Peterson factors in Mississippi

2010Under the Rule 609 Peterson analysis, the trial judge should make a determination on the record that the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant, by considering the following factors: “(1) the kind of crime involved; (2) when the conviction occurred; (3) importance of the witness’[s] testimony to the case; • [and] (4) the importance of the credibility of the defendant.” Peterson, 518 So.2d at 636 . ¶ 20.

1990In the peculiar state of the Peterson record, the Court said, "Based on what we have before us, we cannot say from the evidence in this record that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Peterson's motion for a mistrial." Id.

2000Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987); See also, Settles v. State, 584 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Miss.1991).

2000Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987); See also, Settles v. State, 584 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Miss.1991).

2005In Young v. State, 731 So.2d 1145, 1152 (Miss.1999), we noted that although the trial court had not done a full on-the-record Peterson analysis, it was apparent that he had appropriately "conduct[ed] a balancing test considering at least some of the factors." Accordingly, although Peterson does give factors which a trial court ought to consider in determining whether to allow in evidence of prior criminal acts for the purpose of impeachment, we do not apply it so rigidly that we reject honest efforts by trial courts to carefully weigh the probative value of prior acts against their prejudicial

2002In Young v. State, 731 So. 2d 1145, 1152 (Miss. 1999), we noted that although the trial court had not done a full on-the-record Peterson analysis, it was apparent that he had appropriately “conduct[ed] a balancing test considering at least some of the factors.” Accordingly, although Peterson does give factors which a trial court ought to consider in determining whether to allow in evidence of prior criminal acts for the purpose of impeachment, we do not apply it so rigidly that we reject honest efforts by trial courts to carefully weigh the probative value of prior acts against their prejudici

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767, 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767 , 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781 , 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191 , 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

2025“The Peterson factors include: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the [age] of the conviction . . . and the witness’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” Burgess v. State, 210 So. 3d 569, 575 (¶17) (Miss.

2025“The Peterson factors include: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the [age] of the conviction . . . and the witness’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” Burgess v. State, 210 So. 3d 569, 575 (¶17) (Miss.

2024Adams v. State, 772 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (¶58) (Miss. 2000). ¶32.

2024Adams v. State, 772 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (¶58) (Miss. 2000). ¶32.

2024See Gray, 799 So. 2d at 61 (¶30).4 4 To some extent, Scott argues the trial court committed error by not addressing the overriding-prejudice-versus-probative component of the Peterson factors.

2024See Gray, 799 So. 2d at 61 (¶30).4 4 To some extent, Scott argues the trial court committed error by not addressing the overriding-prejudice-versus-probative component of the Peterson factors.

2022This Court has held that an appeal from a denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory in nature and is “subsequently rendered moot by the trial on the merits.” Gibson v. Wright, 870 So. 2d 1250, 1254 (¶8) (Miss.

2019Specifically, Jones asserts his trial counsel: (1) “was grossly inadequate and ineffective in trial tactics and cross[-]examination of witnesses”; (2) “failed to object to the admission of the alleged drug evidence when there was a break in the chain of custody”; (3) “failed to object when the prosecutor asked how [he] knew what a bag of marijuana felt like”; (4) “failed to object to the questioning of [his] prior convictions/drug activity without requiring a Peterson hearing”; and (5) “failed to object to the search of [his] jacket by an employee of Scott County in violation of the 4th Amendm

2019Specifically, Jones asserts his trial counsel: (1) “was grossly inadequate and ineffective in trial tactics and cross[-]examination of witnesses”; (2) “failed to object to the admission of the alleged drug evidence when there was a break in the chain of custody”; (3) “failed to object when the prosecutor asked how [he] knew what a bag of marijuana felt like”; (4) “failed to object to the questioning of [his] prior convictions/drug activity without requiring a Peterson hearing”; and (5) “failed to object to the search of [his] jacket by an employee of Scott County in violation of the 4th Amendm

2019This Court will “only consider an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct 9 appeal when: (1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.” Nelson v. State, 222 So. 3d 318, 322 (¶5) (Miss.

2019This Court will “only consider an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct 9 appeal when: (1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.” Nelson v. State, 222 So. 3d 318, 322 (¶5) (Miss.

2018In its brief, the State says that it does not “contest Peterson’s right to an out-of-time appeal . . . .” Thus, Peterson’s motion to suspend the appeal deadline is granted. 2 erroneous.” Walton v. State, 16 So. 3d 66, 70 (¶8) (Miss.

2018In its brief, the State says that it does not “contest Peterson’s right to an out-of-time appeal . . . .” Thus, Peterson’s motion to suspend the appeal deadline is granted. 2 erroneous.” Walton v. State, 16 So. 3d 66, 70 (¶8) (Miss.

2018See, e.g., Harris v. State, 224 So. 3d 76, 83 (¶30) (Miss. 2017); Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 992, 995-96 (¶¶6-8) (Miss. 2014); Stone v. State, 94 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (¶11) (Miss. 2012).

2018See, e.g. , Harris v. State , 224 So.3d 76 , 83 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2017) ; Hampton v. State , 148 So.3d 992 , 995-96 (¶¶ 6-8) (Miss. 2014) ; Stone v. State , 94 So.3d 1078 , 1082 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2012).

2018See, e.g., Harris v. State, 224 So. 3d 76, 83 (¶30) (Miss. 2017); Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 992, 995-96 (¶¶6-8) (Miss. 2014); Stone v. State, 94 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (¶11) (Miss. 2012).

2018See, e.g. , Harris v. State , 224 So.3d 76 , 83 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2017) ; Hampton v. State , 148 So.3d 992 , 995-96 (¶¶ 6-8) (Miss. 2014) ; Stone v. State , 94 So.3d 1078 , 1082 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2012).

2018See, e.g., Harris v. State, 224 So. 3d 76, 83 (¶30) (Miss. 2017); Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d 992, 995-96 (¶¶6-8) (Miss. 2014); Stone v. State, 94 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (¶11) (Miss. 2012).

2018See, e.g. , Harris v. State , 224 So.3d 76 , 83 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2017) ; Hampton v. State , 148 So.3d 992 , 995-96 (¶¶ 6-8) (Miss. 2014) ; Stone v. State , 94 So.3d 1078 , 1082 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2012).

2010DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 520 (¶ 34) (Miss.1998).

1999Bogard v. State, 624 So.2d 1313, 1316 (Miss.1993).

1999Bogard v. State, 624 So.2d 1313, 1316 (Miss.1993).

1998The circuit judge, commenting on this issue, stated that “[t]he Court has ruled that even though there may be a split of authority on whether the crimes of theft such as grand larceny, and the burglary of a house, and burglary of an automobile are categorized as crimes which would fall under 609A2, this Court has taken a doctrine of majority view that they are not.” See Blackman v. State, 659 So.2d 583, 585 (Miss.1995) (citing Hopkins v. State, 639 So.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Miss.1993)) (“[wjhile there is a split of authority on the question whether theft crimes such as larceny and shoplifting shoul

1998The circuit judge, commenting on this issue, stated that “[t]he Court has ruled that even though there may be a split of authority on whether the crimes of theft such as grand larceny, and the burglary of a house, and burglary of an automobile are categorized as crimes which would fall under 609A2, this Court has taken a doctrine of majority view that they are not.” See Blackman v. State, 659 So.2d 583, 585 (Miss.1995) (citing Hopkins v. State, 639 So.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Miss.1993)) (“[wjhile there is a split of authority on the question whether theft crimes such as larceny and shoplifting shoul

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767, 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767 , 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781 , 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191 , 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767, 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

1995Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767 , 770 (Miss. 1992), citing Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781 , 785 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191 , 1195 (Miss. 1990); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1988); Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987).

1987Citing Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss. 1983); Wilcher v. State, 448 So.2d 927, 941 (Miss. 1984).