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38 California opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2024He further asserts that under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), “[i]f there was only a violation of state law,” it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to him would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error. 2023(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the alleged error]; see also Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 [improper admission of expert’s CSAAS testimony that went beyond rehabilitating the complaining witness’s credibility was harmless].)5 II. | 7 | 26 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [ineffective assistance claim can be rejected on appeal without addressing the alleged deficiency in counsel’s performance if it is clear the same result is reasonably probable in the absence of the alleged error].) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. 2016(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) In order to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have occurred in the absence of the alleged error. | 2 | 3 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2023(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the alleged error]; see also Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 [improper admission of expert’s CSAAS testimony that went beyond rehabilitating the complaining witness’s credibility was harmless].)5 II. 2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson) [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the alleged error].) C. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Preyergreen2 sentences2021(See People v. Preyer (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [“‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge’”].) In any event, we find there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome in the absence of the alleged error. 2021(See People v. Preyer (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [“‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge’”].) In any event, we find there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome in the absence of the alleged error. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Brevermangreen2 sentences2024(People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 924 .) The Watson standard asks whether it is "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error." (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) When applying the Watson standard, "an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the 2015(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 ; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 68 .) In any event, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have resulted in the absence of the alleged error. ( Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165, 178; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Even if the jury had been instructed on simple kidnapping, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that a completed carjacking took place, and defendant kidnapped B. in order to accomplish it. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2024(People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 924 .) The Watson standard asks whether it is "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error." (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) When applying the Watson standard, "an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the 2015(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602 .) If character evidence is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s conviction will not be reversed unless it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been 19. reached in the absence of the alleged error.” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 , citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) C. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Bowkergreen2 sentences2023(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the alleged error]; see also Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 [improper admission of expert’s CSAAS testimony that went beyond rehabilitating the complaining witness’s credibility was harmless].)5 II. 2023(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the alleged error]; see also Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 [improper admission of expert’s CSAAS testimony that went beyond rehabilitating the complaining witness’s credibility was harmless].)5 II. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Larsengreen1 sentence2021(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830-831 [failure to give pinpoint instruction reviewed for prejudice under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 ].) 15 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McNealgreen1 sentence2021(See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 131 [erroneous exclusion of evidence reviewed for prejudice under state law standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ]; People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203 [same].) Murphy has not identified any evidence that he was precluded from introducing at the section 1170.95, subdivision (d) hearing, nor has he suggested the existence of any evidence that he would offer at such a hearing on remand. | 1 | 1 |
People v. DeHoyosgreen1 sentence2021(See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 131 [erroneous exclusion of evidence reviewed for prejudice under state law standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ]; People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203 [same].) Murphy has not identified any evidence that he was precluded from introducing at the section 1170.95, subdivision (d) hearing, nor has he suggested the existence of any evidence that he would offer at such a hearing on remand. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2021Code, § 354, subd (a) [judgment or decision shall not be reversed for erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the “substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by . . . an offer of proof, or by any other means”]; People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 571 [defendant forfeited any claim about purported exclusion of evidence by “failing to offer it in evidence below”].) Even assuming the claim was preserved, 20 Murphy has not shown it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have reached a different result in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Prietogreen1 sentence2016(See People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 [noting the standard announced in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 836 applies to erroneous admission of expert testimony].) D. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2015(Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 391, 394 .) Jones relies principally on two cases for the proposition that counsel had an absolute duty to file a motion to withdraw the plea. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mayfieldgreen1 sentence2015(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 ; see People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 206 .) In order to demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must show a reasonable likelihood that a different outcome would have occurred in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Luskgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jeansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kobeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Duncangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fayed
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 192 .) For all these reasons, we conclude it is not reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the alleged error. 2020(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 192 .) For all these reasons, we conclude it is not reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the alleged error. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Mendoza
red
1 sentence2025(People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 , 176–177 [applying standard of review under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].) Romero’s argument here is inconsistent with his defense that he never displayed the firearm. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 924 .) The Watson standard asks whether it is "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error." (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) When applying the Watson standard, "an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus
green
1 sentence2023(California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1449 .) To show prejudice, the Project Opponents must show it is reasonably probable that they would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Soule v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2023(Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574 .) The reason for the Project is stated in the ordinance itself: “[T]o preserve functional connectivity for wildlife and vegetation throughout the overlay zone.” The public had ample opportunity to comment on the Project through the legislative process. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. B.M. (In re B.M.)
green
1 sentence2021(See B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 534 .) There is no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Ledesma
green
1 sentence2016(Id. at pp. 687- 688, 694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 .) Flores has not even come close to establishing prejudice. 8 As we have indicated, the failure to object has not worked a forfeiture. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ballard v. Uribe
green
1 sentence2015(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 ; Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 .) It must appear more “reasonably probable” that the outcome of the case would have been different in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Lamer
green
1 sentence2015(Lamer, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) To the extent defendant contends the alleged instructional error resulted in constitutional error because it called into question the presumption of innocence and denied him his due process right to a fair trial, we are certain beyond any reasonable doubt that the result of defendant’s trial would have been the same had the trial court not instructed with CALCRIM No. 361. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lewis v. County of Sacramento
green
1 sentence2015(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 ; Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 .) It must appear more “reasonably probable” that the outcome of the case would have been different in the absence of the alleged error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Van Pham
green
1 sentence2015(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 ; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 68 .) In any event, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have resulted in the absence of the alleged error. ( Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165, 178; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Even if the jury had been instructed on simple kidnapping, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that a completed carjacking took place, and defendant kidnapped B. in order to accomplish it. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602 .) If character evidence is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s conviction will not be reversed unless it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been 19. reached in the absence of the alleged error.” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 , citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Daly v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2015(Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 746 .) The trial court considered de Jonckheere’s written and oral arguments, including his primary assertion that the hearing officer violated his due process rights by failing to allow him to call or cross-examine Officer Russey at the administrative hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Fudge
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 .) The evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Malone
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 22 , citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) It is not reasonably probably defendant would have received a more favorable trial outcome in the absence of the alleged error in this case because defendant’s fingerprints were found in the interior of the victim’s vehicle. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Chun
red
2 sentences2014"Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1201 .) The District Attorney acknowledges that Chun would require application of the Chapman standard on direct appeal, but argues that our habeas review should be more deferential. 2014“Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1201 .) The District Attorney acknowledges that Chun would require application of the Chapman standard on direct appeal, but argues that our habeas corpus review should be more deferential. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Guiton green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Lockett v. Ohio green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Lingham-Pritchard v. Commissioner green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Gaylord v. Clemmer green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.