Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1923–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Raleigh v. Rileygreen2 sentences1998Moreover, "the law presumes that a public official or governing body will discharge its duty in a regular manner and act within its delegated authority." City of Raleigh v. Riley, 64 N.C.App. 623, 636 , 308 S.E.2d 464, 473 (1983). 1998Moreover, "the law presumes that a public official or governing body will discharge its duty in a regular manner and act within its delegated authority." City of Raleigh v. Riley, 64 N.C.App. 623, 636 , 308 S.E.2d 464, 473 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
REDEVELOPMENT COM'N OF CITY OF WASHINGTON v. Grimesgreen2 sentences1998On the contrary, in Grimes, our Supreme Court observed that when construing legislation granting the power of condemnation, the courts of this State have held that "where the general power to condemn exists, the right of selection as to route, quantity, etc., is left largely to the discretion of the company or corporation, and does not become the subject of judicial inquiry except on allegations of fact tending to show bad faith on the part of the company or corporation or an oppressive and manifest abuse of the discretion conferred upon them by law." 277 N.C. at 641 , 178 S.E.2d at 349 (citat 1998On the contrary, in Grimes, our Supreme Court observed that when construing legislation granting the power of condemnation, the courts of this State have held that "where the general power to condemn exists, the right of selection as to route, quantity, etc., is left largely to the discretion of the company or corporation, and does not become the subject of judicial inquiry except on allegations of fact tending to show bad faith on the part of the company or corporation or an oppressive and manifest abuse of the discretion conferred upon them by law." 277 N.C. at 641 , 178 S.E.2d at 349 (citat | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler
green
2 sentences1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). 1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). | 2 | 1971–1972 |
Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Irvin
green
2 sentences1998Although the propriety of a taking is generally not reviewable by the courts once a public purpose is established, our courts have consistently held that “[u]pon specific allegations tending to show bad faith, malice, wantonness, or oppressive and manifest abuse of dis cretion by the condemnor, [the takings] issue . . . becomes a subject of judicial inquiry as a question of fact to be determined by the judge.” Greensboro-Highpoint Airport Authority v. Irvin, 36 N.C. 1998App. 662, 665 , 245 S.E.2d 390, 392 , appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548 , 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 , 59 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Airport Authority v. Irvin
green
2 sentences1998App. 662, 665 , 245 S.E.2d 390, 392 , appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548 , 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 , 59 L. 1998App. 662, 665 , 245 S.E.2d 390, 392 , appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548 , 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 , 59 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Levitt v. United States
green
1 sentence1998App. 662, 665 , 245 S.E.2d 390, 392 , appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548 , 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 , 59 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Irvin v. Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority
green
1 sentence1998App. 662, 665 , 245 S.E.2d 390, 392 , appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 548 , 248 S.E.2d 726 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 , 59 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
City of Charlotte v. McNeely
green
2 sentences1978To the foregoing rule proscribing judicial interference with the condemning body’s determination of necessity, there is an exception, to wit: “Upon specific allegations tending to show bad faith, malice, wantonness, or oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion by the condemnor, the issue raised becomes the subject of judicial inquiry as a question of fact to be determined by the judge.” (Emphasis added.) City of Charlotte v. McNeely, supra, 281 N.C. at 690 , 190 S.E. 2d at 185 , and cases cited therein. 1978To the foregoing rule proscribing judicial interference with the condemning body’s determination of necessity, there is an exception, to wit: “Upon specific allegations tending to show bad faith, malice, wantonness, or oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion by the condemnor, the issue raised becomes the subject of judicial inquiry as a question of fact to be determined by the judge.” (Emphasis added.) City of Charlotte v. McNeely, supra, 281 N.C. at 690 , 190 S.E. 2d at 185 , and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Town of Selma v. Nobles
neutral
1 sentence1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
In Re Housing Authority of City of Salisbury
green
2 sentences1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). 1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Kaperonis v. North Carolina State Highway Commission
green
2 sentences1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). 1972In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463 , 70 S.E. 2d 500 (1952); Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322 , 111 *691 S.E. 543 (1922); Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269 , 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Jeffress v. Greenville, supra. See Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587 , 133 S.E. 2d 464 (1963). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Stratford v. City of Greensboro
green
1 sentence1923The question is purely political, does not require a hearing, and is not the subject of judicial inquiry." The plaintiffs rely upon Stratford v. Greensboro , 124 N.C. 127 , but as to that case it was said by Hoke, J. , in Edwards v. Comrs. , 170 N.C. 451 , cited in Allen v. Reidsville , 178 N.C. 532 : "In that case there was specific allegation, with evidence tending to show that the action of the city authorities was in pursuance to a contract admittedly *Page 143 entered into with the individual defendant and making it according to plaintiff's evidence, not at all improbable that the measure | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.