typicality requirement in Texas

2015The United States Supreme Court has defined the typicality requirement as mandating that the representative “possess the same interests and suffer the same injury.” East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).

1999The United States Supreme Court has held that the typicality requirement mandates that the representative “possess the same interests and suffer the same injury.” Dresser Indus., 847 S.W.2d at 373 (citing East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 , 97 S.Ct. 1891 , 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977)).

2006Manning , 914 S.W.2d at 613 ; Glassell v. Ellis , 956 S.W.2d 676, 685 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet dism'd w.o.j.).

2002Manning, 914 S.W.2d at 613 ; Glassell v. Ellis, 956 S.W.2d 676, 685 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, pet dism’d w.o.j.).

2000"Class representatives satisfy the typicality requirement when they show that their claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the class as a whole." Microsoft , 914 S.W.2d at 613 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc . v. Kennedy , 808 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.)); Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc. , 743 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

2000“Class representatives satisfy the typicality requirement when they show that their claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the class as a whole.” Microsoft, 914 S.W.2d at 613 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Kennedy, 808 S.W.2d *210 159, 162 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ dism’d w.o.j.)); Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

2014The State supports the argument by citing Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, which finds the typicality requirement satisfied when a plaintiff proves “she possesses the same interest and suffered the same injury as the other members of the class, that her claims are based on the same legal theory as the other class members’ claims and that she does not have certain potential defenses peculiar to her.” 195 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.).

2014The State supports the argument by citing Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, which finds the typicality requirement satisfied when a plaintiff proves “she possesses the same interest and suffered the same injury as the other members of the class, that her claims are based on the same legal theory as the other class members’ claims and that 16 she does not have certain potential defenses peculiar to her.” 195 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (emphasis added).

2014In this sense, this issue is often collapsed into the typicality analysis.”); see also E&V Slack, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 969 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (in suit against Shell Oil Co., named representatives—who were former Shell dealers that currently own stations that compete with Shell—could not adequately represent current Shell dealers).

2014In this sense, this issue is often collapsed into the typicality analysis.”); see also E & V Slack, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 969 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (in suit against Shell Oil Co., named representatives — who were former Shell dealers that currently own stations that compete with Shell— could not adequately represent current Shell dealers).

2000"Class representatives satisfy the typicality requirement when they show that their claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the class as a whole." Microsoft , 914 S.W.2d at 613 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc . v. Kennedy , 808 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.)); Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc. , 743 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

1999FirstCollect, 976 S.W.2d at 301 ; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Kennedy, 808 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, writ dism. w.o.j.).

1998Cedar Crest Funeral Home, Inc. v. Lashley, 889 S.W.2d 325, 331 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, no writ).

1998Cedar Crest Funeral Home, Inc. v. Lashley , 889 S.W.2d 325, 331 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, no writ).

1994See Petty , 778 S.W.2d at 161 .

1994See Petty, 778 S.W.2d at 161 .

1999The United States Supreme Court has held that the typicality requirement mandates that the representative “possess the same interests and suffer the same injury.” Dresser Indus., 847 S.W.2d at 373 (citing East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 , 97 S.Ct. 1891 , 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977)).

1999The United States Supreme Court has held that the typicality requirement mandates that the representative "possess the same interests and suffer the same injury." Dresser Indus. , 847 S.W.2d at 373 (citing East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc, v. Rodriguez , 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)).

2000"Class representatives satisfy the typicality requirement when they show that their claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the class as a whole." Microsoft , 914 S.W.2d at 613 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc . v. Kennedy , 808 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.)); Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc. , 743 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

2000“Class representatives satisfy the typicality requirement when they show that their claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the class as a whole.” Microsoft, 914 S.W.2d at 613 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Kennedy, 808 S.W.2d *210 159, 162 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ dism’d w.o.j.)); Wiggins v. Enserch Exploration, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

2006To meet the typicality requirement, "the representative's claims must arise from the same event or course of conduct giving rise to the claims of other class members and must also be based on the same legal theories." Nissan Motor Co. , 27 S.W.3d at 582 .

2006To meet the typicality requirement, “the representative’s claims must arise from the same event or course of conduct giving rise to the claims of other class members and must also be based on the same legal theories.” Nissan Motor Co., 27 S.W.3d at 582.

2015See, e.g., Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 196 (Del.

2015Defendants say that “[n]umerous courts have held that the disparity between tendering and non-tendering shareholders prevents plaintiffs from satisfying the typicality requirement” – citing Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183 (Del.

2024The typicality requirement thus “screen[s] out class actions in which the legal or factual position of the representatives is markedly different from that of other members of the class even though common issues of law or fact are present.” 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1764, at 323 (4th ed. 2021); see also, e.g., Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 467 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the variation in claims strikes at the heart of the respective causes of actions, we have readily denied class certification.”).

2008When the claims of both “arise from the same event or practice or course of conduct ... [and] are based on the same legal theory, ... [the typicality requirement] may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other Class members.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).

2008Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613-14 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d) (various defenses did not destroy typicality or commonality, e.g., superseding cause, contributory negligence, failure to comply with warranty); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 373 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, no writ) (typicality not destroyed by defenses of limitations, lack of misrepresentation and ratification); Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 290-91 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (claims primarily grounded on misrepresentations and omissions in “common core of documents” met typical

2008Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613-14 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d) (various defenses did not destroy typicality or commonality, e.g., superseding cause, contributory negligence, failure to comply with warranty); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 373 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, no writ) (typicality not destroyed by defenses of limitations, lack of misrepresentation and ratification); Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 290-91 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (claims primarily grounded on misrepresentations and omissions in “common core of documents” met typical

1990See Joseph v. General Motors Corp., 109 F.R.D. at 640-41 .