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38 California opinions name it 3 courts 1914–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighinogreen2 sentences1999Variations on the standard are subject to 580b only if they come within the purpose of that section.’ (Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35, 41 .)” (Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d 603, 610 , fn. omitted.) Applying this principle, the court found that “a sale of real property for commercial development in which the vendor agrees to subordinate his senior lien under the purchase money deed of trust to the liens of lenders of the construction money for the commercial development is a variation on the standard purchase money mortgage transaction.” (Spangler v. Memel, supra, 1 Cal 1993(Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 41 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ].) Where the transaction is a variation of the standard purchase money mortgage transaction, the antideficiency statute applies only when doing so will promote the purposes underlying section 580b. | 7 | 9 |
Spangler v. Memelgreen2 sentences2016(Spangler, at p. 611.) However, “if the transaction in question is a variation on the standard purchase money mortgage or deed of trust transaction, it should be examined so as to determine whether it subserves the purposes of section 580b as explicated by us in Roseleaf and Bargioni.” (Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 .) Applying this inquiry, we concluded that “the subordination clause situation is sufficiently different from the standard purchase money mortgage situation to remove it from automatic application of section 580b.” (Id. at pp. 611-612.) We went on to explain that the purpose 1999We are of the view that if the transaction in question is a variation on the standard purchase money mortgage or deed of trust transaction, it should be examined so as to determine whether it subserves the purposes of section 580b...." ( Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 .) Thus, Spangler created a two-part inquiry: does the sale vary from a standard purchase money transaction, and if so, does applying section 580b's antideficiency protection comport with the Legislature's intent? | 6 | 13 |
Boyle v. Sweeneygreen2 sentences1996(See Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 .) ‘[T]he determining factor is not the intended use per se; rather “the purchaser does not intend to continue with the same use of the property but actually intends a different use which contemplates considerable improvement of it.” ’ [Citation.]” (Boyle v. Sweeney (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003-1004 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 153 ].) Substantial evidence supported the finding that there was a change of use affecting the value of respondent’s security. 1991(Spangler v. Memel (1972) 7 Cal.3d 603, 610-611 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 ], quoting Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 41; Boyle v. Sweeney, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001 .) It appears both Anderson and Stone acknowledge the instant transaction could only fall within section 580b protection as a variation on the standard purchase money transaction. | 2 | 3 |
Shepherd v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1999The only possible protection available to the vendor[,] other than careful and sometimes fortuitous choice of purchasers, is to allow a deficiency judgment against the commercial developer." ( Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 614 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 .) The Court of Appeal has, in various decisions, properly recognized that Spangler 's application is limited. " Spangler does not make the mere presence of a subordination agreement a push button that defeats the rule of automatic application of section 580b. [Citation.] It is only when a subordination agreement signals a pronounced 1999The only possible protection available to the vendor[,] other than careful and sometimes fortuitous choice of purchasers, is to allow a deficiency judgment against the commercial developer." ( Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 614 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 .) The Court of Appeal has, in various decisions, properly recognized that Spangler 's application is limited. " Spangler does not make the mere presence of a subordination agreement a push button that defeats the rule of automatic application of section 580b. [Citation.] It is only when a subordination agreement signals a pronounced | 2 | 2 |
Long v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(Spangler v. Memel (1972) 7 Cal.3d 603, 610-611 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 ]; Long v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 499, 504 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 337 ]; see Ziegler v. Barnes (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 224, 229, 232 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; see also 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Security Transactions in Real Property, § 169, pp. 668-670.) A sale of real property in which the vendor agrees to subordinate his or her senior lien under the purchase money deed of trust to the liens of construction lenders—the same factual situation as is presented in this case—constitutes a variat 1989(See Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 610-611; Long v. Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 504 ; see also Ziegler v. Barnes, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 229, 232.) Spangler and its progeny instruct us that a variation of the standard purchase money transaction occurs when, after the vendor agrees to subordinate his or her deed of trust to a construction lender’s deed of trust, the underlying property is to be developed for a more intensive use that makes the present value of the property an unreliable indicator of its actual fair market value. | 2 | 2 |
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2012(Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a)(1) [notice shall include a brief description of the project]; see International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 265, 273 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 875 ] [project description in notice was of debatable adequacy].) See footnote, ante, page 408. 2012(Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a)(1) [notice shall include a brief description of the project]; see International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 265, 273 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 875 ] [project description in notice was of debatable adequacy].) See footnote, ante, page 408. | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Commissiongreen2 sentences2012The mixture of ministerial and discretionary action has been addressed by the California Supreme Court: “Where a project involves elements of both ministerial and discretionary action, it is subject to CEQA. [Citations.]” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 119 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580 , 939 P.2d 1280 ]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act, supra, § 4.27, p. 186.1.) A slight variation of this principle—one phrased in terms of a single approval—is set forth in subdivision (d) of Guidelines section 15268: “Where a project involves an 2012The mixture of ministerial and discretionary action has been addressed by the California Supreme Court: “Where a project involves elements of both ministerial and discretionary action, it is subject to CEQA. [Citations.]” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 119 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580 , 939 P.2d 1280 ]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act, supra, § 4.27, p. 186.1.) A slight variation of this principle—one phrased in terms of a single approval—is set forth in subdivision (d) of Guidelines section 15268: “Where a project involves an | 1 | 1 |
Boon v. Riveragreen2 sentences2010(Boon v. Rivera (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1326-1327 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) A. The Claims Against the Individual Directors 1. 2010(Boon v. Rivera (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1326-1327 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) A. The Claims Against the Individual Directors 1. | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Jewettgreen1 sentence2007“In its most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. [Citation.] Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. [Citations.]” | 1 | 1 |
Priebe v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2007“In its most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. [Citation.] Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. [Citations.]” 2007“In its most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. [Citation.] Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. [Citations.]” | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences2005A variation of the rule was applied in Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 725-726 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 , 41 P.3d 128 ] (Hamilton), where the court held that an insurance company defending its insured cannot be held liable on the policy where the insured settles without the insurer’s participation or consent and without the benefit of an actual trial to determine its, and thus the insurer’s, ultimate liability. 4 The portion of the April 30 order that we specified for deletion ran from page 4, line 14 through page 7, line 15, and consisted of the discussion concerning the 2005A variation of the rule was applied in Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 725-726 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 , 41 P.3d 128 ] (Hamilton), where the court held that an insurance company defending its insured cannot be held liable on the policy where the insured settles without the insurer’s participation or consent and without the benefit of an actual trial to determine its, and thus the insurer’s, ultimate liability. 4 The portion of the April 30 order that we specified for deletion ran from page 4, line 14 through page 7, line 15, and consisted of the discussion concerning the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carreragreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Melhadogreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carpentergreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castanedagreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Diedrichgreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici 2001(See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 643 P.2d 971 ]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ]; e.g., People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1058 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 988 P.2d 531 ] [failure to give instruction harmless]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311-312 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 ] [failure to instruct not error]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1539 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 ] [failure to instruct prejudici | 1 | 1 |
People v. Overstreetgreen2 sentences1999(People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 726 P.2d 1288 ].) But the word “or,” at least in the context of paragraph (B), is not susceptible to being understood as “and,” any more than paragraph (D)’s reference to “an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” is susceptible to being understood as referring, as well, to offenses that are not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) but are classified as “serious” or “violent.” If, perhaps, the court were forced to choose between two possible ways of rewriting 1999(People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 726 P.2d 1288 ].) But the word “or,” at least in the context of paragraph (B), is not susceptible to being understood as “and,” any more than paragraph (D)’s reference to “an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” is susceptible to being understood as referring, as well, to offenses that are not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) but are classified as “serious” or “violent.” If, perhaps, the court were forced to choose between two possible ways of rewriting | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Allertgreen2 sentences1999The only possible protection available to the vendor[,] other than careful and sometimes fortuitous choice of purchasers, is to allow a deficiency judgment against the commercial developer." ( Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 614 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 .) The Court of Appeal has, in various decisions, properly recognized that Spangler 's application is limited. " Spangler does not make the mere presence of a subordination agreement a push button that defeats the rule of automatic application of section 580b. [Citation.] It is only when a subordination agreement signals a pronounced 1999The only possible protection available to the vendor[,] other than careful and sometimes fortuitous choice of purchasers, is to allow a deficiency judgment against the commercial developer." ( Spangler, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 614 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 807 , 498 P.2d 1055 .) The Court of Appeal has, in various decisions, properly recognized that Spangler 's application is limited. " Spangler does not make the mere presence of a subordination agreement a push button that defeats the rule of automatic application of section 580b. [Citation.] It is only when a subordination agreement signals a pronounced | 1 | 1 |
| Roskamp Manley Associates, Inc. v. Davin Development & Investment Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ziegler v. Barnesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allstate Savings & Loan Assn. v. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goodyear v. MacKgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bank of Costa Mesa v. Losackgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Langergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
IT Corp. v. County of Imperial
green
2 sentences2020(IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 66, 72–73.) The IT Corp. standard is highly pertinent here because AB 5 specifically authorizes the Attorney General or a city attorney or prosecutor to bring “an action for injunctive 17 relief to prevent the continued misclassification of employees as independent contractors.” (§ 2786; see former § 2750.3, subd. (j).) The injunction at issue in IT Corp. restrained a company from disposing of unauthorized wastes at a particular site, in violation of a zoning ordinance that specifically authorized injunctive relief. 2020(IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 66, 72–73.) The IT Corp. standard is highly pertinent here because AB 5 specifically authorizes the Attorney General or a city attorney or prosecutor to bring “an action for injunctive 17 relief to prevent the continued misclassification of employees as independent contractors.” (§ 2786; see former § 2750.3, subd. (j).) The injunction at issue in IT Corp. restrained a company from disposing of unauthorized wastes at a particular site, in violation of a zoning ordinance that specifically authorized injunctive relief. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Bauman v. Ross
green
2 sentences1997(See United States v. River Rouge Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 411 [ 46 S.Ct. 144 , 70 L.Ed. 339 ]; Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U.S. 548 [ 17 S.Ct. 966 , 42 L.Ed. 270 ].) As discussed in the text, contrary to the before-and-after rule, under the present eminent domain statutes of this state benefits may be set off only against damage to the remaining property, not against compensation for the part taken. (§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) The current federal law of eminent domain provides for setoff of “special and direct” benefits against both severance damages and compensation for the taking. 1997(See United States v. River Rouge Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 411 [ 46 S.Ct. 144 , 70 L.Ed. 339 ]; Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U.S. 548 [ 17 S.Ct. 966 , 42 L.Ed. 270 ].) As discussed in the text, contrary to the before-and-after rule, under the present eminent domain statutes of this state benefits may be set off only against damage to the remaining property, not against compensation for the part taken. (§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) The current federal law of eminent domain provides for setoff of “special and direct” benefits against both severance damages and compensation for the taking. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co.
green
2 sentences1997(See United States v. River Rouge Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 411 [ 46 S.Ct. 144 , 70 L.Ed. 339 ]; Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U.S. 548 [ 17 S.Ct. 966 , 42 L.Ed. 270 ].) As discussed in the text, contrary to the before-and-after rule, under the present eminent domain statutes of this state benefits may be set off only against damage to the remaining property, not against compensation for the part taken. (§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) The current federal law of eminent domain provides for setoff of “special and direct” benefits against both severance damages and compensation for the taking. 1997(See United States v. River Rouge Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 411 [ 46 S.Ct. 144 , 70 L.Ed. 339 ]; Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U.S. 548 [ 17 S.Ct. 966 , 42 L.Ed. 270 ].) As discussed in the text, contrary to the before-and-after rule, under the present eminent domain statutes of this state benefits may be set off only against damage to the remaining property, not against compensation for the part taken. (§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) The current federal law of eminent domain provides for setoff of “special and direct” benefits against both severance damages and compensation for the taking. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Darden
green
2 sentences2018The United States Supreme Court's decision in Darden , supra , 503 U.S. 318 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 , in holding that this standard applies in interpreting the meaning of the term "employee" in federal statutes that do not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of that term, lists 12 secondary factors to be considered in addition to the right to control factor. ( 503 U.S. at p. 323 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 [quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) 490 U.S. 730 , 751-752, 109 S.Ct. 2166 , 104 L.Ed.2d 811 ].) The IRS has adopted a variation of this standard which lists 20 secondary factors 2018The United States Supreme Court's decision in Darden , supra , 503 U.S. 318 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 , in holding that this standard applies in interpreting the meaning of the term "employee" in federal statutes that do not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of that term, lists 12 secondary factors to be considered in addition to the right to control factor. ( 503 U.S. at p. 323 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 [quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) 490 U.S. 730 , 751-752, 109 S.Ct. 2166 , 104 L.Ed.2d 811 ].) The IRS has adopted a variation of this standard which lists 20 secondary factors | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
green
2 sentences2018The United States Supreme Court's decision in Darden , supra , 503 U.S. 318 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 , in holding that this standard applies in interpreting the meaning of the term "employee" in federal statutes that do not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of that term, lists 12 secondary factors to be considered in addition to the right to control factor. ( 503 U.S. at p. 323 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 [quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) 490 U.S. 730 , 751-752, 109 S.Ct. 2166 , 104 L.Ed.2d 811 ].) The IRS has adopted a variation of this standard which lists 20 secondary factors 2018The United States Supreme Court's decision in Darden , supra , 503 U.S. 318 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 , in holding that this standard applies in interpreting the meaning of the term "employee" in federal statutes that do not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of that term, lists 12 secondary factors to be considered in addition to the right to control factor. ( 503 U.S. at p. 323 , 112 S.Ct. 1344 [quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) 490 U.S. 730 , 751-752, 109 S.Ct. 2166 , 104 L.Ed.2d 811 ].) The IRS has adopted a variation of this standard which lists 20 secondary factors | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Coley v. M & M MARS, INC.
green
1 sentence2015Based on the facts of Rackin, we question whether this is, indeed, a discrete exception to the doctrine, as opposed to a variation of the exception applicable to conduct outside the scope of employment.8 The court in Coley v. M & M Mars, Inc. (M.D.Ga. 1978) 461 F.Supp. 1073 rejected the multiple discriminatory acts exception to the doctrine based on the “general rule . . . that a single entity cannot conspire with itself” no matter the number of acts involved. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fox v. JAMDAT MOBILE, INC.
green
1 sentence2013This is a variation of the rule that the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision, not its rationale. [Citation.]” (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 .) II. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences2007Applying a slight variation of the analysis that this court adopted in Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d 92 , 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , I conclude that releases for gross negligence are not enforceable in this particular context. 2007Applying a slight variation of the analysis that this court adopted in Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d 92 , 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 383 P.2d 441 , I conclude that releases for gross negligence are not enforceable in this particular context. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Calatayud v. State of California
green
2 sentences2007“In its most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. [Citation.] Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. [Citations.]” 2007“In its most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. [Citation.] Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. [Citations.]” | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wright v. Johnston
green
1 sentence1999Accordingly, in such a situation, an analysis of the factual situation in the light of the purposes of the section is required. (7 Cal.3d at pp. 611-612.) After that analysis, the court concluded that “the purchaser not the vendor [should] bear the risk of failure, particularly since in the event of default, the junior lienor vendor will lose both the land and the purchase price.” (Id., at p. 613.) Accordingly, “. . . when in the sale of real property for commercial development, the vendor pursuant to the agreement of sale, subordinates his purchase money lien to the lien securing the purchase | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bargioni v. Hill green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Celotex Corp. v. Copeland green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Gong v. City of Fremont green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Betancourt v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hollman v. Warren green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Frost v. Trustees of California State University & Colleges green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Knoff v. City & County of San Francisco green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Veterans' Industries, Inc. v. Lynch green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hilton v. Board of Supervisors green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Ballard v. Anderson green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Phyle v. Duffy green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State Board of Equalization v. Watson green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hays v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Jackson v. Taylor green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head District green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. Jensen green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Carrieres v. Commissioner green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Freedland v. Greco green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Patterson v. Nixon green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Medway Cotton Manufactory v. Adams neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| President of the Commercial Bank v. French green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Walter G. Reese Co. v. House green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.