5 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011“To invoke this right, a suspect must state his desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for counsel.” Id. at 49 , 613 S.E.2d at 584 ; see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (originally setting forth this rule). “[T]he invocation of the right to counsel -2- must be clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal.” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 136 , 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009). 2005Id. at 328 , 568 S.E.2d at 699 ; see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2011When a suspect invokes this right, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,” id. at 474 , “unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). “[T]he determination whether [a suspect] actually invoked his right to counsel is a purely objective inquiry.” Hilliard, 270 Va. at 50 , 613 S.E.2d at 584 . | 1 | 1 |
Zektaw v. Com.green2 sentences2011“To invoke this right, a suspect must state his desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for counsel.” Id. at 49 , 613 S.E.2d at 584 ; see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (originally setting forth this rule). “[T]he invocation of the right to counsel -2- must be clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal.” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 136 , 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009). 2011“To invoke this right, a suspect must state his desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for counsel.” Id. at 49 , 613 S.E.2d at 584 ; see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (originally setting forth this rule). “[T]he invocation of the right to counsel -2- must be clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal.” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 136 , 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Hilliard
green
2 sentences2026The subjective understanding of the officer and goal of the suspect are irrelevant, as “the determination whether an accused actually invoked his right to counsel is a purely objective inquiry.” Hilliard, 270 Va. at 50 . 2023The trial court found that in speaking with the police (i) Bush’s speech was not slurred, (ii) his answers were responsive to the questions asked, 5 This Court is not bound by—and rejects—Deputy Hall’s legal opinion that Bush had invoked his right to counsel. “[W]hether an accused actually invoked his right to counsel is a purely objective inquiry.” Hilliard, 270 Va. at 50 . | 3 | 2011–2026 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2011When a suspect invokes this right, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,” id. at 474 , “unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). “[T]he determination whether [a suspect] actually invoked his right to counsel is a purely objective inquiry.” Hilliard, 270 Va. at 50 , 613 S.E.2d at 584 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Jose Jesus Uribe-Galindo
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 328 , 568 S.E.2d at 699 ; see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . 2005Id. at 328 , 568 S.E.2d at 699 ; see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Redmond
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 328 , 568 S.E.2d at 699 ; see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . 2005Id. at 328 , 568 S.E.2d at 699 ; see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba
green
1 sentence1997However, this Court, like Judge Vieregg, does not find that the application of the Rule is susceptible to such a bright fine test as that delineated in either Thomas Organ, supra, or Kandel, supra. The adoption of a purely objective standard of reasonable foreseeability furthers the purpose of the Rule to avoid unreasonable intrusions into the files of would-be litigants, yet affording access to those able to show demonstrable hardship and need in the event discovery would otherwise be denied. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kandel v. Tocher
green
1 sentence1997However, this Court, like Judge Vieregg, does not find that the application of the Rule is susceptible to such a bright fine test as that delineated in either Thomas Organ, supra, or Kandel, supra. The adoption of a purely objective standard of reasonable foreseeability furthers the purpose of the Rule to avoid unreasonable intrusions into the files of would-be litigants, yet affording access to those able to show demonstrable hardship and need in the event discovery would otherwise be denied. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.