injury-in-fact requirement in Texas

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2015H, § 1. 48 ExparteHalsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article ITI of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article HIprevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2015H, § 1. 48 ExparteHalsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article ITI of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article HIprevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2015H, § 1. 48 ExparteHalsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article ITI of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article HIprevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the

2025Texas standing doctrine parallels “the federal requirements for standing,” Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696, and as the U.S. Supreme Court recently held, “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation . . . ,” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); see also Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (turning “for guidance to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court” given “the parallels between [the federal] test [for Article III standing] and our own”); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 33

2024Certainly, these cases stand for the proposition that a plaintiff will not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341 ; see TransUnion, 141 S.Ct. at 2205 .

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2015H, § 1. 48 ExparteHalsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article ITI of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article HIprevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2015II, § 1. 48 Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex. Crim. 453, 457 , 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 See supra n. 12. 51 See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of

2025As to whether such a claim could be based on a risk of harm, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the plaintiff could not allege a “bare procedural violation [of the FCRA], divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III [of the United States Constitution].” Id. at 341 .

2025Texas standing doctrine parallels “the federal requirements for standing,” Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696, and as the U.S. Supreme Court recently held, “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation . . . ,” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); see also Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (turning “for guidance to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court” given “the parallels between [the federal] test [for Article III standing] and our own”); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 33

2003See, e.g., Spear, 520 U.S. at 167 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 .

2003See, e.g., Spear, 520 U.S. at 167 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 .

2014Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 845-46 (discussing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205-06 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)).

2014Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 845–46 (discussing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 498–500, 95 S. Ct. 2197 , 2205–06 (1975)).

2025Texas standing doctrine parallels “the federal requirements for standing,” Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696, and as the U.S. Supreme Court recently held, “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation . . . ,” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); see also Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154 (turning “for guidance to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court” given “the parallels between [the federal] test [for Article III standing] and our own”); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 33

2010Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1025 , at *8-24 (applying this requirement to hold that association members, who claimed environmental, scientific, and recreational interests in Barton Springs, but no property interests affected by alleged pollution, had not established injury distinct from that of general public); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60, 576-78 (discussing role of standing in preventing judicial incursions into legislative and executive spheres). principles in public rights cases that resemble the injury-in-fact test applied by federal courts)

2008Under this rule, insurance coverage is triggered on the date when an actual injury and damage occurs, even if the injury has not yet been discovered or become manifest.” (citing Scott v. Keever, 212 Kan. 719 , 512 P.2d 346, 351-52 (1973))); Trizec Props., Inc. v. Biltmore Constr.

2008Under this rule, insurance coverage is triggered on the date when an actual injury and damage occurs, even if the injury has not yet been discovered or become manifest.” (citing Scott v. Keever, 212 Kan. 719 , 512 P.2d 346, 351-52 (1973))); Trizec Props., Inc. v. Biltmore Constr.

2008Samuels Co., 370 F.3d 755, 758 (8th Cir.2004) ("The Kansas Supreme Court has adopted an injury-in-fact rule for purposes of determining when coverage is triggered under a CGL policy.