subject of judicial inquiry in Illinois

1984The statute here involved is part of the regulatory scheme and, as the court said in Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 103 , “[wjhether the course chosen is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry” ( 51 Ill. 2d 103, 111 ).

1984The statute here involved is part of the regulatory scheme and, as the court said in Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 103 , “[wjhether the course chosen is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry” ( 51 Ill. 2d 103, 111 ).

1981(Schreiber v. County of Cook (1944), 388 Ill. 297 ; Stewart v. Brady (1921), 300 Ill. 425 .) If there is a reasonable basis for the classification and it bears a reasonable and proper relation to the purposes of the Act, the classification is not unreasonable.

1980(Schreiber v. County of Cook (1944), 388 Ill. 297 ; Stewart v. Brady (1921), 300 Ill. 425 .) If there is a reasonable basis for the classification and it bears a reasonable and proper relation to the purposes of the Act, the classification is not unreasonable.

1981(Schreiber v. County of Cook (1944), 388 Ill. 297 ; Stewart v. Brady (1921), 300 Ill. 425 .) If there is a reasonable basis for the classification and it bears a reasonable and proper relation to the purposes of the Act, the classification is not unreasonable.

1980(Schreiber v. County of Cook (1944), 388 Ill. 297 ; Stewart v. Brady (1921), 300 Ill. 425 .) If there is a reasonable basis for the classification and it bears a reasonable and proper relation to the purposes of the Act, the classification is not unreasonable.

1991(People v. Love (1921), 298 Ill. 304, 312 .) The question of whether the course chosen by the legislature to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.

1989(People v. Love (1921), 298 Ill. 304, 312 .) The question of whether the course chosen by the legislature to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.

2018Accordingly, the Court held, “[t]he purity of [a judge’s] motives cannot *** be the subject of judicial inquiry.” Id. at 347 . ¶ 25 Here, the parties presented the defendant justices with a controversy to be decided in their judicial capacity, and the defendant justices resolved that controversy by entering an order.

2017Accordingly, the Court held, "[t]he purity of [a judge's] motives cannot *** be the subject of judicial inquiry." Id. at 347 . *1047 ¶ 25 Here, the parties presented the defendant justices with a controversy to be decided in their judicial capacity, and the defendant justices resolved that controversy by entering an order.

2003Sherman , 203 Ill. 2d at 297 .

2003Sherman, 203 Ill. 2d at 297 .

1999Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 503 .

1999Shephard , 152 Ill. 2d at 503 .

1985(Thornton v. Mono Manufacturing Co. (1981), 99 Ill.

1983App. 3d 722 , 425 N.E.2d 522 ; see also “Beat the Clock.”) Whether this statute is wise or is the best means to achieve the purpose of the legislature is not, of course, a proper subject of judicial inquiry.

1990Defendant relies heavily upon People v. Clark (1979), 70 Ill.

1989Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487 , 99 L.Ed. 563 , 571, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464 .

1989Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487 , 99 L.Ed. 563 , 571, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464 .

1989The State has a substantial interest in promoting the general welfare by licensing physicians. ( Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill.2d 488, 497 .) The legislature is presumed to have investigated the question and ascertained what is best for the good of the profession and the good of the people among whom it is practiced. ( People v. Love (1921), 298 Ill. 304, 312 .) The question of whether the course chosen by the legislature to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry. ( Garcia v. Tully (1978), 72 Ill.2d 1, 10 .) It is for the

1987As the court has stated, “ ‘[wjhether the course chosen by the General Assembly to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.’ ” People v. Tosch (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 474, 482 , quoting Garcia v. Tully (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 1,10 .

1987(People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 215 .) We believe the legislature may assign a circuit court to exercise the powers that are reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose (City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 184 ), and we consider that here it was proper to authorize the circuit court to issue Judicial Driving Permits (People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517 ) .

1987(People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 215 .) We believe the legislature may assign a circuit court to exercise the powers that are reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose (City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 184 ), and we consider that here it was proper to authorize the circuit court to issue Judicial Driving Permits (People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517 ) .

1987(People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 215 .) We believe the legislature may assign a circuit court to exercise the powers that are reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose (City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 184 ), and we consider that here it was proper to authorize the circuit court to issue Judicial Driving Permits (People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517 ) .

1986Ed. 2d 273 , 91 S. Ct. 1889 .) As this court observed in Garcia v. Tully (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 1, 10 , “Whether the course chosen by the General Assembly to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.” We hold that the signature requirements of section 9 — 2 of the Liquor Control Act did not deprive voters of equal protection nor impinge upon their first amendment rights to contribute funds, advertise, or associate with other voters in support of a referendum.

1985(Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 116, 123 , 412 N.E.2d 151, 154 .) Whether this statute is the best means to achieve the desired goal of the legislature is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry; it is enough that the statute bears a reasonable relationship to its intended purpose.

1985(Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 116, 123 , 412 N.E.2d 151, 154 .) Whether this statute is the best means to achieve the desired goal of the legislature is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry; it is enough that the statute bears a reasonable relationship to its intended purpose.

1983The case of Lublin v. Central Islip Psychiatric Center (1977), 43 N.Y.2d 341 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 466 , 372 N.E.2d 307 , already quoted in part above, sets out the specific rationale as to why such a statutory allocation of the burden of proof in a NGRI release hearing does not violate equal protection.

1983The case of Lublin v. Central Islip Psychiatric Center (1977), 43 N.Y.2d 341 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 466 , 372 N.E.2d 307 , already quoted in part above, sets out the specific rationale as to why such a statutory allocation of the burden of proof in a NGRI release hearing does not violate equal protection.

1982Stobo v. Davis Provision Co. (1894), 54 Ill.

1981(Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 175 , 290 N.E.2d 589 ; Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 103 , 281 N.E.2d 317 .) “Whether the course chosen is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.” Bridgewater v. Hotz, at Ill.

1981(Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 175 , 290 N.E.2d 589 ; Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 103 , 281 N.E.2d 317 .) “Whether the course chosen is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.” Bridgewater v. Hotz, at Ill.

1979This was not bare evidence of arrests which have not resulted in conviction but a full presentation of facts and circumstances where the evidence was introduced formally with due opportunity for confrontation, cross-examination and rebuttal.” 33 Ill.

1979This was not bare evidence of arrests which have not resulted in conviction but a full presentation of facts and circumstances where the evidence was introduced formally with due opportunity for confrontation, cross-examination and rebuttal." 33 Ill.

1978Ed. 1234, 1242-43 , 58 S. Ct. 778 , 784-85: “Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry * * *. ” 6 0 But by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.

1968A comment in the case of Village of Justice v. Jamieson, 7 Ill App2d 113, 129 NE2d 269 (1955) is particularly demonstrative of the distinction which the Village urges.

1894Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U. S. 605 .