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5 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Industrial Energy Consumers v. Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC Public Utility Commission of Texasgreen1 sentence2016Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 102-03 (Tex.2010) (explaining that prior case law, which relied on the agency’s own sever-ability rule, had invalidated a Public Utility Commission rule only as to the timing portion of the rule, not the interest rate portion of the rule). | 1 | 1 |
Taryn Ef v. Joshua Mcgreen2 sentences2003Taryn E.F. by Grünewald v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418, 422 (App.1993) (holding that use of the term "any insured” “unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages in excluda-ble conduct”). 4 . 2003Taryn E.F. by Grünewald v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418, 422 (App.1993) (holding that use of the term "any insured” “unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages in excluda-ble conduct”). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
American Family Mutual Insurance v. Copeland-Williamsgreen1 sentence2003Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 629 (Mo. Ct.App.1997) (holding that "[t]he use of the phrase ‘any insured’ makes the exclusionary clause unambiguous even in light of the sever-ability clause”); c.f. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Doctors Hospitalgreen2 sentences2000See id. (construing the statute’s severability clause, found in Act of Aug. 29, 1977, ch. 817, § 41.04). “[I]f, when we strike the statute’s application to the common law claims, we are left with something which ‘remains complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must stand.’ ” Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845 (quoting Western Union Tel. 2000See id. (construing the statute’s severability clause, found in Act of Aug. 29, 1977, ch. 817, § 41.04). “[I]f, when we strike the statute’s application to the common law claims, we are left with something which ‘remains complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must stand.’ ” Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845 (quoting Western Union Tel. | 1 | 1 |
Sharber v. Florencegreen2 sentences1990The goal of this severability clause, to retain valid portions and applications of the statute whenever possible, reflects the case law’s reminder that “[i]n the construction of statutes, if it can be lawfully done, it is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to render it valid.” Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 345 , 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1938). 1990The goal of this severability clause, to retain valid portions and applications of the statute whenever possible, reflects the case law’s reminder that “[i]n the construction of statutes, if it can be lawfully done, it is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to render it valid.” Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 345 , 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Tullos
green
1 sentence1979The sever-ability clause in this case is identical to the one that we applied in Ex parte Tullos, supra, to save the 17-year-old classification in Article 67017-4. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.