compelling interest test in California

1994In White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 , 533 P.2d 222 ], the first decision of this court to address a claim under the state constitutional privacy provision, our court specifically held that the ballot statement of the Privacy Initiative "makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest. " (Italics added.) Subsequent cases, over the past 20 years, have relied upon this interpretation of the privacy provision in referring repeatedly to the c

1994In White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 , 533 P.2d 222 ], the first decision of this court to address a claim under the state constitutional privacy provision, our court specifically held that the ballot statement of the Privacy Initiative "makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest. " (Italics added.) Subsequent cases, over the past 20 years, have relied upon this interpretation of the privacy provision in referring repeatedly to the c

1994(See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948, fn. 12 [ 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 719 P.2d 660 ]; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 163-164 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ]; People v. Strizinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [ 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ]; Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 , 553 P.2d 624 ].) In view of the rather clear language of the ballot pamphlet, the appl

1994(See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948, fn. 12 [ 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 719 P.2d 660 ]; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 163-164 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ]; People v. Strizinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [ 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ]; Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 , 553 P.2d 624 ].) In view of the rather clear language of the ballot pamphlet, the appl

2019(Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 512 ; see id. at pp. 513–514.) Although Stritzinger cited cases that had applied the compelling interest test to constitutional privacy claims (id. at p. 511), we subsequently said that not “every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 [of the California Constitution] must be overcome by a ‘compelling interest’ ” ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 34–35).

2019(Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 512 ; see id. at pp. 513–514.) Although Stritzinger cited cases that had applied the compelling interest test to constitutional privacy claims (id. at p. 511), we subsequently said that not “every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 [of the California Constitution] must be overcome by a ‘compelling interest’ ” ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 34–35).

1996Indeed, in both cases the motivation for the activity was economic gain, not religious observance; yet the high court nonetheless held that each of these conflicts resulted in a constitutionally significant burden on the believer that the government had to justify under the compelling interest test. 2 It is thus not surprising that Massachusetts’s highest court has concluded, as do I, that under the United States Supreme Court’s case law prior to Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , forcing a landlord to rent to unmarried heterosexual couples contrary to his or her religious beliefs substantially burd

1996Elsewhere, the Smith court expressly acknowledged that its prior case law, the case law adopted by Congress in RFRA, had rejected any centrality test: “Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.” ( Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 887 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 891 ].) More fundamentally, regardless of the Smith court’s views on the feasibility of a compelling interest test without a threshold centrality inquiry, in enacting RFRA Congress was not required to adop

1997For example, she cites People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 717 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 394 P.2d 813 ] (Woody) for the proposition that a compelling interest test should apply to evaluate the state’s interest in prosecuting marijuana possession.

1997For example, she cites People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 717 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 394 P.2d 813 ] (Woody) for the proposition that a compelling interest test should apply to evaluate the state’s interest in prosecuting marijuana possession.

1971(See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638, 660 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615, 617, 630 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 ]; Williams v. Rhodes (1968) 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 31-32 , 89 S.Ct. 5 ]; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 169 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 ]; Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 [ 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 , 62 S.Ct. 1110 ]; Castro v. State of California (1970) 2 Cal.3d 223, 235-244 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 466 P.2d 244 ]; Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection (1969) 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1120-1131.) Petitioners contend that the utili

1971(See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638, 660 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615, 617, 630 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 ]; Williams v. Rhodes (1968) 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 24, 31-32 , 89 S.Ct. 5 ]; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 169 , 86 S.Ct. 1079 ]; Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 [ 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 , 62 S.Ct. 1110 ]; Castro v. State of California (1970) 2 Cal.3d 223, 235-244 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 466 P.2d 244 ]; Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection (1969) 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1120-1131.) Petitioners contend that the utili

2020In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill), our Supreme Court "established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims." (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926 ; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552-553 [the Hill framework has been applied broadly in balancing privacy claims].) "If an obvious invasion of interest fundamental to personal autonomy is involved, then the compelling interest test applies.

2019(Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 512 ; see id. at pp. 513–514.) Although Stritzinger cited cases that had applied the compelling interest test to constitutional privacy claims (id. at p. 511), we subsequently said that not “every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 [of the California Constitution] must be overcome by a ‘compelling interest’ ” ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 34–35).

1994Contrary to the suggestion of the majority (maj. opn., ante, p. 31), the compelling interest standard, as articulated and applied in our past decisions on the right to privacy, is not a standard that is "`"strict" in theory and fatal in fact.'" (See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 859 [upholding legislative scheme permitting retention of record of an arrest that did not result in conviction]; Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ] [upholding State Bar subpoena of attorney's financial records]; accord, County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974)

1994Contrary to the suggestion of the majority (maj. opn., ante, p. 31), the compelling interest standard, as articulated and applied in our past decisions on the right to privacy, is not a standard that is "`"strict" in theory and fatal in fact.'" (See, e.g., Loder v. Municipal Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 859 [upholding legislative scheme permitting retention of record of an arrest that did not result in conviction]; Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ] [upholding State Bar subpoena of attorney's financial records]; accord, County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974)

1994(See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948, fn. 12 [ 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 719 P.2d 660 ]; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 163-164 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ]; People v. Strizinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [ 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ]; Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 , 553 P.2d 624 ].) In view of the rather clear language of the ballot pamphlet, the appl

1994(See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948, fn. 12 [ 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 719 P.2d 660 ]; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 163-164 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ]; People v. Strizinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ]; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [ 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 , 610 P.2d 436 , 12 A.L.R.4th 219 ]; Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 , 553 P.2d 624 ].) In view of the rather clear language of the ballot pamphlet, the appl

2020In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill), our Supreme Court "established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims." (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926 ; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552-553 [the Hill framework has been applied broadly in balancing privacy claims].) "If an obvious invasion of interest fundamental to personal autonomy is involved, then the compelling interest test applies.

2017Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, we are not bound to conclude that there *367 is a fundamental privacy interest at stake requiring a compelling interest analysis. ‘ ‘“[W]e are not bound by a federal circuit court opinion. [Citation.] In the absence of a controlling United States Supreme Court decision on a federal question, we are free to make an independent determination of law.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Where the federal circuits are in conflict, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are entitled to no greater weight than those of other circuits.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We are, however, bound to accept

2017Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, we are not bound to conclude that there *367 is a fundamental privacy interest at stake requiring a compelling interest analysis. ‘ ‘“[W]e are not bound by a federal circuit court opinion. [Citation.] In the absence of a controlling United States Supreme Court decision on a federal question, we are free to make an independent determination of law.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Where the federal circuits are in conflict, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are entitled to no greater weight than those of other circuits.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We are, however, bound to accept

2017(Gonzales, at p. 384.) However, “in many contexts, the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by federal courts. [Citations.]” (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 326-327.) Gonzales further explained: “In Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) 518 U.S. 1 [ 135 L.Ed.2d 337 , 116 S.Ct. 1923 ], the United States Supreme Court adopted a psychotherapist-patient privilege applicable in federal proceedings, but the Jajfee decision was grounded in the

2017Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, we are not bound to conclude that there *367 is a fundamental privacy interest at stake requiring a compelling interest analysis. ‘ ‘“[W]e are not bound by a federal circuit court opinion. [Citation.] In the absence of a controlling United States Supreme Court decision on a federal question, we are free to make an independent determination of law.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Where the federal circuits are in conflict, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are entitled to no greater weight than those of other circuits.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We are, however, bound to accept

2017(Gonzales, at p. 384.) However, “in many contexts, the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by federal courts. [Citations.]” (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 326-327.) Gonzales further explained: “In Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) 518 U.S. 1 [ 135 L.Ed.2d 337 , 116 S.Ct. 1923 ], the United States Supreme Court adopted a psychotherapist-patient privilege applicable in federal proceedings, but the Jajfee decision was grounded in the