injury-in-fact requirement in New York

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Stevens , 40 NY3d at 515 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. , 33 NY3d at 50; New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists , 2 NY3d at 211 ; Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 772-773 ).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Stevens , 40 NY3d at 515 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. , 33 NY3d at 50; New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists , 2 NY3d at 211; Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 772-773).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Festa v Town of Oyster Bay , 210 AD3d 678, 679-680 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Frankel v J.P.

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Festa v Town of Oyster Bay , 210 AD3d 678, 679-680 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Frankel v J.P.

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Stevens , 40 NY3d at 515 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. , 33 NY3d at 50; New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists , 2 NY3d at 211 ; Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 772-773 ).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Stevens , 40 NY3d at 515 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. , 33 NY3d at 50; New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists , 2 NY3d at 211; Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 772-773).

2025Footnote 4: Although respondents suggest that the principle that competitive injury, by itself, is insufficient to confer standing relates to the injury in fact requirement, Dairylea Coop. makes plain that the competitive injury issue relates to the zone of interests requirement ( Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ["In the case before us, there is no issue as to the deleterious effect on Dairylea of the commissioner's action [i.e., injury in fact requirement]; rather the dispute concerns the applicability and scope of the Agriculture and Markets Law [i.e., the zone of interests requirement"]; see

2025Footnote 4: Although respondents suggest that the principle that competitive injury, by itself, is insufficient to confer standing relates to the injury in fact requirement, Dairylea Coop. makes plain that the competitive injury issue relates to the zone of interests requirement ( Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ["In the case before us, there is no issue as to the deleterious effect on Dairylea of the commissioner's action [i.e., injury in fact requirement]; rather the dispute concerns the applicability and scope of the Agriculture and Markets Law [i.e., the zone of interests requirement"]; see

2014Although the Second Circuit found standing in Baur , it cautioned about “the potentially expansive and nebulous nature of enhanced risk claims” and reiterated that “the injury-in-fact analysis is highly case-specific” {id. at 637). “[I]njury based on exposure to potentially or actually harmful products can take at least two forms: (1) ‘uncontested exposure to a potentially harmful substance’ . . . and (2) ‘potential exposure to an undisputedly dangerous contaminant’ ” (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v United States Food & Drug Admin., 710 F3d 71, 83 [2d Cir 2013], quoting Baur v Venem

2014Although the Second Circuit found standing in Baur , it cautioned about “the potentially expansive and nebulous nature of enhanced risk claims” and reiterated that “the injury-in-fact analysis is highly case-specific” {id. at 637). “[I]njury based on exposure to potentially or actually harmful products can take at least two forms: (1) ‘uncontested exposure to a potentially harmful substance’ . . . and (2) ‘potential exposure to an undisputedly dangerous contaminant’ ” (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v United States Food & Drug Admin., 710 F3d 71, 83 [2d Cir 2013], quoting Baur v Venem

2025Where the party challenging a governmental action has sustained an injury in fact, that party has a concrete interest in prosecuting its action, providing a bona fide controversy for the court's consideration that will produce a confined, restrained judgment, as opposed to an advisory opinion ( see Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 773 ; see also Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. , 23 NY3d at 6 ).

2025Where the party challenging a governmental action has sustained an injury in fact, that party has a concrete interest in prosecuting its action, providing a bona fide controversy for the court's consideration that will produce a confined, restrained judgment, as opposed to an advisory opinion ( see Society of Plastics Indus. , 77 NY2d at 773; see also Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. , 23 NY3d at 6).

2022The injury in fact cannot be speculative ( Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki , 100 NY2d 801, 812 [2003]).

2022The injury-in-fact cannot be speculative ( Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki , 100 NY2d 801, 812 [2003]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2013State Ch. v Roberts, 122 AD2d 406, 407 [1986]) and further that their asserted injuries are too speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 211-213; Matter of Brunswick Smart Growth, Inc. v Town of Brunswick, 73 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2010]; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63 AD3d 1498, 1501-1502 [2009]).

2025Morgan Chase & Co. , 193 AD3d at 690).

2025Morgan Chase & Co. , 193 AD3d at 690 ).

2025The dissent commented that the petitioner's alleged economic injury occasioned by the introduction of a competitor into its territory was sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement ( id. at 951-952 [Sweeney, J., dissenting]).

2025The dissent commented that the petitioner's alleged economic injury occasioned by the introduction of a competitor into its territory was sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement ( id. at 951-952 [Sweeney, J., dissenting]).

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025As the Third Department stated, "[w]hile a competitive injury may in some instances be sufficient to confer standing, the critical showing is that such an injury falls within the zone of interest of the controlling statute" ( Matter of Troy Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 260 AD2d 715, 716 [3d Dept 1999], citing Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9; see also Matter of Dorsett-Felicelli, Inc. v County of Clinton , 18 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; Matter of C.L.B.

2025Footnote 4: Although respondents suggest that the principle that competitive injury, by itself, is insufficient to confer standing relates to the injury in fact requirement, Dairylea Coop. makes plain that the competitive injury issue relates to the zone of interests requirement ( Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ["In the case before us, there is no issue as to the deleterious effect on Dairylea of the commissioner's action [i.e., injury in fact requirement]; rather the dispute concerns the applicability and scope of the Agriculture and Markets Law [i.e., the zone of interests requirement"]; see

2025Footnote 4: Although respondents suggest that the principle that competitive injury, by itself, is insufficient to confer standing relates to the injury in fact requirement, Dairylea Coop. makes plain that the competitive injury issue relates to the zone of interests requirement ( Dairylea Coop. , 38 NY2d at 9 ["In the case before us, there is no issue as to the deleterious effect on Dairylea of the commissioner's action [i.e., injury in fact requirement]; rather the dispute concerns the applicability and scope of the Agriculture and Markets Law [i.e., the zone of interests requirement"]; see

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized [*2]to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Borrello v Hochul , 221 AD3d 1484, 1485 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted], appeal dismissed 41 NY3d 1006 [2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 910 [2025]; see Matter of Hohman v Town of Poestenkill , 179 AD3d 1172, 1173-1174 [3d Dept 2020]).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized [*2]to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of Borrello v Hochul , 221 AD3d 1484 , 1485 [4th Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted], appeal dismissed 41 NY3d 1006 [2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 910 [2025]; see Matter of Hohman v Town of Poestenkill , 179 AD3d 1172, 1173-1174 [3d Dept 2020]).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural, but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of McCrory v Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of Trustees , 181 AD3d at 71 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025"The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, ephemeral, or conjectural, but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" ( Matter of McCrory v Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of Trustees , 181 AD3d at 71 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2024So, to establish standing in order to challenge the Planning Board's administrative determinations, petitioners must show that they will suffer an injury-in-fact and that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute ( Matter of Veteri v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Kent , 202 AD3d 975, 979 [2d Dept 2022]).

2024Additionally, in land use matters, courts have repeatedly emphasized that the harm "must be 'different in kind or degree from the public at large' " ( Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post , 26 NY3d 301, 311 [2015], quoting Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , 77 NY2d at 778 ; see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany , 13 NY3d 297, 306 [2009]).

2024Additionally, in land use matters, courts have repeatedly emphasized that the harm "must be 'different in kind or degree from the public at large' " ( Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post , 26 NY3d 301, 311 [2015], quoting Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , 77 NY2d at 778 ; see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany , 13 NY3d 297, 306 [2009]).

2023Accordingly, petitioners' asserted injuries are conjecture and too speculative to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement ( see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello , 2 NY3d at 211-213 ; see also Matter of Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 112 AD3d 1198 , 1199 [3d Dept 2013]; Matter of New York State Psychiatric Assn., Inc. [*4]v Mills , 29 AD3d at 1059-1060 ; Matter of Parkland Ambulance Serv. v New York State Dept. of Health , 261 AD2d at 772 ).

2019Thus, if the issue of standing is raised, a party challenging governmental action must meet the threshold burden of establishing that it has suffered an “injury in fact” and that the injury it asserts “fall[s] within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the [government] has acted” (New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]).2 The injury in fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has “an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated” and has suffered a cognizable harm (s

2019Our cases do not require a plaintiff suffer a pecuniary loss, only that the injury be actual and not hypothetical or abstract (Matter of Dental Soc. of State v Carey, 61 NY2d 330, 334 [1984] [“(I)njury in fact need not be demonstrated by out-of-pocket loss”]).

2016“In the class action context, plaintiffs ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.’ ” (Whalen v Michael Stores Inc., 153 F Supp 3d 577, 580 [ED NY 2015] [emphasis omitted], quoting Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 503 [1975].) “Thus, ‘if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of [herself] or any other member of the class.’