declined rule in Oregon

2026Although the parties do not dispute appealability, “ ‘we have an independent obligation to consider matters concerning jurisdiction sua sponte.’ ” Hanley Engineering v. Weitz & Company, 321 Or App 323, 325 , 516 P3d 1192 (2022) (quoting Walton v. Board of Parole, 267 Or App 673, 676 , 341 P3d 828 (2014)).

2026Although the parties do not dispute appealability, “ ‘we have an independent obligation to consider matters concerning jurisdiction sua sponte.’ ” Hanley Engineering v. Weitz & Company, 321 Or App 323, 325 , 516 P3d 1192 (2022) (quoting Walton v. Board of Parole, 267 Or App 673, 676 , 341 P3d 828 (2014)).

2026Although the parties do not dispute appealability, “ ‘we have an independent obligation to consider matters concerning jurisdiction sua sponte.’ ” Hanley Engineering v. Weitz & Company, 321 Or App 323, 325 , 516 P3d 1192 (2022) (quoting Walton v. Board of Parole, 267 Or App 673, 676 , 341 P3d 828 (2014)).

2026Although the parties do not dispute appealability, “ ‘we have an independent obligation to consider matters concerning jurisdiction sua sponte.’ ” Hanley Engineering v. Weitz & Company, 321 Or App 323, 325 , 516 P3d 1192 (2022) (quoting Walton v. Board of Parole, 267 Or App 673, 676 , 341 P3d 828 (2014)).

2011Id. at *4, citing Jensen v. Dept. of Rev. , 13 OTR 296 , 301 .

2007The state further argued that, even if the search was illegal, evidence of a new crime — in this case, interfering with a peace officer — committed after an illegal search is nonetheless admissible under State v. Janicke, 103 Or App 227 , 796 P2d 392 (1990). *503 The trial court declined to rule on the legality of the search, but denied defendant’s motion to suppress, based on Janiche'.

2007The state further argued that, even if the search was illegal, evidence of a new crime — in this case, interfering with a peace officer — committed after an illegal search is nonetheless admissible under State v. Janicke, 103 Or App 227 , 796 P2d 392 (1990). *503 The trial court declined to rule on the legality of the search, but denied defendant’s motion to suppress, based on Janiche'.

1980Comley v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 35 Or App 465 , 472 n.6, 582 P2d 443 (1978). 8 There is no issue of defendant’s jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ theater.

1980Comley v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 35 Or App 465 , 472 n.6, 582 P2d 443 (1978). 8 There is no issue of defendant’s jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ theater.

1980Cf. Dickens v. DeBolt, 288 Or 3 , 602 P2d 246 (1979) (ORS 30.265(3)(c) does not protect state police officer from liability for conversion for eating sturgeon seized while officer was enforcing state wildlife laws, since when officer "eats the evidence” he is not acting "within the scope of [his] employment or duties” within the meaning of the statute.) 6 In Dickens v. DeBolt, supra, 288 Or at 12 n.4, the court declined to rule on the plaintiffs contention that ORS 30.265(3)(c) only provides immunity to an officer who acts in "good faith.” 7 The common law and statutory discretionary act excep

1980Cf. Dickens v. DeBolt, 288 Or 3 , 602 P2d 246 (1979) (ORS 30.265(3)(c) does not protect state police officer from liability for conversion for eating sturgeon seized while officer was enforcing state wildlife laws, since when officer "eats the evidence” he is not acting "within the scope of [his] employment or duties” within the meaning of the statute.) 6 In Dickens v. DeBolt, supra, 288 Or at 12 n.4, the court declined to rule on the plaintiffs contention that ORS 30.265(3)(c) only provides immunity to an officer who acts in "good faith.” 7 The common law and statutory discretionary act excep

1978Between these two portions there may be a further distinction drawn: defendant had the legal power and right to institute condemnation proceedings with regard to the greenway area; however, the condemnation of private property for the purpose of establishing a transit station may be outside the ambit of defendant’s condemning authority and may lie exclusively within the condemning authority of another agency. 14a The faulty legal characterization of the land use plan in Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 46 Cal App 3d 1, 120 Cal Rptr 108 (1975)

1978Between these two portions there may be a further distinction drawn: defendant had the legal power and right to institute condemnation proceedings with regard to the greenway area; however, the condemnation of private property for the purpose of establishing a transit station may be outside the ambit of defendant’s condemning authority and may lie exclusively within the condemning authority of another agency. 14a The faulty legal characterization of the land use plan in Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 46 Cal App 3d 1, 120 Cal Rptr 108 (1975)

1978Between these two portions there may be a further distinction drawn: defendant had the legal power and right to institute condemnation proceedings with regard to the greenway area; however, the condemnation of private property for the purpose of establishing a transit station may be outside the ambit of defendant’s condemning authority and may lie exclusively within the condemning authority of another agency. 14a The faulty legal characterization of the land use plan in Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 46 Cal App 3d 1, 120 Cal Rptr 108 (1975)