Town defendant in Rhode Island

2022II Standard of Review It is a basic principle that “[f]actual findings of a trial justice in a nonjury case are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless found to be clearly wrong or unless the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Town of West Greenwich v. A. Cardi Realty Associates, 786 A.2d 354, 360 (R.I. 2001).

2020However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that it has been “quite sparing” in its recognition of absolute immunity and will not “extend it any further than its justification would warrant.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020What is more, counsel for the Town defendants stated at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that the Town defendants had opted not to argue the public duty doctrine in their motion for summary judgment. 7 We note that absolute immunity “defeats a suit at the outset * * *.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 419 n.13 (1976). 8 The policy which forms the basis of absolute immunity for prosecutors was articulated with particular eloquence by Judge Learned Hand: “It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others,

2020What is more, counsel for the Town defendants stated at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that the Town defendants had opted not to argue the public duty doctrine in their motion for summary judgment. 7 We note that absolute immunity “defeats a suit at the outset * * *.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 419 n.13 (1976). 8 The policy which forms the basis of absolute immunity for prosecutors was articulated with particular eloquence by Judge Learned Hand: “It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others,

2015This omission, then, constituted a violation of the RFP, which explicitly stated that “[f]ailure to completely execute and submit the required documents before the Submittal Deadline may render a bid nonresponsive.” We have previously held that “municipal contracts can properly be awarded to a bidder ‘other than the lowest bidder when the awarding authority deems it in the public interest to do so.’ ” Coastal Recycling, Inc. v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 716 (R.I.2004) (quoting H.V.

2003In O’Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 700 (R.I.1993), we declared that “[p]ursuant to § 24-6-2 a town must hold a hearing so that [abutting] landowners may argue against the abandonment and present evidence concerning the damage the landowners will incur if the abandonment proceedings go forward.” It is painfully apparent that no meaningful hearing occurred in this case and that the town violated both the statute and its own procedure.

2003In O'Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 700 (R.I.1993), we declared that "[p]ursuant to § 24-6-2 a town must hold a hearing so that [abutting] landowners may argue against the abandonment and present evidence concerning the damage the landowners will incur if the abandonment proceedings go forward." It is painfully apparent that no meaningful hearing occurred in this case and that the town violated both the statute and its own procedure.

2000However, this Court has expressly stated that past practice may not form the basis to prevent enforcement of an award, unless the contract itself contains a “sufficiently clear past-practice provision.” Town of Smithfield, 707 A.2d at 262 (citing Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I.1991)).