compelling interest test in Vermont

2017See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (“But RLUIPA . . . contemplates a ‘more focused’ inquiry and ‘requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” (citations omitted)).

2017See also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (“But RLUIPA . . . contemplates a ‘more focused’ inquiry and ‘requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’— the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” (citations omitted)); but see Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 , 285 (2011) (RLUIPA does not operate to waive a State’s sovereign immunity to damages claims); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for mo

1985Taxpayers ask this Court to invalidate the durational residency aspect of the statute because it fails “to promote a compelling governmental interest,” Dunn, supra, 405 U.S. at 339 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); see also Dunn, supra, at 342, 343 . (requiring a precisely drawn statute choosing less drastic means). 4 However, the Court’s decision in Memorial Hospital, supra, 415 U.S. at 259 , indicates that unequal treatment based on prior residency does not mandate application of a compelling interest standard where no “basic necessity of life” is inv

1985Taxpayers ask this Court to invalidate the durational residency aspect of the statute because it fails "to promote a compelling governmental interest," Dunn, supra, 405 U.S. at 339 , 92 S.Ct. at 1001 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)); see also Dunn, supra, 405 U.S., at 342, 343 , 92 S.Ct. at 1003, 1004 (requiring a precisely drawn statute choosing less drastic means). [4] However, the Court's decision in Memorial Hospital, supra, 415 U.S. at 259 , 94 S.Ct. at 1082 , indicates that unequal treatment based on prior residenc

1985Taxpayers ask this Court to invalidate the durational residency aspect of the statute because it fails “to promote a compelling governmental interest,” Dunn, supra, 405 U.S. at 339 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); see also Dunn, supra, at 342, 343 . (requiring a precisely drawn statute choosing less drastic means). 4 However, the Court’s decision in Memorial Hospital, supra, 415 U.S. at 259 , indicates that unequal treatment based on prior residency does not mandate application of a compelling interest standard where no “basic necessity of life” is inv

1985Taxpayers ask this Court to invalidate the durational residency aspect of the statute because it fails “to promote a compelling governmental interest,” Dunn, supra, 405 U.S. at 339 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); see also Dunn, supra, at 342, 343 . (requiring a precisely drawn statute choosing less drastic means). 4 However, the Court’s decision in Memorial Hospital, supra, 415 U.S. at 259 , indicates that unequal treatment based on prior residency does not mandate application of a compelling interest standard where no “basic necessity of life” is inv

1985See id. at 260 n.15 (approving Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D.

1985See id. at 260 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. at 1083 n. 15 (approving Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 238 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971)); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 , 95 S.Ct. 553, 562 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975).

2017See also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (“But RLUIPA . . . contemplates a ‘more focused’ inquiry and ‘requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’— the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” (citations omitted)); but see Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 , 285 (2011) (RLUIPA does not operate to waive a State’s sovereign immunity to damages claims); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for mo

1994Sherbert noted that "a rational relationship to some colorable state interest" is insufficient; instead, "`[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'" Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 , 83 S.Ct. at 1795 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 , 65 S.Ct. 315, 323 , 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)).

1994Sherbert noted that “a rational relationship to some colorable state interest” is insufficient; instead, “‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).

1994The Act’s stated purpose is “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l).

1994As the majority recognizes, the purpose of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).

1985See id. at 260 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. at 1083 n. 15 (approving Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 238 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971)); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 , 95 S.Ct. 553, 562 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975).

1985See id. at 260 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. at 1083 n. 15 (approving Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 238 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 , 91 S.Ct. 1231 , 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971)); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 , 95 S.Ct. 553, 562 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975).