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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Selleck v. Globe International, Inc.green1 sentence2023(See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 964-965 [motion for summary judgment]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1129-1130, 1136 [demurrer].) 23 imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’” ( Jackson, supra, at p. 1266, fn. 11 , quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter).) The Harrises contend (1) both causes of action are cumulative of Peterson’s claim for defamation; (2) both are based on conduct not amounting to extreme or outrageous conduct; an | 1 | 1 |
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2023(See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 964-965 [motion for summary judgment]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1129-1130, 1136 [demurrer].) 23 imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’” ( Jackson, supra, at p. 1266, fn. 11 , quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter).) The Harrises contend (1) both causes of action are cumulative of Peterson’s claim for defamation; (2) both are based on conduct not amounting to extreme or outrageous conduct; an | 1 | 1 |
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.green1 sentence2023(See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 964-965 [motion for summary judgment]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1129-1130, 1136 [demurrer].) 23 imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’” ( Jackson, supra, at p. 1266, fn. 11 , quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter).) The Harrises contend (1) both causes of action are cumulative of Peterson’s claim for defamation; (2) both are based on conduct not amounting to extreme or outrageous conduct; an | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Mayweathergreen1 sentence2023(See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 964-965 [motion for summary judgment]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1129-1130, 1136 [demurrer].) 23 imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’” ( Jackson, supra, at p. 1266, fn. 11 , quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984 (Potter).) The Harrises contend (1) both causes of action are cumulative of Peterson’s claim for defamation; (2) both are based on conduct not amounting to extreme or outrageous conduct; an | 1 | 1 |
Rappleyea v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2022If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained’ ”]; accord, Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 980–981.) Accordingly, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling in light of the Peterson factors other than prejudice. 2022If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained’ ”]; accord, Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 980–981.) Accordingly, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling in light of the Peterson factors other than prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Danielsgreen1 sentence2020(See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1262– 1263; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 865 [“a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future”].) Peterson’s brief, undeveloped claims of federal constitutional error arising from the dismissal of Juror No. 5 rest on the principle, established in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 and Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38 , that the right to trial by an impartial jury may be compromised when a state selectively | 1 | 1 |
People v. Manibusangreen1 sentence2020Discussion “A trial court learning of grounds for dismissal [of a juror] ‘has an affirmative obligation to investigate.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[b]oth the scope of any investigation and the ultimate decision whether to discharge a given juror are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 560 ; see People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40 , 53–54.) Hearsay evidence of “alleged jury misconduct ordinarily is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in either denying the motion [for a mistrial based on misconduct] or 97 PEOPLE v. PETER | 1 | 1 |
Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1991(See Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 726, 731 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 ].) We must decide if TPB removed itself in this transaction from established limitations on the obligations incurred in "normal commercial banking transactions." ( Id. at p. 729.) It is not uncommon for a lending institution to handle escrow functions. 1991(See Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 726, 731 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 ].) We must decide if TPB removed itself in this transaction from established limitations on the obligations incurred in "normal commercial banking transactions." ( Id. at p. 729.) It is not uncommon for a lending institution to handle escrow functions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Ripley
green
1 sentence2025In Wright, the trial court made “no finding the case was supported by probable cause.” (Wright, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 .) So too in this case, where the trial court made no findings but simply denied Peterson’s motion without comment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
1 sentence2023The trial court denied Peterson’s motion to strike one or more of these two prior convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cooksey v. ALEXAKIS
green
1 sentence2022(Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 714 .) “[I]n the absence of an affidavit that requires a continuance under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (h), we review the trial court’s denial of [a] request for a continuance for abuse of discretion.” (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 254 .) Although not entirely clear, Singh appears to contend the trial court abused its discretion by declining to continue the hearing on respondents’ motions for summary judgment because: (1) he was not timely or appropriately notified of Peterson’s motion to be relie | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lerma v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence2022(Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 714 .) “[I]n the absence of an affidavit that requires a continuance under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (h), we review the trial court’s denial of [a] request for a continuance for abuse of discretion.” (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 254 .) Although not entirely clear, Singh appears to contend the trial court abused its discretion by declining to continue the hearing on respondents’ motions for summary judgment because: (1) he was not timely or appropriately notified of Peterson’s motion to be relie | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,797 Norman E. Peterson v. Shearson/american Express, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Agnes, which the California Supreme Court had adopted from the Tenth Circuit opinion in Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. (10th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 464 (Peterson) (usually referred to herein as the “Peterson waiver test” or “Peterson factors”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2020(See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1262– 1263; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 865 [“a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future”].) Peterson’s brief, undeveloped claims of federal constitutional error arising from the dismissal of Juror No. 5 rest on the principle, established in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 and Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38 , that the right to trial by an impartial jury may be compromised when a state selectively 2020(See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1262– 1263; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 865 [“a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future”].) Peterson’s brief, undeveloped claims of federal constitutional error arising from the dismissal of Juror No. 5 rest on the principle, established in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 and Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38 , that the right to trial by an impartial jury may be compromised when a state selectively | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2020(See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1262– 1263; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 865 [“a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future”].) Peterson’s brief, undeveloped claims of federal constitutional error arising from the dismissal of Juror No. 5 rest on the principle, established in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 and Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38 , that the right to trial by an impartial jury may be compromised when a state selectively | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Adams v. Texas
green
1 sentence2020(See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1262– 1263; People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 865 [“a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future”].) Peterson’s brief, undeveloped claims of federal constitutional error arising from the dismissal of Juror No. 5 rest on the principle, established in Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 and Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38 , that the right to trial by an impartial jury may be compromised when a state selectively | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Duff
green
1 sentence2020Discussion “A trial court learning of grounds for dismissal [of a juror] ‘has an affirmative obligation to investigate.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[b]oth the scope of any investigation and the ultimate decision whether to discharge a given juror are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 560 ; see People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40 , 53–54.) Hearsay evidence of “alleged jury misconduct ordinarily is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in either denying the motion [for a mistrial based on misconduct] or 97 PEOPLE v. PETER | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.