injury-in-fact requirement in Colorado

2016Taxpayers satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement if they allege that an “injury flow[ed] from governmental violations of constitutional provisions that specifically protect the legal interests involved.” Conrad v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982).

2014As we explained in Conrad, however, the injury-in-fact requirement "assure[s] that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution." 656 P.2d at 668 .

2026Comm’n, 2025 CO 27, ¶ 40 ; Hickenlooper, ¶ 8. ¶ 11 A party satisfies the injury in fact requirement if they show that they have suffered “a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.” Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for 4 Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)).

2025See Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004); see also City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000) (“[H]arm to intangible values can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”).

2021To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that the plaintiff ‘suffered injury in fact’ and (2) that the injury was to a ‘legally protected interest.’ " Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg , 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977) ). ¶ 15 Although Colorado permits broad taxpayer standing, 2 "the injury-in-fact requirement [provides] conceptual limits to the doctrine when plaintiffs challenge an allegedly unlawful government action." Reeves-Toney , ¶ 23 (quoting Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 12

2021To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that the plaintiff ‘suffered injury in fact’ and (2) that the injury was to a ‘legally protected interest.’ " Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg , 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977) ). ¶ 15 Although Colorado permits broad taxpayer standing, 2 "the injury-in-fact requirement [provides] conceptual limits to the doctrine when plaintiffs challenge an allegedly unlawful government action." Reeves-Toney , ¶ 23 (quoting Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 12

2021But “to meet the injury-in-fact requirement, a plaintiff relying on her status as a taxpayer to confer standing must demonstrate ‘a clea r nexus between h[er] status as a taxpayer and the challenged gov ernment action.’” Id. (quoting Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Reli gion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 12). 18 ¶ 30 The plaintiffs don’t allege any such clear nexus in this case.

2021But "to meet the injury-in-fact requirement, a plaintiff relying on her status as a taxpayer to confer standing must demonstrate ‘a clear nexus between h[er] status as a taxpayer and the challenged government action.’ " Id. (quoting Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 12 , 338 P.3d 1002 ). ¶ 30 The plaintiffs don't allege any such clear nexus in this case.

2008"A plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement by demonstrating that the activity complained of has caused or has threatened to cause injury to the plaintiff...." J.C.S., 169 P.3d at 245 (quoting Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Colo.1992)).

2008“A plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement by demonstrating that the activity complained of has caused or has threatened to cause injury to the plaintiff....” J.C.S., 169 P.3d at 245 (quoting Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286,1289 (Colo.1992)).

2021To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that the plaintiff ‘suffered injury in fact’ and (2) that the injury was to a ‘legally protected interest.’ " Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg , 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977) ). ¶ 15 Although Colorado permits broad taxpayer standing, 2 "the injury-in-fact requirement [provides] conceptual limits to the doctrine when plaintiffs challenge an allegedly unlawful government action." Reeves-Toney , ¶ 23 (quoting Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 12

2019To meet the injury-in-fact requirement, Reeves-Toney was required to show that "her tax dollars [we]re spent in an unconstitutional manner." Barber , 196 P.3d at 255 (Eid, J., concurring in the judgment).

2026Comm’n, 2025 CO 27, ¶ 40 ; Hickenlooper, ¶ 8. ¶ 11 A party satisfies the injury in fact requirement if they show that they have suffered “a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.” Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for 4 Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)).

2025See Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004); see also City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000) (“[H]arm to intangible values can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”).

2016Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Colo.1992).

2016Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Colo. 1992).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

2007We consider whether the claimant is "personally adversely affected by the particular constitutional defect asserted." People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493, 495 (Colo.1986); accord DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents, 196 Colo. 216, 221 , 590 P.2d 486, 489 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 113 , 575 P.2d 423, 425 (1978).

1989See Wimberly, 194 Colo, at 167, 570 P.2d at 538 (“Courts cannot, under the pretense of an actual case, assume powers vested in either the executive or legislative branches of government.”), quoted in Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1982) and State Board for Com munity Colleges v. Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 434 (Colo.1984). .

1985Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 , 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education v. Olson, supra. Here, it is undisputed that none of the plaintiffs have suffered any loss of income from the withholding provision of Article 31-3.

2020Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 9 , 338 P.3d 1002, 1007 (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ). ¶ 36 As the district court correctly pointed out, it is undisputed that the Poudre Defendants “denied Stanczyk’s request for nonprobationary portability, and, therefore, allegedly caused her injury.” The Poudre Defendants argue the opposite: that Stanczyk cannot establish the first prong because “she caused her own injury by affirmatively waiving her right to transfer her nonprobationary status and subsequently waiting eight months to request portability.” We disagree

2008"A plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement by demonstrating that the activity complained of has caused or has threatened to cause injury to the plaintiff...." J.C.S., 169 P.3d at 245 (quoting Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Colo.1992)).

1998See Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo.1985). *573 The first step, the injury in fact requirement, "is derived from the state constitutional limitation on judicial power requiring the presence of an actual controversy, which is demonstrated by a real injury." Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util.

1993Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo.1985); see Mt.

2012Thus, "[the injury in fact test does not require that the plaintiff demonstrate an economic injury. '[HJarm to intangible values is sufficient.'" Rocky Mountain Animal Def. v. Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 100 P.3d 508, 513 (Colo.App.2004) (quoting Friends of Black Forest Reg'l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 80 P.3d 871, 877 (Colo.App.2003)). 122 "Like an injury-in-fact, a legally protected interest may be tangible or intangible." Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 .

2004The injury in fact test does not require that the plaintiff demonstrate an economic injury. “[H]arm to intangible values is sufficient.” Friends of Black Forest Reg’l Park, supra, 80 P.3d at 877 .

2025RE-2 v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 217 P.3d 918, 923 (Colo. App. 2009). “[T]he injury-in-fact requirement ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution,” and while “both tangible injuries (e.g., physical damage) and intangible injuries (e.g., aesthetic deterioration of the environment) can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, ‘an injury that is overly “indirect and incidental” to the defendant’s action’ will not convey standing, nor will the remote possibility of a future injury.” Hickenlooper, ¶ 9 (citations omitted).

2020Hickenlooper, ¶ 12; accord Hotaling, 275 P.3d at 727 .

2014Because judicial determination of an issue may result in disapproval of legislative or executive acts, this constitutional basis for standing ensures that judicial “determination may not be had at the suit of any and all members of the public.” Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 167 , 570 P.2d at 538 (quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. City of Chicago, 115 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1940)); see also Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855–56; Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982).

2014Because judicial determination of an issue may result in disapproval of legislative or executive acts, this constitutional basis for standing ensures that judicial "determination may not be had at the suit of any and all members of the public" Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 167 , 570 P.2d at 588 (quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. City of Chicago, 115 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir.1940)); see also Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855-56 ; Comrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1982).

2012Thus, "[the injury in fact test does not require that the plaintiff demonstrate an economic injury. '[HJarm to intangible values is sufficient.'" Rocky Mountain Animal Def. v. Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 100 P.3d 508, 513 (Colo.App.2004) (quoting Friends of Black Forest Reg'l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 80 P.3d 871, 877 (Colo.App.2003)). 122 "Like an injury-in-fact, a legally protected interest may be tangible or intangible." Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 .

2012"To be a 'legally protect interest' ... the interest the complainant seeks to protect must be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected." Rocky Mountain Animal Def., 100 P.3d at 513 .

2009Syfrett v. Pullen, 209 P.3d 1167, 1169 (Colo.App.2008).

2008"Thus, we have interpreted Wimberly to confer standing when a plaintiff argues that a governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional." Atnscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; see also Nicholl, 896 P.2d at 866 (reasoning that the plaintiff-taxpayer satisfied the first part of the Wimberly test "because he seeks review of what he claims is an unlawful government expenditure which is contrary to our state constitution").

2008Concerning the injury-in-fact requirement of the Wimberly test, we hold, as we did in Nicholl, that Petitioners suffered an injury-in-fact because they seek review of what they claim "is an unlawful government expenditure which is contrary to our state government." Id. at 866 .

2000See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

2000See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

2000See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 , 92 S.Ct. 1361 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (aesthetic and ecological interests); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1985) (legislature's authority to appropriate funds); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1983) (governmental interference with religion).

2000See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 , 92 S.Ct. 1361 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (aesthetic and ecological interests); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1985) (legislature's authority to appropriate funds); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1983) (governmental interference with religion).

2000See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 , 92 S.Ct. 1361 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (aesthetic and ecological interests); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1985) (legislature's authority to appropriate funds); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo.1983) (governmental interference with religion).