section 5102(d) day category in New York

2026The defendants' submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; see also Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2025The defendants' submissions also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims, as set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; see also Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2023The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Nicholson v Kwarteng , 180 AD3d 695, 696 ; Strenk v Rodas , 111 AD3d 920 ; Karpinos v Cora , 89 AD3d 994, 995 ).

2022The defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Karpinos v Cora , 89 AD3d 994, 995 ).

2025However, Hernandez correctly contends that, in opposition, he raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use category ( see Perl v Meher , 18 NY3d 208, 217-219 ; Daley v Jennette-Mingo , 205 AD3d 878, 878-879 ).

2017In opposition, however, the plaintiffs submitted evidence raising triable issues of fact as to whether Rakhaminov sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine, and whether he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

2014The papers submitted by the defendant did not adequately address Lopez’s claims, set forth in the bills of particulars, that she sustained serious injuries to the lumbar region of her spine and to her right hip under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Fudol v Sullivan, 38 AD3d 593, 594 [2007]).

2014The papers submitted by the defendant did not adequately address Lopez’s claims, set forth in the bills of particulars, that she sustained serious injuries to the lumbar region of her spine and to her right hip under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Fudol v Sullivan, 38 AD3d 593, 594 [2007]).

2013Serino, who testified at a deposition that the accident caused her to lose only about one week of work, did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/ 180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see McIntosh v O’Brien, 69 AD3d 585, 587 [2010]).

2013Serino, who testified at a deposition that the accident caused her to lose only about one week of work, did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/ 180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see McIntosh v O’Brien, 69 AD3d 585, 587 [2010]).

2019The papers submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury to her right elbow as a result of the subject accident under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Staff v Yshua , 59 AD3d 614 ; cf. Jilani v Palmer , 83 AD3d 786, 787 ), and that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Tinsley v Bah , 50 AD3d 1019, 1020 ; cf. And

2017The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]; cf. Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]).

2026Further, the movants' submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Valdez v Classic Hauling, LLC , 233 AD3d 959 , 960-961; Z.H.B. v Sica , 221 AD3d 575, 576 ; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ).

2026The defendants' submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the claims in the bill of particulars that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see DelGrosso v Ljutich , 242 AD3d 828 , 828; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969, 969 ).

2025Moreover, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Estrella did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d at 1121; John v Linden , 124 AD3d at 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d at 657 ).

2025In addition, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Cosme-Almandoz did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d 1121 ; John v Linden , 124 AD3d 598, 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d 656, 657 ).

2025Moreover, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Estrella did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d at 1121; John v Linden , 124 AD3d at 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d at 657 ).

2025In addition, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Cosme-Almandoz did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d 1121 ; John v Linden , 124 AD3d 598, 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d 656, 657 ).

2022In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz , 95 AD3d 950, 951 ; McLoud v Reyes , 82 AD3d 848, 849 ).

2020In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz , 95 AD3d 950, 951 ; McLoud v Reyes , 82 AD3d 848, 849 ).

2014The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address the plaintiffs claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see DeVille v Barry, 41 AD3d 763, 763-764 [2007]).

2014The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address the plaintiffs claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see DeVille v Barry, 41 AD3d 763, 763-764 [2007]).

2012In opposition, the plaintiff, who failed to adequately explain a cessation of her medical treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 574 [2005]; Vasquez v John Doe #1, 73 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2010]), failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d at 579 ).

2012In opposition, the plaintiff, who failed to adequately explain a cessation of her medical treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 574 [2005]; Vasquez v John Doe #1, 73 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2010]), failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d at 579 ).

2025Moreover, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Estrella did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d at 1121; John v Linden , 124 AD3d at 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d at 657 ).

2025In addition, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that Cosme-Almandoz did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Wettstein v Tucker , 178 AD3d 1121 ; John v Linden , 124 AD3d 598, 599 ; Marin v Ieni , 108 AD3d 656, 657 ).

2023Here, based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff at trial, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident ( see Arroyo v Fox , 92 AD3d 705 ; see generally Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys. , 98 NY2d 345, 357 ; Gaddy v Eyler , 79 NY2d 955, 958 ).

2018The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident ( see Stead v Serrano , 156 AD3d 836 ; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969, 969 ; see also Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys ., 98 NY2d 345, 357 ).

2022In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz , 95 AD3d 950, 951 ; McLoud v Reyes , 82 AD3d 848, 849 ).

2020In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz , 95 AD3d 950, 951 ; McLoud v Reyes , 82 AD3d 848, 849 ).

2026The defendants' submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; see also Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2025The defendants' submissions also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims, as set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; see also Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2019The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the injured plaintiff's contention, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Gentry v Mean , 166 AD3d 583 ; Espinal v Shortis , 164 AD3d 1217 ; Alperin v Herwerth , 162 AD3d 832 , 833; Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung , 78 AD3d 919, 920 ).

2013The defendant’s motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claims, clearly set forth in the bill of particulars, that the plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his knees under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Bove v Zanelli, 102 AD3d 644 [2013]), and that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung, 78 AD3d 919, 920 [2010]).

2025On appeal, Hernandez does not challenge the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that Hernandez did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and 90/180-day categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Staff v Yshua , 59 AD3d 614 ).

2025The defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and 90/180-day categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Staff v Yshua , 59 AD3d 614 ).

2023Here, based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff at trial, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident ( see Arroyo v Fox , 92 AD3d 705 ; see generally Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys. , 98 NY2d 345, 357 ; Gaddy v Eyler , 79 NY2d 955, 958 ).

2015The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]).

2026Further, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the injuries to the plaintiff's left ankle were not caused by the accident ( see Zennia v Ramsey , 208 AD3d 735 , 735; Luigi v Avis Cab Co. , Inc. , 96 AD3d 809, 809 ).

2025Further, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to [*2]the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine and to his right shoulder were not caused by the accident ( see Zennia v Ramsey , 208 AD3d at 735; Luigi v Avis Cab Co., Inc. , 96 AD3d 809 ; Reyes v Diaz , 82 AD3d 484 ; see generally Jilani v Palmer , 83 AD3d 786, 787 ).

2024NO. 45 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/04/2024 under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (Hall v. Stargot, I 87 A.D.3d 996, 996 , 131 N.Y.S.3d 250,251 [2020]). 1n defendant's Atfinnation in Support of his motion, he sets forth that plaintiff alleged soft tissue style injuries in her Bill of Particulars (Defendant :v Affirmation in Support, NYSCEF Doc. 24).

2023The defendant's submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Despinos-Cadet v Stein , 209 AD3d 978, 980 ; Hall v Stargot , 187 AD3d 996, 996 ; Rodriguez v McCullough , 184 AD3d 735, 735 ).

2020In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Zavala v Zizzo , 172 AD3d 793 , 794; Cavitolo v Broser , 163 AD3d 913 , 914; Bayk v Martini , 142 AD3d 484 ; Estrella v Geico Ins.

2019In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Durand v Urick , 131 AD3d 920 ; see also Bayk v Martini , 142 AD3d 484, 484-485 ; see generally Perl v Meher , 18 NY3d 208, 215-218 ).

2017In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see McLoud v Reyes, 82 AD3d 848, 849 [2011]; Resek v Morreale, 74 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2010]; Raleigh v Ram, 60 AD3d 747, 747-748 [2009]).

2013In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Resek v Morreale, 74 AD3d 1043 [2010]; Raleigh v Ram, 60 AD3d 747, 747-748 [2009]).