injury-in-fact requirement in California

2023III, § 2), a plaintiff in federal court “must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, (3) that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” (Federal Election Commission v. Cruz (2022) __ U.S. __ [ 142 S.Ct. 1638 , 1646].) Proposition 64 incorporated the injury-in-fact requirement into the UCL ( Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323) but did not borrow the traceability or redressability requirements of the federal standing inquiry.4 To show an injury in fact, a plaintiff must identify “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest

2023Beyond this limitation to economic injuries, section 17204’s reference to “money or property” does not otherwise define or limit the injury-in-fact inquiry. ( Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 323–325.) A showing of economic injury requires only that the plaintiff allege or prove “a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount.” (Id. at p. 325.) Moreover, because the issue is one of standing, rather than the amount of restitution due, “a specific measure of the amount of this loss is not required.

2023Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840 , 864; Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338 .) A. Economic Injury A private plaintiff has UCL standing only if that plaintiff “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property.” (§ 17204.) Because loss of money or property is a subset of injury in fact, proof of harm to money or property will generally satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.

2023In Havens, a nonprofit corporation devoted to increasing equal housing opportunities in the Richmond, Virginia area joined individuals who had allegedly suffered from a building owner’s racial steering practices in suing the owner under the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 ( Havens, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 366–368), alleging the defendant’s practices had frustrated the organization’s mission and caused it “ ‘to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] racially discriminatory steering practices.’ ” (Id. at p. 379.) The high court held the organization’s alleg

2021(See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-980 .) 5 Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1334 , which addressed “what claims and remedies may be pursued by a plaintiff who alleges a lost business opportunity due to the unfair practices of a competitor.” (Id. at p. 1140.) In Korea Supply, the plaintiff was an agent representing the supplier of military equipment in the supplier’s bid to procure a lucrative military contract with a foreign government.

2015Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) __ U.S. __ [ 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342 , 189 L.Ed.2d 246, 255 ].) Instead, appellant can satisfy the injury- in-fact requirement by showing an intent to engage in the prohibited conduct and the existence of a credible threat of prosecution.

2015Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) __ U.S. __ [ 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342 , 189 L.Ed.2d 246, 255 ].) Instead, appellant can satisfy the injury- in-fact requirement by showing an intent to engage in the prohibited conduct and the existence of a credible threat of prosecution.

2014(Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 243 [“courts have permitted plaintiffs who have been determined to lack standing, or who lost standing after the complaint was filed, to substitute as plaintiffs the true real parties in interest”]; see Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 19-21 ; California Air Resources Bd. v. Hart (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 289, 300 .) The Supreme Court in Branick, which considered the injury-in-fact requirement added to the UCL by Proposition 64, explained, “Leave to amend a complaint is thus entrusted to the sound discretion of the tria

2007(C.D.Cal. 2005) 426 F.Supp.2d 1061 (Housing Rights), and several other cases.

1996Co., supra, 10 Cal.4th 645 .) Yet, the Montrose court explicitly recognized that an injury-in-fact analysis is not inconsistent with a continuous trigger: “In the context of continuous or progressively deteriorating injuries, the injury-in-fact trigger, like the continuous injury trigger, affords coverage for continuing or progressive injuries occurring during successive policy periods subsequent to the established date of the initial injury-in-fact.” (Id. at p. 676.) That is, the continuous trigger pertains to the duration of coverage, providing coverage throughout successive policy periods.