compelling interest standard in Washington

2015See Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 915 (finding that documents filed in support of dispositive motions in a civil case are subject to Ishikawa); Rufer, 154 Wn.2d at 549 (finding that documents filed with the court in a civil case, whether dispositive or not, are subject to the compelling interest standard described in Ishikawa).

2015See Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 915 (finding that documents filed in support of dispositive motions in a civil case are subject to Ishikawa); Rufer, 154 Wn.2d at 549 (finding that documents filed with the court in a civil case, whether dispositive or not, are subject to the compelling interest standard described in Ishikawa). ¶79 Thus, to the extent Lewis stands for the proposition that article I, section 10 applies only to criminal cases, that holding has been expressly abrogated by this court.

2015See Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 915 (finding that documents filed in support of dispositive motions in a civil case are subject to Ishikawa); Rufer, 154 Wn.2d at 549 (finding that documents filed with the court in a civil case, whether dispositive or not, are subject to the compelling interest standard described in Ishikawa).

2015See Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 915 (finding that documents filed in support of dispositive motions in a civil case are subject to Ishikawa); Rufer, 154 Wn.2d at 549 (finding that documents filed with the court in a civil case, whether dispositive or not, are subject to the compelling interest standard described in Ishikawa). ¶79 Thus, to the extent Lewis stands for the proposition that article I, section 10 applies only to criminal cases, that holding has been expressly abrogated by this court.

2005In my view the compelling interest standard should not be extended so greatly as to include records filed with pretrial discovery-related motions or to attachments that have no relevance to the matter. ¶ 44 The Third Circuit has thoughtfully dealt with the issue of sealing records in pretrial discovery motions and correctly concluded that "there is a presumptive right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these motions are case dispositive or not, but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents." Leucadia, Inc.

2005In my view the compelling interest standard should not be extended so greatly as to include records filed with pretrial discovery-related motions or to attachments that have no relevance to the matter. ¶45 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has thoughtfully dealt with the issue of sealing records in pretrial discovery motions and correctly concluded that “there is a presumptive right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these motions are case dispositive or not, but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents.

2005Accord, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions); Hammock ex rel.

2005Accord Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions); Hammock ex rel.

2000See Sumner, 97 Wash.2d at 13-14 , 639 P.2d 1358 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wash.2d at 227-28 , 840 P.2d 174 (city's interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wash.2d at 252-53 , 916 P.2d 374 (city's interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wash.2d at 199-201 , 930 P.2d 318 (city's interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not com

2000See Sumner, 97 Wn.2d at 13-14 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wn.2d at 227-28 (city’s interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wn.2d at 252-53 (city’s interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wn.2d at 199-201 (city’s interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not compelling).

2000See Sumner, 97 Wash.2d at 13-14 , 639 P.2d 1358 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wash.2d at 227-28 , 840 P.2d 174 (city's interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wash.2d at 252-53 , 916 P.2d 374 (city's interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wash.2d at 199-201 , 930 P.2d 318 (city's interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not com

2000See Sumner, 97 Wn.2d at 13-14 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wn.2d at 227-28 (city’s interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wn.2d at 252-53 (city’s interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wn.2d at 199-201 (city’s interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not compelling).

2000Congress subsequently attempted to overrule Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the stated purpose of which was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)).

2000Congress subsequently attempted to overrule Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the stated purpose of which was “ ‘ “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” ’ ” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l)).

2000See Sumner, 97 Wash.2d at 13-14 , 639 P.2d 1358 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wash.2d at 227-28 , 840 P.2d 174 (city's interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wash.2d at 252-53 , 916 P.2d 374 (city's interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wash.2d at 199-201 , 930 P.2d 318 (city's interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not com

2000See Sumner, 97 Wn.2d at 13-14 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wn.2d at 227-28 (city’s interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wn.2d at 252-53 (city’s interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wn.2d at 199-201 (city’s interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not compelling).

2000See Sumner, 97 Wash.2d at 13-14 , 639 P.2d 1358 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wash.2d at 227-28 , 840 P.2d 174 (city's interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wash.2d at 252-53 , 916 P.2d 374 (city's interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wash.2d at 199-201 , 930 P.2d 318 (city's interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not com

2000See Sumner, 97 Wn.2d at 13-14 (no compelling interest in citing for contempt for, and enjoining a church from, maintaining a religious school contrary to local zoning); First Covenant II, 120 Wn.2d at 227-28 (city’s interest in landmark preservation not compelling); First United Methodist Church, 129 Wn.2d at 252-53 (city’s interest in landmark designation of a church building not compelling); Munns, 131 Wn.2d at 199-201 (city’s interest on historical landmark grounds to prevent church from demolishing church building not compelling).

2000See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).

2000See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).

1993See Burson v. Freeman, 119 L.Ed.2d at 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that in time, place, and manner cases, since the regulation's justification is a "central inquiry", the compelling interest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law). [7] In this manner, we are able to balance the competing interests while recognizing that the burden of justifying a restriction on speech remains on the State.