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38 California opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Arandared2 sentences2026Regarding the effect Coreas’ statements had in incriminating J.S., we note that currently, “the Sixth Amendment protections under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine [referring to People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ], whatever their reach before, are confined to testimonial statements now.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) We previously concluded that statements in question were not testimonial, and, absent an objection on this ground to preserve this issue in the juvenile court, we have confined our review accordingly. 2026Regarding the effect Coreas’ statements had in incriminating J.S., we note that currently, “the Sixth Amendment protections under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine [referring to People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ], whatever their reach before, are confined to testimonial statements now.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) We previously concluded that statements in question were not testimonial, and, absent an objection on this ground to preserve this issue in the juvenile court, we have confined our review accordingly. | 4 | 26 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2013(Fletcher, at p. 455, citing Aranda, at pp. 528-530.) 18 Thus, at a joint trial, Aranda and Bruton bar admission of a nontestifying— defendant's out-of-court statement that incriminates a codefendant, even if the court instructs the jury to consider the statement in determining the guilt only of the declarant, because admission of the statement violates the codefendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. ( Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 126, 135-137; Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 529-530; Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 455 ; see 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Cr 2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the assumed Aranda-Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Burneygreen2 sentences2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the assumed Aranda-Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the assumed Aranda-Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 4 | 4 |
Bruton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Regarding the effect Coreas’ statements had in incriminating J.S., we note that currently, “the Sixth Amendment protections under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine [referring to People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ], whatever their reach before, are confined to testimonial statements now.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) We previously concluded that statements in question were not testimonial, and, absent an objection on this ground to preserve this issue in the juvenile court, we have confined our review accordingly. 2026Regarding the effect Coreas’ statements had in incriminating J.S., we note that currently, “the Sixth Amendment protections under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine [referring to People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ], whatever their reach before, are confined to testimonial statements now.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) We previously concluded that statements in question were not testimonial, and, absent an objection on this ground to preserve this issue in the juvenile court, we have confined our review accordingly. | 3 | 26 |
People v. Fletchergreen2 sentences2025(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 ; see People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where “[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were not facially incriminating of defendant”].) Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials, 39 “lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan to deny everything if and when they were apprehended 2024I, § 28, subd. (d) [now subd. (f)(2)]).” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465 .) 39 PEOPLE v. LAMB Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. is inapplicable and that defendant’s confrontation clause claim therefore fails.” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 129 ; see also People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1196 (Tran) [“In sum, because the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda-Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protections likewise apply only to testimonial hearsay statements”].) C. | 3 | 12 |
People v. Eppsgreen2 sentences1987That concept is widely described as the “Aranda-Bruton rule” (see, e.g., Witkin, supra, § 293A, p. 375; People v. Manson, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 150 ; People v. Epps (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 146, 157 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 733 ]; People v. Fulks (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 609, 616 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1118 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306](“Bruton-Aranda Error”)), and an objection on the grounds of “Aranda” sufficiently informs the trial court and the prosecutor that the Aranda-Bruton rule is being invoked. 2. 1987That concept is widely described as the “Aranda-Bruton rule” (see, e.g., Witkin, supra, § 293A, p. 375; People v. Manson, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 150 ; People v. Epps (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 146, 157 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 733 ]; People v. Fulks (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 609, 616 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1118 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306](“Bruton-Aranda Error”)), and an objection on the grounds of “Aranda” sufficiently informs the trial court and the prosecutor that the Aranda-Bruton rule is being invoked. 2. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Capistranogreen2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 2 | 4 |
Richardson v. Marshgreen2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 2 | 4 |
People v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 2 | 3 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2022(See generally, People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [explaining reach of Aranda-Bruton rule].) In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the confrontation clause's guarantee of the right to cross-examination even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession as to the defendant. 2022(See generally, People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [explaining reach of Aranda-Bruton rule].) In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the confrontation clause's guarantee of the right to cross-examination even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession as to the defendant. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2015A nontestifying defendant's statement that is not testimonial, however, does not implicate the confrontation clause concerns embodied by the Aranda-Bruton rule. ( Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571-572.) If the statement is not testimonial, "the issue is simply whether the statement is admissible under state law as an exception to the hearsay rule." (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 291 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 812 (Gutierrez) ["Only the admission of testimonial hearsay statements violates the confrontation clause—unless the declarant is unavailable an 2015A nontestifying defendant's statement that is not testimonial, however, does not implicate the confrontation clause concerns embodied by the Aranda-Bruton rule. ( Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571-572.) If the statement is not testimonial, "the issue is simply whether the statement is admissible under state law as an exception to the hearsay rule." (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 291 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 812 (Gutierrez) ["Only the admission of testimonial hearsay statements violates the confrontation clause—unless the declarant is unavailable an | 2 | 2 |
People v. Andersonred2 sentences1987That concept is widely described as the “Aranda-Bruton rule” (see, e.g., Witkin, supra, § 293A, p. 375; People v. Manson, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 150 ; People v. Epps (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 146, 157 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 733 ]; People v. Fulks (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 609, 616 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1118 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306](“Bruton-Aranda Error”)), and an objection on the grounds of “Aranda” sufficiently informs the trial court and the prosecutor that the Aranda-Bruton rule is being invoked. 2. 1987That concept is widely described as the “Aranda-Bruton rule” (see, e.g., Witkin, supra, § 293A, p. 375; People v. Manson, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 150 ; People v. Epps (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 146, 157 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 733 ]; People v. Fulks (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 609, 616 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1118 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306](“Bruton-Aranda Error”)), and an objection on the grounds of “Aranda” sufficiently informs the trial court and the prosecutor that the Aranda-Bruton rule is being invoked. 2. | 2 | 2 |
Harrington v. Californiared2 sentences2004(Harrington v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 250, 254 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 ].) To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question. 2004(Harrington v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 250, 254 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 ].) To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Figueroa-Cartagenagreen2 sentences2022(See Figueroa-Cartagena, supra, 612 F.3d at p. 85 [“The threshold question in every case is whether the challenged statement is testimonial.”].) In sum, because the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda-Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protections likewise apply only to testimonial hearsay statements. 2022(See Figueroa-Cartagena, supra, 612 F.3d at p. 85 [“The threshold question in every case is whether the challenged statement is testimonial.”].) In sum, because the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda-Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protections likewise apply only to testimonial hearsay statements. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Hajek and Vogreen2 sentences2015The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’” [Citation.] (People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1 2015The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’” [Citation.] (People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1 | 1 | 3 |
People v. Hardygreen2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gallardogreen2 sentences2025(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 ; see People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where “[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were not facially incriminating of defendant”].) Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials, 39 “lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan to deny everything if and when they were apprehended 2025(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 ; see People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where “[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were not facially incriminating of defendant”].) Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials, 39 “lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan to deny everything if and when they were apprehended | 1 | 2 |
People v. Fayedgreen2 sentences2025They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 688 ; accord, People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 [“a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony’”].) 37 Murphy contends the trial court violated his rights under Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause pursuant t 2025They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 688 ; accord, People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 [“a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony’”].) 37 Murphy contends the trial court violated his rights under Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause pursuant t | 1 | 2 |
People v. Brawleygreen2 sentences2015(Ibid.; People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 286 .) For 39 example, in this case, the Aranda-Bruton rule resulted in separate juries for Kyle and Inserra so that Inserra's statements to police that incriminated both Inserra and Kyle could be excluded from Kyle's jury. 2015(Ibid.; People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 286 .) For 39 example, in this case, the Aranda-Bruton rule resulted in separate juries for Kyle and Inserra so that Inserra's statements to police that incriminated both Inserra and Kyle could be excluded from Kyle's jury. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 652 [applying Chapman standard of review to alleged Aranda-Bruton error].) First, as we have said, “they dumped” did not identify the shooter or shooters. 2011(See People v. Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1390 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 ].)” He also complains that the trial court’s admonition did “not cure [the] Aranda-Bruton error,” and the violation of his right to confrontation “was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” “Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’ [Ci | 1 | 2 |
People v. Montesgreen2 sentences2025(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 ; see People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where “[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were not facially incriminating of defendant”].) Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials, 39 “lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan to deny everything if and when they were apprehended 2025(Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 207-208; People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 ; see People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [Aranda-Bruton rule inapplicable where “[t]here was no joint trial and [codefendant’s] statements were not facially incriminating of defendant”].) Murphy makes the additional argument that Smith’s denial during the police interview of any involvement in a gang or the April 11 shooting, combined with Murphy’s similar denials, 39 “lent to the inference that Murphy and Smith coordinated a plan to deny everything if and when they were apprehended | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valenciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Armstronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Greenbergergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Massiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shawn Garfield Price v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Archergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Combsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mitchamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Fulksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Atkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 7 | 2004–2025 |
People v. Arceo
green
2 sentences2016Green said that Infant, meaning Parsley, shot Duncan. 12 Parsley characterizes his argument as “error under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 has been abrogated “to the extent it required exclusion of relevant evidence that need not be excluded under federal constitutional law.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 331, fn. 12 (Greenberger).) Additionally, under Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 “a codefendant’s hearsay statement is admissible ‘if it falls within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or 2016Green said that Infant, meaning Parsley, shot Duncan. 12 Parsley characterizes his argument as “error under the Aranda-Bruton doctrine.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 has been abrogated “to the extent it required exclusion of relevant evidence that need not be excluded under federal constitutional law.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 331, fn. 12 (Greenberger).) Additionally, under Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 “a codefendant’s hearsay statement is admissible ‘if it falls within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or | 6 | 2014–2022 |
Gray v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus 2025(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 .) “The Aranda-Bruton doctrine ‘addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant,’ and prevents such a statement’s admission even if a limiting instruction is given to the jury.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1194; accord, People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 869 , overruled on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) “[T]he Confrontation Claus | 3 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2025They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 688 ; accord, People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 [“a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony’”].) 37 Murphy contends the trial court violated his rights under Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause pursuant t 2025They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 688 ; accord, People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168 [“a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony’”].) 37 Murphy contends the trial court violated his rights under Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause pursuant t | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Homick
green
2 sentences2024As we have observed, ‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self- incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830 , 869 overruled on other grounds in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) However, as Redman is forced to concede, the Aranda/Bruton rule provides only “‘a narrow exception to the general rule tha 2024As we have observed, ‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self- incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830 , 869 overruled on other grounds in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) However, as Redman is forced to concede, the Aranda/Bruton rule provides only “‘a narrow exception to the general rule tha | 2 | 2022–2024 |
Whorton v. Bockting
green
2 sentences2015The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’” [Citation.] (People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1 2015The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’” [Citation.] (People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1 | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that 7 This rule derives from People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 . 38 defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examina 2014The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “‘Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that 7 This rule derives from People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 . 38 defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examina | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdall
green
2 sentences2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the assumed Aranda-Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2013(See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the assumed Aranda-Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Black green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Raymond L. Nieves green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Wilcoxon green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Thomas v. United States green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Payne & Bond green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Moses Tootick, United States of America v. Charles Evans Frank green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Arauz green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Hardy green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Morales green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Song green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Robertson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Souza green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Castille green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Carlos v. Superior Court red | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Manson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.