Peterson rule in Washington

2002However, the court felt bound by the decision in State v. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388 , 779 P.2d 707 (1989), which conditioned application of the Peterson rule on whether the State’s delay in filing the charges was understandable and justified.

2002However, the court felt bound by the decision in State v. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388 , 779 P.2d 707 (1989), which conditioned application of the Peterson rule on whether the State’s delay in filing the charges was understandable and justified.

1997Joinder principles are designed to protect defendants from "successive prosecutions based upon essentially the same conduct, whether the purpose in so doing is to hedge against the risk of an unsympathetic jury at the first trial, to place a `hold' upon a person after he has been sentenced to imprisonment, or simply to harass by multiplicity of trials." [ State v. ] McNeil, [ 20 Wash.App. 527 ,] 532, [ 582 P.2d 524 ] (1978).

1997Joinder principles are designed to protect defendants from "successive prosecutions based upon essentially the same conduct, whether the purpose in so doing is to hedge against the risk of an unsympathetic jury at the first trial, to place a `hold' upon a person after he has been sentenced to imprisonment, or simply to harass by multiplicity of trials." [ State v. ] McNeil, [ 20 Wash.App. 527 ,] 532, [ 582 P.2d 524 ] (1978).

2003When multiple charges stem from the same criminal conduct or criminal episode, the State must prosecute all related charges within the speedy trial time limits." State v. Lee, 132 Wash.2d 498, 503 , 939 P.2d 1223 (1997) (quoting Harris, 130 Wash.2d at 43-44 , 921 P.2d 1052 ).

2003When multiple charges stem from the same criminal conduct or criminal episode, the State must prosecute all related charges within the speedy trial time limits." State v. Lee, 132 Wash.2d 498, 503 , 939 P.2d 1223 (1997) (quoting Harris, 130 Wash.2d at 43-44 , 921 P.2d 1052 ).

1996App. 597, 599 , 687 P.2d 856 (remanding for computation of the speedy trial time under the Peterson rule), review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984); State v. Wilke, 28 Wn.

1996App. 597, 599 , 687 P.2d 856 (remanding for computation of the speedy trial time under the Peterson rule), review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984); State v. Wilke, 28 Wn.

1996App. 597, 599 , 687 P.2d 856 (remanding for computation of the speedy trial time under the Peterson rule), review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984); State v. Wilke, 28 Wn.

1996App. 597, 599 , 687 P.2d 856 (remanding for computation of the speedy trial time under the Peterson rule), review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984); State v. Wilke, 28 Wn.

1996Fladebo did not signal a relaxation of the Peterson rule, as suggested by State v. Wilton, 57 Wn.

1996App. 606, 608 , 789 P.2d 800 , review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1005 (1990); rather, Fladebo merely indicates the Peterson rule does not apply to situations where multiple charges are brought in different courts with exclusive jurisdictions, and the charges are prosecuted by different prosecutorial authorities.

2025We must first determine whether the court erred by denying the request to discharge counsel before reaching the issue of any prejudice resulting from the denial. 10 No. 85553-1-I/11 deny Peterson’s motion to discharge counsel was an abuse of discretion, applying the factors set out in Stenson I, 132 Wn.2d 668 .

2025App. 24, 36-37 , 206 P.3d 682 (2009), the State further contended that the motion should be dismissed and refiled as a civil claim of unjust enrichment because Peterson’s claim is rooted in equity. 4 24 Wn.

2025She further raised a due process argument that relied on Nelson v. Colorado 2 and State v. Curtis, 3 despite her concession that those cases involved 2 581 U.S. 128 , 137 S. Ct. 1249 , 197 L.

2025She further raised a due process argument that relied on Nelson v. Colorado 2 and State v. Curtis, 3 despite her concession that those cases involved 2 581 U.S. 128 , 137 S. Ct. 1249 , 197 L.

2021In its decision, the Board relied on Rhodes v. Department of Labor & Industries, 103 Wn.2d 895, 898 , 700 P.2d 729 (1985).

2021In its decision, the Board relied on Rhodes v. Department of Labor & Industries, 103 Wn.2d 895, 898 , 700 P.2d 729 (1985).

2018Id. (citing Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 ).

2018Id. (citing Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 ).

2018The difference is immaterial in this case, though, because both the Workman test for lesser degree instruction and the Peterson test for an inferior degree offense instruction require the same factual prong: that the evidence in the case supports that only the lesser or inferior degree offense was 16 No. 75144-1-1/17 committed.2 See State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 316 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Peterson, 133 Wn.2d at 891 .

2018The difference is immaterial in this case, though, because both the Workman test for lesser degree instruction and the Peterson test for an inferior degree offense instruction require the same factual prong: that the evidence in the case supports that only the lesser or inferior degree offense was 16 No. 75144-1-1/17 committed.2 See State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 316 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Peterson, 133 Wn.2d at 891 .

2018The difference is immaterial in this case, though, because both the Workman test for lesser degree instruction and the Peterson test for an inferior degree offense instruction require the same factual prong: that the evidence in the case supports that only the lesser or inferior degree offense was 16 No. 75144-1-1/17 committed.2 See State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 316 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Peterson, 133 Wn.2d at 891 .

2018The difference is immaterial in this case, though, because both the Workman test for lesser degree instruction and the Peterson test for an inferior degree offense instruction require the same factual prong: that the evidence in the case supports that only the lesser or inferior degree offense was 16 No. 75144-1-1/17 committed.2 See State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 316 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Peterson, 133 Wn.2d at 891 .

2018Id. (citing Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 ).

2018Id. (citing Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 ).

2012It limited its discussion of the elements of the crime of failure to register to “only whether residential status is an element because this is the element that Peterson primarily claims the State failed to prove.” Peterson, 168 Wn.2d at 771 .

2002See, e.g., State v. Lee, 132 Wn.2d 498, 502-03 , 939 P.2d 1223 (1997); Harris, 130 Wn.2d at 39-40 ; Ross, 98 Wn.

2002Ross, 98 Wn.

1998NOTES [1] This statute is now codified at RCW 46.55.113 (1997) and provides: "[A] police officer may take custody of a vehicle and provide for its prompt removal to a place of safety under any of the following circumstances: ".... "(7) Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle ... with a suspended or revoked license in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420." [1] Former RCW 46.20.435 was in effect in May 1996 when the car was impounded. [2] Verbatim report of proceedings at 9-10. [3] Verbatim report of proceedings at 7. [4] See Reynoso, 41 Wash.App. 113 , 702 P.2d 1222 .

1998NOTES [1] This statute is now codified at RCW 46.55.113 (1997) and provides: "[A] police officer may take custody of a vehicle and provide for its prompt removal to a place of safety under any of the following circumstances: ".... "(7) Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle ... with a suspended or revoked license in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420." [1] Former RCW 46.20.435 was in effect in May 1996 when the car was impounded. [2] Verbatim report of proceedings at 9-10. [3] Verbatim report of proceedings at 7. [4] See Reynoso, 41 Wash.App. 113 , 702 P.2d 1222 .

1996The purpose of JuCR 7.8 "is to ensure prompt resolution of juvenile offense proceedings, which in turn promotes rehabilitation of the juvenile offender." State v. Wilcox, 71 Wash.App. 116, 119 , 856 P.2d 1104 (1993).

1996The purpose of JuCR 7.8 "is to ensure prompt resolution of juvenile offense proceedings, which in turn promotes rehabilitation of the juvenile offender." State v. Wilcox, 71 Wash.App. 116, 119 , 856 P.2d 1104 (1993).

1996"This court has consistently interpreted CrR 3.3 so as to resolve ambiguities in a manner which supports the purpose of the rule in providing a prompt trial for the defendant once prosecution is initiated." State v. Edwards, 94 Wash.2d 208, 216 , 616 P.2d 620 (1980) (citations omitted). *1057 Applying the Peterson rule to this case serves the purpose of the speedy trial rule.

1996"This court has consistently interpreted CrR 3.3 so as to resolve ambiguities in a manner which supports the purpose of the rule in providing a prompt trial for the defendant once prosecution is initiated." State v. Edwards, 94 Wash.2d 208, 216 , 616 P.2d 620 (1980) (citations omitted). *1057 Applying the Peterson rule to this case serves the purpose of the speedy trial rule.

1979Elliott v. Kundahl, 89 Wn.2d 639 , 574 P.2d 732 (1978).

1979Elliott v. Kundahl, 89 Wn.2d 639 , 574 P.2d 732 (1978).