purely objective standard in California

2026(People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291 .) Forcible rape is sexual intercourse against a person’s will “by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.” (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1022 .) Duress is “a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have 4 submitted.” (§

2026(See White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 467.) Section 288, subdivision (b)(1) makes it a felony for any person to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); see People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 .) Duress means “ ‘ “a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to w

2026(See White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 467.) Section 288, subdivision (b)(1) makes it a felony for any person to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); see People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 .) Duress means “ ‘ “a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to w

2025(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 [defining duress for forcible lewd act statute]; People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [defining duress for forcible oral 11 copulation and forcible sexual penetration statutes].) “[T]he legal definition of duress is objective in nature and not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246 .) “Because duress is measured by a purely objective standard, a jury [can] find that the defendant used threats or intimidation to commit a [sex] act without resolving how the victim subjectively p

2025Whether defendant used “duress is measured by a purely objective standard,” so a jury can find that a defendant used threats or intimidation to commit the offense “without resolving how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246 .) The focus is “on the defendant’s wrongful act, not the victim’s response to it.” (Ibid.) It is irrelevant “how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to [the] behavior.” (Ibid.) “The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8 , 15, overruled on anothe

2025(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 [defining duress for forcible lewd act statute]; People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [defining duress for forcible oral 11 copulation and forcible sexual penetration statutes].) “[T]he legal definition of duress is objective in nature and not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246 .) “Because duress is measured by a purely objective standard, a jury [can] find that the defendant used threats or intimidation to commit a [sex] act without resolving how the victim subjectively p

2025Whether defendant used “duress is measured by a purely objective standard,” so a jury can find that a defendant used threats or intimidation to commit the offense “without resolving how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246 .) The focus is “on the defendant’s wrongful act, not the victim’s response to it.” (Ibid.) It is irrelevant “how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to [the] behavior.” (Ibid.) “The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8 , 15, overruled on anothe

2022(See People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246 [analyzing section 288, subdivision (b)(1) as to aggravated lewd acts on a child under age 14, under which duress was defined by reference to direct or implied threats “ ‘ “sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted” ’ ”]; accord, People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 , disapproved on other grounds in Soto, at p. 248, fn. 12.) “Because duress is measured by a purely obje

2026(See White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 467.) Section 288, subdivision (b)(1) makes it a felony for any person to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); see People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 .) Duress means “ ‘ “a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to w

2025“Where the defendant is a family member and the victim is young, . . . the position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous exploitation of the victim” [are] relevant to the existence of duress.’” (People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1319-1320 (Espinoza).) “‘Other relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46 .) Because “dures

2025Whether defendant used “duress is measured by a purely objective standard,” so a jury can find that a defendant used threats or intimidation to commit the offense “without resolving how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to this behavior.” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246 .) The focus is “on the defendant’s wrongful act, not the victim’s response to it.” (Ibid.) It is irrelevant “how the victim subjectively perceived or responded to [the] behavior.” (Ibid.) “The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8 , 15, overruled on anothe

2025(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004 [defining duress for forcible lewd act statute]; People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [defining duress for forcible oral 11 copulation and forcible sexual penetration statutes].) “[T]he legal definition of duress is objective in nature and not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246 .) “Because duress is measured by a purely objective standard, a jury [can] find that the defendant used threats or intimidation to commit a [sex] act without resolving how the victim subjectively p

2025“Where the defendant is a family member and the victim is young, . . . the position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous exploitation of the victim” [are] relevant to the existence of duress.’” (People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1319-1320 (Espinoza).) “‘Other relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46 .) Because “dures

2025The victim was the defendant’s 12-year-old daughter and a student in special education classes. ( Espinoza, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) When he molested her on five occasions, she was “‘too scared to do anything. . . .’” (Id. at pp. 1292-1293.) After reporting his actions to school personnel, the victim was “‘very worried about her own safety in going home.’” (Id. at p. 1295.) The Espinoza court understood “‘[d]uress can arise from various circumstances, including the relationship between the defendant and the victim and their relative ages and sizes. . . .

2020(Soto); People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 940 ; People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 ; People v. Superior Court (Kneip) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 235, 238-239 ; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 51 , disapproved on other grounds in Soto, at p. 248, fn. 12.) “The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.” (Cochran, at p. 15.) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “the legal definition of duress [under section 288] is objective in nature and not dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246 .) “[D]uress is measur

2011In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th 999 , we held that “duress,” as used in section 288(b)(1), means “ ‘a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted.’ ” (Leal, at p. 1004, second italics added, quoting People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 221 ].) 9 Because duress is measured by a purely objective standard, a jury could find