purely subjective analysis (Utah) · Go Syfert
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purely subjective analysis in Utah

5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Orsellogreen
minn · 1996 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[ ] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” *736 so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). ¶ 28 In considering Robert’s request for an injunction, the district court repeatedly focused on the fact that

22
Baird v. Bairdgreen
utah · 2014 · cited in 3 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
2 sentences

2024“When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to protect against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, ¶ 27 , 322 P.3d 728 (cleaned up). ¶22 Here, the district court appropriately analyzed Thomas’s conduct in light of the specific facts and circumstances at hand.

2024“When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to protect against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, ¶ 27 , 322 P.3d 728 (cleaned up). ¶22 Here, the district court appropriately analyzed Thomas’s conduct in light of the specific facts and circumstances at hand.

13
Cesare v. Cesaregreen
nj · 1998 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

11
Hes v. Jcsgreen
nj · 2003 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

11
State v. Hinchliffegreen
vt · 2009 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Anderson v. Deem green
utahctapp · 2023
1 sentence

2023Still, our supreme court has cautioned that “when assessing these and other relevant factors, . . . courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to protect against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or (continued…) 20210558-CA 14 2023 UT App 48 Anderson v. Deem ¶30 Here, the district court’s analysis was legally flawed because it approached the matter using an insular rather than a holistic framework to arrive at its conclusion that Deem’s course of conduct was not of such a type as to cause fear

12023–2023
Roper v. Shovan neutral
utahctapp · 2013
2 sentences

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

12014–2014
Coombs v. Dietrich green
utahctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v.

12014–2014

Statutes the citing opinions construe

UT § Utah Code § 76-5-106.5 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

AL 7 (1984–2006) NJ 5 (1994–2009) UT 5 (2014–2024) PA 4 (2009–2019) MI 4 (1992–1996) CA 4 (2001–2014) WA 4 (1981–2023) TX 4 (1993–2015) CT 3 (1993–2020) NY 3 (1986–2023) KS 3 (1991–2008) VT 2 (2010–2010) OR 2 (2023–2025) VA 2 (1981–2009) IA 2 (2019–2025) NH 2 (1993–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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