Town motion in Wisconsin

2023In response to the Ricciardis’ argument that para. (2)(d) is a savings clause and must be read separately from para. (2)(c), the court called this a “tortured and incorrect reading” that would “allow a plaintiff to sue for whatever that plaintiff wanted to pursue” and “would not leave the statute as the 5 While the Town’s motion for summary judgment was pending, our supreme court issued its decision in Southport Commons, LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 52 , 397 Wis. 2d 362 , 960 N.W.2d 17 .

2023Susedik v. Knutson, 52 Wis. 2d 593, 596-97 , 191 N.W.2d 23 (1971), were met. 3 The Town’s original Notice to Kornreich, sent via certified mail on October 8, 2020, was returned to the Town as “unclaimed” on November 10, 2020.

2023Susedik v. Knutson, 52 Wis. 2d 593, 596-97 , 191 N.W.2d 23 (1971), were met. 3 The Town’s original Notice to Kornreich, sent via certified mail on October 8, 2020, was returned to the Town as “unclaimed” on November 10, 2020.

2022Nothing prevents the Board from referencing the Town’s decision or analysis, and much like we benefit from the circuit court’s decision in reviewing an appeal of a summary judgment decision, see, e.g., Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶14 , 317 Wis. 2d 288 , 766 N.W.2d 517 (when reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment on appeal, we review such issues independently, “but we benefit from the lower courts’ analyses”), the Board benefits from the Town’s analysis. 10 No. 2021AP240 “disapprove livestock facility siting permits unless one of eight narrow exceptions” identified in § 93.90(3)(a) a

2022Nothing prevents the Board from referencing the Town’s decision or analysis, and much like we benefit from the circuit court’s decision in reviewing an appeal of a summary judgment decision, see, e.g., Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶14 , 317 Wis. 2d 288 , 766 N.W.2d 517 (when reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment on appeal, we review such issues independently, “but we benefit from the lower courts’ analyses”), the Board benefits from the Town’s analysis. 10 No. 2021AP240 “disapprove livestock facility siting permits unless one of eight narrow exceptions” identified in § 93.90(3)(a) a

2021Our supreme court has explained that the intervention statute “attempts to strike a balance between two conflicting public policies.” On the one hand, “[t]he original parties to a lawsuit should be allowed to conduct and conclude their own lawsuit....” On the other hand, “persons should be allowed to join a lawsuit in the interest of the speedy and economical resolution of controversies.” Id. (footnotes and quoted sources omitted). 7 Montgomery argued in the circuit court that the Town’s motion was untimely, noting that the court’s June 5, 2020 order approved the department’s supervised releas

2020It appears we felt comfortable using “occurred” and “discovered” interchangeably because the damage was discovered contemporaneously with when it occurred, as we noted that it was “undisputed that Pruim discovered the damage right after the heavy rainstorm of March 13, 1990,” and thus “the town claim[ed] that he had ninety days from that date [i.e., the date the damage also “occurred”] to file the notice of claim.” Id. at 122 . 4 Had we meant for “occurred” and “discovered” to have two distinct meanings, like in the case now before us, it would have been unnecessary for us to say “occurred” at

2020It appears we felt comfortable using “occurred” and “discovered” interchangeably because the damage was discovered contemporaneously with when it occurred, as we noted that it was “undisputed that Pruim discovered the damage right after the heavy rainstorm of March 13, 1990,” and thus “the town claim[ed] that he had ninety days from that date [i.e., the date the damage also “occurred”] to file the notice of claim.” Id. at 122 . 4 Had we meant for “occurred” and “discovered” to have two distinct meanings, like in the case now before us, it would have been unnecessary for us to say “occurred” at

2020Cf. Larry v. Harris, 2008 WI 81, ¶43 , 311 Wis. 2d 326 , 752 N.W.2d 279 (suggesting that the concern with a court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment without statutorily required notice is that it deprives parties of the opportunity to submit evidence).

2020Cf. Larry v. Harris, 2008 WI 81, ¶43 , 311 Wis. 2d 326 , 752 N.W.2d 279 (suggesting that the concern with a court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment without statutorily required notice is that it deprives parties of the opportunity to submit evidence).

2018First, it contends the City was the "real controlling influence" behind the annexation's design and configuration, such that it-not the property owners-should be charged with any arbitrariness in the boundaries. " 'Influencing' the proceedings, in this context, means more than providing mere technical assistance or recommendations to the petition signers; rather, it means conduct by which the annexing authority dominates the petitioners so as to have effectively selected the boundaries." Town of Menasha , 170 Wis. 2d at 192 , 488 N.W.2d 104 (citation omitted).

2018First, it contends the City was the "real controlling influence" behind the annexation's design and configuration, such that it-not the property owners-should be charged with any arbitrariness in the boundaries. " 'Influencing' the proceedings, in this context, means more than providing mere technical assistance or recommendations to the petition signers; rather, it means conduct by which the annexing authority dominates the petitioners so as to have effectively selected the boundaries." Town of Menasha , 170 Wis. 2d at 192 , 488 N.W.2d 104 (citation omitted).

2018Second, a town may challenge an annexation as creating " 'gerrymandered' or 'crazy quilt' municipal boundaries, even when *138 the annexation is initiated by a private landowner who sets the boundaries." Town of Medary , 88 Wis. 2d at 115 -16 , 277 N.W.2d 310 . 7 ¶ 40 The Town argues both circumstances exist here.

2018Second, a town may challenge an annexation as creating " 'gerrymandered' or 'crazy quilt' municipal boundaries, even when *138 the annexation is initiated by a private landowner who sets the boundaries." Town of Medary , 88 Wis. 2d at 115 -16 , 277 N.W.2d 310 . 7 ¶ 40 The Town argues both circumstances exist here.

2012Gableman individually to recuse himself from the instant case and a motion directed to the Court to order a rehearing in the instant case without Justice Gableman's participation. 5 The Adams/Town challenge to Justice Gableman's participation is based on the allegation that the challengers did not know that Justice Gableman was represented by Michael Best & Friedrich LLP in a personal legal matter without any obligation to pay legal fees to Michael Best, and that Michael Best represents a party in the instant case. 6 The Adams/Town motion is based on Michael Best's revealing on or about Decemb

2012Gableman individually to recuse himself from the instant case and a motion directed to the Court to order a rehearing in the instant case without Justice Gableman's participation. 5 The Adams/Town challenge to Justice Gableman's participation is based on the allegation that the challengers did not know that Justice Gableman was represented by Michael Best & Friedrich LLP in a personal legal matter without any obligation to pay legal fees to Michael Best, and that Michael Best represents a party in the instant case. 6 The Adams/Town motion is based on Michael Best's revealing on or about Decemb

2009This is well after the two-year limit on moratoriums. 6 See Hunt Club Condos., Inc. v. Mac-Gray Servs., Inc., 2006 WI App 167, ¶ 22 , 295 Wis. 2d 780 , 721 N.W.2d 117 (attorneys who wrote the Wisconsin condominium law handbook practice in the field of condominium law and possess sufficient expertise on the topic to be called upon to advise other lawyers regarding it). 7 In the Town's brief it states that the commercial unit contains an existing machinery business.

2009This is well after the two-year limit on moratoriums. 6 See Hunt Club Condos., Inc. v. Mac-Gray Servs., Inc., 2006 WI App 167, ¶ 22 , 295 Wis. 2d 780 , 721 N.W.2d 117 (attorneys who wrote the Wisconsin condominium law handbook practice in the field of condominium law and possess sufficient expertise on the topic to be called upon to advise other lawyers regarding it). 7 In the Town's brief it states that the commercial unit contains an existing machinery business.

2008Ripeness ¶ 40 We now address whether the circuit court properly granted the Town's motion for summary judgment because it determined that Olson's suit for declaratory judgment was not ripe, and therefore not justiciable. ¶ 41 We agree with the court of appeals' assessment that "[t]he nature of this controversy is precisely the type to be resolved by a declaratory judgment." Olson , No.2005AP2257, unpublished slip. op., ¶ 15 (citing Weber v. Town of Lincoln, 159 Wis.2d 144, 148 , 463 N.W.2d 869 (Ct.App. 1990)).

2008Ripeness ¶ 40 We now address whether the circuit court properly granted the Town's motion for summary judgment because it determined that Olson's suit for declaratory judgment was not ripe, and therefore not justiciable. ¶ 41 We agree with the court of appeals' assessment that "[t]he nature of this controversy is precisely the type to be resolved by a declaratory judgment." Olson , No.2005AP2257, unpublished slip. op., ¶ 15 (citing Weber v. Town of Lincoln, 159 Wis.2d 144, 148 , 463 N.W.2d 869 (Ct.App. 1990)).

2008The Vande Zandes invoke Klinkert v. City of Racine, 177 Wis. 200 , 188 N.W. 72 (1922), for the proposition that equitable estoppel may sometimes be applied to defeat the public's property interests.

2008The Vande Zandes invoke Klinkert v. City of Racine, 177 Wis. 200 , 188 N.W. 72 (1922), for the proposition that equitable estoppel may sometimes be applied to defeat the public's property interests.

2004The circuit court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment and rejected the Winkelmans' argument that under Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654 , 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998), it was required to hear their equitable argument.

2004The circuit court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment and rejected the Winkelmans' argument that under Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654 , 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998), it was required to hear their equitable argument.

2001Relying upon Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516 , 500 N.W.2d 268 (1993), the trial court determined that the annexed properties and the City were neither touching, nor close enough to be contiguous, and invalidated all four annexations.

2001Relying upon Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516 , 500 N.W.2d 268 (1993), the trial court determined that the annexed properties and the City were neither touching, nor close enough to be contiguous, and invalidated all four annexations.

2000Accordingly, because the County timely complied with its reasonable interpretation of the appeal procedures mandated by § 66.60(12)(a), we conclude that the circuit court erred by granting the Town's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 *576 By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded. 1 A11 references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 2 In DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623 , 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999), an ambiguity arose from the interpretation of WlS.

2000Accordingly, because the County timely complied with its reasonable interpretation of the appeal procedures mandated by § 66.60(12)(a), we conclude that the circuit court erred by granting the Town's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 *576 By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded. 1 A11 references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 2 In DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623 , 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999), an ambiguity arose from the interpretation of WlS.

1980Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis.2d 379 , 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980). [2] The portion of the Town's brief dealing with the issue of appealability states: "Upon the order of the trial court, the town, over its objections, was allegedly made a party to the ch. 66 lawsuit.

1980Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis.2d 379 , 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980). [2] The portion of the Town's brief dealing with the issue of appealability states: "Upon the order of the trial court, the town, over its objections, was allegedly made a party to the ch. 66 lawsuit.

1975The issue of the capacity of the town to challenge the constitutionality of sec. 66.021 (15), Stats., was considered in Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown, ante, p. 704, 235 N. W. 2d 486 , decided November 25,1975.

1975The issue of the capacity of the town to challenge the constitutionality of sec. 66.021 (15), Stats., was *773 considered in Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown, ante, p. 704, 235 N. W. 2d 486 , decided November 25, 1975.

1958Dalrymple v. Milwaukee County, 58 Wis. 4 , 16 N. W. 21 , in 1883, that proceedings by certiorari 1 or otherwise, to review actions of municipal or other bodies with respect to which there is no specific statute of limitations, should not be permitted to be brought more than two years after the action to be reviewed.

1958Dalrymple v. Milwaukee County, 58 Wis. 4 , 16 N. W. 21 , in 1883, that proceedings by certiorari 1 or otherwise, to review actions of municipal or other bodies with respect to which there is no specific statute of limitations, should not be permitted to be brought more than two years after the action to be reviewed.

1958In Fish Creek Park Co. v. Bayside, 273 Wis. 89, 92 , 76 N. W. (2d) 557 , it was said that an action by the town to challenge an annexation on jurisdictional grounds “could be commenced within a reasonable time.” This court has stated on a number of occasions, commencing with State ex rel.

1958In Fish Creek Park Co. v. Bayside, 273 Wis. 89, 92 , 76 N. W. (2d) 557 , it was said that an action by the town to challenge an annexation on jurisdictional grounds “could be commenced within a reasonable time.” This court has stated on a number of occasions, commencing with State ex rel.

1931The quotation in the Marinette Case, supra, is as follows: “If the town treasurers do not collect money and town orders enough to pay the state and town taxes, the town will have a claim for the balance against the county when the same is collected under the provisions of sec. 1114 (now sec. 74.19), and if they cannot be collected by the county there would seem to be no injustice in saying that the loss should fall equally upon the town and county instead of upon the county alone.” Of this statement, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rosenberry in Bear Bluff v. Knutson, 189 Wis. 353, 35

1931The quotation in the Marinette Case, supra, is as follows: “If the town treasurers do not collect money and town orders enough to pay the state and town taxes, the town will have a claim for the balance against the county when the same is collected under the provisions of sec. 1114 (now sec. 74.19), and if they cannot be collected by the county there would seem to be no injustice in saying that the loss should fall equally upon the town and county instead of upon the county alone.” Of this statement, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rosenberry in Bear Bluff v. Knutson, 189 Wis. 353, 35