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39 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2023Furthermore, “[t]he rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, are personal, and accordingly, an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.” Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948–49). 2014An accused has standing to challenge the legality of a search or seizure only if he personally had a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.” 7 To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, a defendant must show both that he “had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place invaded and that society is prepared to recognize that expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.” Id. | 12 | 16 |
Villarreal v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. 2023The burden is on the defendant to prove the facts to demonstrate “a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134 , 138 12 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 8 |
Matthews, Cornelious L.green2 sentences2015See Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 606 (Tex. Crim. 2015See Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 606 (Tex. Crim. | 5 | 5 |
Richardson v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Furthermore, “[t]he rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, are personal, and accordingly, an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.” Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948–49). 2023Furthermore, “[t]he rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, are personal, and accordingly, an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.” Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 948–49). | 3 | 11 |
Tu Minh Trinh v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Dix, supra; see Trinh v. State , 974 S.W.2d at 874-75 . 2001Dix, supra; see Trinh v. State, 974 S.W.2d at 874-75 . | 3 | 3 |
Kothe v. Stategreen2 sentences2014App. 2013) (“The rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, are personal, and accordingly, an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.”); Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. 2014App. 2013) (“The rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, are personal, and accordingly, an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.”); Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State of Texas v. Betts, Tonygreen2 sentences2023See State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. 2022Since the rights secured by these constitutional provisions are personal, “an accused has standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained by an ‘unlawful’ search or seizure only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.” Betts, 397 S.W.3d at 203 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128, 139, 143 (1978)) (other citation omitted). | 1 | 5 |
Calloway v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Calloway, 743 S.W.2d at 651 . 3 The evidence here is undisputed that Hollis had no property or possessory interest in the Four Winds Dance Hall. 2007Calloway, 743 S.W.2d at 651 .3 The evidence here is undisputed that Hollis had no property or possessory interest in the Four Winds Dance Hall. | 1 | 4 |
Moore, Ex Parte Darron T.green1 sentence2017Ex parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Davidson v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Davidson v. State, 249 S.W.3d 709, 725 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Chavez v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Id.; see also Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (noting standing required to challenge seizure under article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Richardson , 865 S.W.2d at 948-49 ; Fuller v. State , 829 S.W.2d 191, 202 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.