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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ross v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93 , ¶ 27 n.19, 293 P.3d 345 (“This section of the Utah Code has since been revised to eliminate the extreme emotional distress defense.”). 2017See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93 , ¶ 27 n.19, 293 P.3d 345 (“This section of the Utah Code has since been revised to eliminate the extreme emotional distress defense.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2013"In many cases this triggering event will naturally occur just before the criminal act; however, we find no language in our precedent that requires the triggering event be contempora-meous with the defendant's loss of self-control." Id. 131 For example, in State v. White, the supreme court reversed our denial of an extreme emotional distress instruction. 2013This distinction of “exposed” versus “self-imposed” “guide[s] the evaluative process of extreme emotional distress claims in our courts.” White, 2011 UT 21, ¶¶ 22-23 , 251 P.3d 820 (recognizing that because “all intentional homicides, with the exception of those by cold-blooded killers or in the course of a felony, are abnormal acts for the perpetrators and the result of strong emotions and stresses[,] ... a distinction must be drawn so that this defense will only be applicable to those homicides which appropriately qualify under the underlying purpose of this mitigating defense and not en mas | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2013“Thus, defendant’s emotional disturbance was a product of his knowingly or intentionally involving himself in the commission of a crime and [is not] excusable [under the extreme emotional distress defense].” See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 276, 283 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that any error in the jury instructions regarding the defense of extreme emotional distress was harmless where “[t]he triggering event” prompting the defendant to go on a shooting spree “was his escape attempt [from custody in court] in which he was wounded”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shumwaygreen2 sentences2013In analyzing a claim of extreme emotional distress, the defendant’s “reaction cannot be viewed in isolation” because a “broader context” will help paint “an accurate picture of the past experiences and emotions that give meaning to that reaction.” Id. ¶ 31; see also State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 10 , 63 P.3d 94 (determining that an instruction on an extreme emotional distress defense was warranted where the teenager, who ultimately stabbed his friend to death, was a victim of bullying for many years). ¶ 5 While Augustine’s expert witness’s testimony would support a subjective distress analy 2013In analyzing a claim of extreme emotional distress, the defendant’s “reaction cannot be viewed in isolation” because a “broader context” will help paint “an accurate picture of the past experiences and emotions that give meaning to that reaction.” Id. ¶ 31; see also State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 10 , 63 P.3d 94 (determining that an instruction on an extreme emotional distress defense was warranted where the teenager, who ultimately stabbed his friend to death, was a victim of bullying for many years). ¶ 5 While Augustine’s expert witness’s testimony would support a subjective distress analy | 1 | 1 |
State v. Drejgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, 119 , 233 P.3d 476 (''The plain language of section 76-5-205.5 leaves no doubt that the [Llegislature did not intend to enact special mitigation as an affirmative defense.... [Sipecial mitigation is found in its own statutory section rather than included with the affirmative defenses to murder found in section 76-5-203."). 2011See State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, 119 , 233 P.3d 476 (''The plain language of section 76-5-205.5 leaves no doubt that the [Llegislature did not intend to enact special mitigation as an affirmative defense.... [Sipecial mitigation is found in its own statutory section rather than included with the affirmative defenses to murder found in section 76-5-203."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2011See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471 . 21 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hull
green
2 sentences2022(Supp. 2021). 20200685-CA 10 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn decide” that asking for an extreme emotional distress instruction “would detract from his strategy.” The district court agreed that “[o]bjectively reasonable trial counsel could strategize to rely solely on [Flynn’s] claim of self-defense and not raise an extreme emotional distress argument because it would undermine [Flynn’s] claim that he was deliberately standing his ground.” We agree. ¶18 “A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, so long as the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the 2022(Supp. 2021). 20200685-CA 10 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn decide” that asking for an extreme emotional distress instruction “would detract from his strategy.” The district court agreed that “[o]bjectively reasonable trial counsel could strategize to rely solely on [Flynn’s] claim of self-defense and not raise an extreme emotional distress argument because it would undermine [Flynn’s] claim that he was deliberately standing his ground.” We agree. ¶18 “A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, so long as the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Flynn
green
2 sentences2022(Supp. 2021). 20200685-CA 10 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn decide” that asking for an extreme emotional distress instruction “would detract from his strategy.” The district court agreed that “[o]bjectively reasonable trial counsel could strategize to rely solely on [Flynn’s] claim of self-defense and not raise an extreme emotional distress argument because it would undermine [Flynn’s] claim that he was deliberately standing his ground.” We agree. ¶18 “A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, so long as the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the 2022The court denied Flynn’s motion, 20200685-CA 7 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn reasoning that counsel was not ineffective because objectively reasonable counsel could have concluded that the evidence was not strong enough to support an extreme emotional distress claim and that such a claim could undermine his self-defense claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Low
green
2 sentences2011See Urar Cope Amn. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i) (2008) ("It is an affirmative defense to a charge of ... attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another ... under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse."); State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 122 , 192 P.3d 867 (noting that in 1999, the Legislature removed the extreme emotional distress defense from Utah's manslaughter statute and inserted it into the murder statute as an affirmative defense). 2011See Urar Cope Amn. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i) (2008) ("It is an affirmative defense to a charge of ... attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another ... under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse."); State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 122 , 192 P.3d 867 (noting that in 1999, the Legislature removed the extreme emotional distress defense from Utah's manslaughter statute and inserted it into the murder statute as an affirmative defense). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.