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15 Washington opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2019Subsequently, our Supreme Court rejected the application of this test to article I, section 7 seizure analysis, instead applying a purely objective standard, Young, 135 Wn.2d at 509-11 , which focuses not on whether the subject perceived that he or she was being ordered to restrict his or her movement but, 3 "In a challenge to the validity of a Terry stop, article 1, section 7 generally tracks the Fourth Amendment analysis." State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610, 617 , 352 P.3d 796 (2015). -9- No. 77720-3-1/10 rather, on whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that meaning to a re 2018The Washington Constitution, the Young court announced, requires application of a purely objective standard, 135 Wn.2d at 509-11 ,focusing not on whether the suspect subjectively perceived that he or she was being ordered to restrict his or her movements but, rather, on whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that meaning to a reasonable person. 135 Wn.2d at 506 .5 5"The 'purely objective' standard articulated in young rejected the Fourth Amendment seizure test, which contains a subjective element. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Ladsongreen2 sentences2008Id. ¶17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker’s testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. 1 We disagree. ¶18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because “an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop or 2008Id. ¶17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker’s testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. 1 We disagree. ¶18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because “an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop or | 2 | 3 |
State v. Chapingreen2 sentences2008Id. ¶17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker’s testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. 1 We disagree. ¶18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because “an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop or 2008Id. ¶ 17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker's testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. [1] We disagree. ¶ 18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because "an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop | 1 | 5 |
California v. Hodari D.green2 sentences2018See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S. Ct. 1547 , 113 L. 2018See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S. Ct. 1547 , 113 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2001See Young, 135 Wash.2d at 501 , 957 P.2d 681 ; see also id. at 514, 957 P.2d 681 (concluding that the shining of a spotlight alone, "without additional indicia of authority," does not constitute a seizure). 2001See Young, 135 Wash.2d at 501 , 957 P.2d 681 ; see also id. at 514, 957 P.2d 681 (concluding that the shining of a spotlight alone, "without additional indicia of authority," does not constitute a seizure). | 1 | 1 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L. 1997See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ladson
green
2 sentences2008Id. ¶ 17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker's testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. [1] We disagree. ¶ 18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because "an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop 2008Id. ¶ 17 The State argues that, because the trial court found that Sergeant Dresker was credible in his testimony that he did not follow the van hoping to find a legal reason to stop it and his subjective intent was to stop the van and cite the driver for not having his headlights on, Sergeant Dresker's testimony about his own subjective intent is dispositive. [1] We disagree. ¶ 18 In Ladson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the purely objective test for pretext stops because "an objective test may not fully answer the critical inquiry: Was the officer conducting a pretextual traffic stop | 2 | 2003–2008 |
Department of Labor & Industries v. Avundes
green
2 sentences2006Avundes, 140 Wash.2d at 289-90 , 996 P.2d 593 . 2006Avundes, 140 Wn.2d at 289-90 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Z.U.E.
green
2 sentences2019Subsequently, our Supreme Court rejected the application of this test to article I, section 7 seizure analysis, instead applying a purely objective standard, Young, 135 Wn.2d at 509-11 , which focuses not on whether the subject perceived that he or she was being ordered to restrict his or her movement but, 3 "In a challenge to the validity of a Terry stop, article 1, section 7 generally tracks the Fourth Amendment analysis." State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610, 617 , 352 P.3d 796 (2015). -9- No. 77720-3-1/10 rather, on whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that meaning to a re 2019Subsequently, our Supreme Court rejected the application of this test to article I, section 7 seizure analysis, instead applying a purely objective standard, Young, 135 Wn.2d at 509-11 , which focuses not on whether the subject perceived that he or she was being ordered to restrict his or her movement but, 3 "In a challenge to the validity of a Terry stop, article 1, section 7 generally tracks the Fourth Amendment analysis." State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610, 617 , 352 P.3d 796 (2015). -9- No. 77720-3-1/10 rather, on whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that meaning to a re | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bliss
green
1 sentence2013State v. Bliss, 153 Wn.App. 197, 203 , 222 P. d 3 107 (2009).To facilitate our review,the trial court is required to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the conclusion of a suppression hearing. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Mendenhall
green
2 sentences2013State v. Young, 135 Wn. d 498, 501, 957 P. d 681 (1998). 2 2 Circumstances that are likely to result in a seizure include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Young, 135 Wri.2d at 512 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. . 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L. 2013State v. Young, 135 Wn. d 498, 501, 957 P. d 681 (1998). 2 2 Circumstances that are likely to result in a seizure include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Young, 135 Wri.2d at 512 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. . 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 64 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dept. of Labor and Industries v. AVUDES
green
1 sentence2006Avundes, 140 Wash.2d at 289-90 , 996 P.2d 593 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Loewen
green
1 sentence1997Id.; Loewen, 97 Wn.2d at 568 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.