example, in 1994 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in the case of Hao v. Campbell Estate, 76 Hawai’i 77, 869 P.2d 216 (1994), adopted the public use exception as the law of that state under the limited circumstances described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 (1965). 7 In Hao , the court had to decide whether to apply the exception to the owner of a motorcycle track after a racer was injured during a race.

1997For example, in 1994 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in the case of Hao v. Campbell Estate, 76 Hawai’i 77, 869 P.2d 216 (1994), adopted the public use exception as the law of that state under the limited circumstances described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 (1965). 7 In Hao , the court had to decide whether to apply the exception to the owner of a motorcycle track after a racer was injured during a race.

1997The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172 , 379 P.2d 149 (1963), applied the public use exception to hold a landlord liable for injuries sustained by a patron in a tavern who had tripped over a fireplace hearth.

1997The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172 , 379 P.2d 149 (1963), applied the public use exception to hold a landlord liable for injuries sustained by a patron in a tavern who had tripped over a fireplace hearth.

1997As the New Jersey Supreme Court recently stated in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A.2d 1110 (1993), a case in which the Court imposed a duty upon a real estate broker to inspect and warn of dangerous conditions, “one of the main functions of tort law is to prevent accidents rather than simply to provide legal redress to an injured party.” Id. at 448 , 625 A.2d 1110 .

1997As the New Jersey Supreme Court recently stated in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426 , 625 A.2d 1110 (1993), a case in which the Court imposed a duty upon a real estate broker to inspect and warn of dangerous conditions, “one of the main functions of tort law is to prevent accidents rather than simply to provide legal redress to an injured party.” Id. at 448 , 625 A.2d 1110 .

1997Significantly, several courts have held restaurants, taverns and banquet halls as deserving of “public” status for purposes of the exception. 4 For example, in Brunton v. Ellensburg Wash. Lodge No. 1102, 73 Wash.App. 891 , 872 P.2d 47 (Div. 3 1994), the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel 1, held the public use exception to apply to a banquet hall in which a wedding reception was held.

1997Significantly, several courts have held restaurants, taverns and banquet halls as deserving of “public” status for purposes of the exception. 4 For example, in Brunton v. Ellensburg Wash. Lodge No. 1102, 73 Wash.App. 891 , 872 P.2d 47 (Div. 3 1994), the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel 1, held the public use exception to apply to a banquet hall in which a wedding reception was held.

1991In so deciding, the court identified the issue as "whether N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.52 is constitutional, not whether it would be more faithful to constitutional principles by the addition of a use requirement." We granted certification. 122 N.J. 392 , 585 A. 2d 392 (1990).

1991In so deciding, the court identified the issue as “whether N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.52 is constitutional, not whether it would be more faithful to constitutional principles by the addition of a use requirement.” We granted certification. 122 N.J. 392 , 585 A. 2d 392 (1990).

1991In so deciding, the court identified the issue as "whether N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.52 is constitutional, not whether it would be more faithful to constitutional principles by the addition of a use requirement." We granted certification. 122 N.J. 392 , 585 A. 2d 392 (1990).

1991In so deciding, the court identified the issue as “whether N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.52 is constitutional, not whether it would be more faithful to constitutional principles by the addition of a use requirement.” We granted certification. 122 N.J. 392 , 585 A. 2d 392 (1990).

1965The principle is applicable, for example, to municipal condemnation of railroad lands, New Jersey Southern Railroad Company v. Long Branch Commissioners [ 39 N.J.L. 28 ], supra ; railroad condemnation of municipal lands, State, The Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City v. Montclair Railway Company, 35 N.J.L. 328 ( Sup. Ct. 1872), and municipal acquisition of lands of another municipality, Village of Ridgewood v. Borough of Glen Rock, supra , but it has no place when the condemner is, in essence, the sovereign, either federal or state." (Emphasis added) *221 Briefly, the court in Weehawken states t

1965The principle is applicable, for example, to municipal condemnation of railroad lands, New Jersey Southern Railroad Company v. Long Branch Commissioners [ 39 N.J.L. 28 ], supra ; railroad condemnation of municipal lands, State, The Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City v. Montclair Railway Company, 35 N.J.L. 328 ( Sup. Ct. 1872), and municipal acquisition of lands of another municipality, Village of Ridgewood v. Borough of Glen Rock, supra , but it has no place when the condemner is, in essence, the sovereign, either federal or state." (Emphasis added) *221 Briefly, the court in Weehawken states t

1965The principle is applicable, for example, to municipal condemnation of railroad lands, New Jersey Southern Railroad Company v. Long Branch Commissioners [ 39 N.J.L. 28 ], supra ; railroad condemnation of municipal lands, State, The Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City v. Montclair Railway Company, 35 N.J.L. 328 ( Sup. Ct. 1872), and municipal acquisition of lands of another municipality, Village of Ridgewood v. Borough of Glen Rock, supra , but it has no place when the condemner is, in essence, the sovereign, either federal or state." (Emphasis added) *221 Briefly, the court in Weehawken states t