section 240(1) extraordinary protections in New York

2025Nevertheless, "[n]ot every worker who falls at a construction site . . . gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" ( Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc. , 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]).

2025Nevertheless, "[n]ot every worker who falls at a construction site . . . gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" ( Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc. , 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]).

2025Hosp. for Cancer & Allied Diseases , 202 AD3d 601, 604 [1st Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The statute applies to incidents involving a "falling worker" or a "falling object." ( Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc. , 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]; accord Harris v City of NY , 83 AD3d 104, 108 [1st Dept 2011].) However, "[n]ot every worker who falls at a construction site, and not any object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)." ( Narducci , 96 NY2d at 267 ; accord Ross , 81 NY2d at 501 .) The statute is limited to a "narrow class of

2021Thus, the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) " 'do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity' " ( Nicometi , 25 NY3d at 97 , quoting Ross , 81 NY2d at 501 ).

2015Thus, the plaintiff who tripped over the pipes and fell while descending a ladder was not entitled to "the 'extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)'" (Cohen, 11 NY3d at 825 , quoting Nieves, 93 NY2d at 915 ; see McNabb v Oot Bros., Inc., 64 AD3d 1237, 1239 [4th Dept 2009] [section 240 (1) did not apply where the plaintiff tripped over an electrical cord while working on stilts because injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk]; Russell v Widewaters S. Bay Rd.

2015Thus, the plaintiff who tripped over the pipes and fell while descending a ladder was not entitled to “the ‘extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)’ ” (Cohen, 11 NY3d at 825 , quoting Nieves, 93 NY2d at 915 ; see Mc-Nabb v Oot Bros., Inc., 64 AD3d 1237, 1239 [4th Dept 2009] [section 240 (1) did not apply where the plaintiff tripped over an electrical cord while working on stilts because injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk]; Russell v Widewaters S. Bay Rd.

2024"More specifically, Labor Law § 240 (1) relates only to 'special hazards' presenting 'elevation-related risk[s]' " ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97, quoting Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. , 78 NY2d 509, 514 [1991]). "[T]he protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) 'do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity' " ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97, quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2024"More specifically, Labor Law § 240 (1) relates only to 'special hazards' presenting 'elevation-related risk[s]' " ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97, quoting Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. , 78 NY2d 509, 514 [1991]). "[T]he protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) 'do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity' " ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97, quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2025"Labor Law § 240(1) provides special protection to those engaged in the 'erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'" ( Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 880 [2003]).

2025"Labor Law § 240(1) provides special protection to those engaged in the 'erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'" ( Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 880 [2003]).

2026Liability may, therefore, be imposed under the statute only where the plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Canales v Rye Neck Union Free School Dist. , 238 AD3d at 838). "'Consequently, the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity'" ( Giraldo v Highmark I

2026Liability may, therefore, be imposed under the statute only where the plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Canales v Rye Neck Union Free School Dist. , 238 AD3d at 838). "'Consequently, the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity'" ( Giraldo v Highmark I

2026Liability may, therefore, be imposed under the statute only where the plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" ( Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC , 25 NY3d at 97 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Canales v Rye Neck Union Free School Dist. , 238 AD3d at 838). "'Consequently, the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity'" ( Giraldo v Highmark I

2025However, "'[n]ot every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)'" ( id. at 979, quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc. , 96 NY2d 259, 267 ). "'[C]ourts must take into account the practical differences between the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, and . . . the extraordinary elevation risks envisioned by Labor Law § 240(1)'" ( id. , quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC , 18 NY3d 335, 339 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2026That said, not all workers injured at a construction site fall within the scope of protections of section 240 (1), and “a distinction must be made between those accidents caused by the failure to provide a safety device . . . and those caused by general hazards specific to a workplace” (Makarius v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N. J., 76 AD3d 805 , 807 [1st Dept 2010]; Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 267 [1st Dept 2007] [section 240 (1) “does not cover the type of ordinary and usual peril to 151899/2022 KELLY, MICHAEL vs.

2025That said, not all workers injured at a construction site fall within the scope of protections of section 240 (1), and “a distinction must be made between those accidents caused by the failure to provide a safety device . . . and those caused by general hazards specific to a workplace” (Makarius v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N. J., 76 AD3d 805 , 807 [1st Dept 2010]; Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 267 [1st Dept 2007] [section 240 (1) “does not cover the type of ordinary and usual peril to which a worker is commonly exposed at a construction site”]).

2024The motion court correctly found that plaintiff, a stagehand who was affixing decorative banners to a previously erected structure, was not engaged in work that triggered the protections of Labor Law §§ 240(1) or 241(6) ( see Adair v Bestek Light. & Staging Corp. , 298 AD2d 153, 153 [1st Dept 2002]; Perchinsky v State of New York , 232 AD2d 34, 37-38 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 93 NY2d 812 [1998]; see also Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520 [1985]; Royce v Dig EH Hotels, LLC , 139 AD3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2016]; Allen v City of New York , 89 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024The motion court correctly found that plaintiff, a stagehand who was affixing decorative banners to a previously erected structure, was not engaged in work that triggered the protections of Labor Law §§ 240(1) or 241(6) ( see Adair v Bestek Light. & Staging Corp. , 298 AD2d 153, 153 [1st Dept 2002]; Perchinsky v State of New York , 232 AD2d 34, 37-38 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 93 NY2d 812 [1998]; see also Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520 [1985]; Royce v Dig EH Hotels, LLC , 139 AD3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2016]; Allen v City of New York , 89 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2011]).

2020Even assuming that plaintiff's work installing office furniture in a newly renovated leased space involved "altering" the building's configuration or composition within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) ( see Joblon v Solow , 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]), his claim that he was injured by an upper wall cabinet that broke free from the wall after having been permanently installed does not implicate the protections of Labor Law § 240(1).

2016The purpose of Labor Law § 240 (1) is the protection of workers from injury, and the statute “ ‘is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of [that] purpose’ ” (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 521 [1985], quoting Quigley v Thatcher, 207 NY 66, 68 [1912] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “ ‘[Altering’ within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) requires making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure” (Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]; see Saint v Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117 [2015]; Be

2013However, not every object that falls on a worker gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1): a plaintiff must show that, at the time the object fell, it was being hoisted or secured, or that the falling object required securing for the purposes of the undertaking (see Outar v City of New York, 5 NY3d 731, 732 [2005]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]; Mendez v Jackson Dev.

2013However, not every object that falls on a worker gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1): a plaintiff must show that, at the time the object fell, it was being hoisted or secured, or that the falling object required securing for the purposes of the undertaking (see Outar v City of New York, 5 NY3d 731, 732 [2005]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]; Mendez v Jackson Dev.

2025The facts of the accident entitle plaintiff to the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) and summary judgment should have been granted in his favor on that claim ( see Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc. , 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]; Kempisty v 246 Spring St., LLC , 92 AD3d [*2]474, 474-475 [1st Dept 2012]; Ray v City of New York , 62 AD3d 591, 591-592 [1st Dept 2009]).

2025"In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1), the 'single decisive question is whether plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential'" ( Chuqui v Amna, LLC , 203 AD3d 1018, 1020 , quoting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc. , 13 NY3d at 603 ).

2023R.R., 4 NY3d 399, 407 [2005]; Sawczyszyn v New York Univ. , 158 AD3d 510 , 511 [1st Dept 2018]; Lombardo v Park Tower Mgt.

2013R.R., 4 NY3d 399, 407 [2005]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]).

2019Nevertheless, "the statutory language must not be strained in order to encompass what the Legislature did not intend to include" ( Martinez v City of New York , 93 NY2d 322, 326 [internal quotation marks omitted]). " [A]ltering,' within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) requires making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure" ( Joblon v Solow , 91 NY2d 457, 465 ).

2019That would constitute a distinction based solely on the location of the work, a distinction that the majority acknowledges is impermissible ( see Martinez v City of New York , 93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999]; see also Dahar , 18 NY3d at 525 ; Joblon , 91 NY2d at 464 ), and would improperly "compartmentalize [decedent's] activity and exclude from the statute's coverage preparatory work essential to the enumerated act" ( Saint , 25 NY3d at 125 ).

2012Absent an elevation differential, “[t]he protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) are not implicated simply because the injury is caused by the effects of gravity upon an object” (Melo v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 92 NY2d at 911 ; see Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d at 270 ).

2012Absent an elevation differential, “[t]he protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) are not implicated simply because the injury is caused by the effects of gravity upon an object” (Melo v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 92 NY2d at 911 ; see Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d at 270 ).

2011Plaintiff appeals. * The protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) apply to workers injured during the “ ‘erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure’ ” (Smith v Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1002 [1995], quoting Labor Law § 240 [1]; accord Kirk v Outokumpu Am.

2004Because Labor Law § 240 (1) does not extend protection to workers engaged in routine maintenance (see Smith v Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1001-1002 [1995]), but does protect workers engaged in repairing a building, “[t]he critical inquiry in determining coverage under the statute is ‘what type of work the plaintiff was performing at the time of injury’ ” (Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452, 457 [2003], quoting Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]).

2024The motion court correctly found that plaintiff, a stagehand who was affixing decorative banners to a previously erected structure, was not engaged in work that triggered the protections of Labor Law §§ 240(1) or 241(6) ( see Adair v Bestek Light. & Staging Corp. , 298 AD2d 153, 153 [1st Dept 2002]; Perchinsky v State of New York , 232 AD2d 34, 37-38 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 93 NY2d 812 [1998]; see also Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520 [1985]; Royce v Dig EH Hotels, LLC , 139 AD3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2016]; Allen v City of New York , 89 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024The motion court correctly found that plaintiff, a stagehand who was affixing decorative banners to a previously erected structure, was not engaged in work that triggered the protections of Labor Law §§ 240(1) or 241(6) ( see Adair v Bestek Light. & Staging Corp. , 298 AD2d 153, 153 [1st Dept 2002]; Perchinsky v State of New York , 232 AD2d 34, 37-38 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 93 NY2d 812 [1998]; see also Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520 [1985]; Royce v Dig EH Hotels, LLC , 139 AD3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2016]; Allen v City of New York , 89 AD3d 406 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024In this regard, the Appellate Division, Second Department has held that no liability under section 240 (1) attaches where a fall occurs on a permanent stairway that serves as a normal appurtenance in the building ( see Verdi v SP Irving Owner, LLC , — AD3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op 02721, *3 [2d Dept 2024]; Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of NY , 162 AD3d 955 , 957 [2d Dept 2018], lv dismissed 32 NY3d 1196 [2019]; Gallagher v Andron Constr.

2024In this regard, the Appellate Division, Second Department has held that no liability under section 240 (1) attaches where a fall occurs on a permanent stairway that serves as a normal appurtenance in the building ( see Verdi v SP Irving Owner, LLC , — AD3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op 02721, *3 [2d Dept 2024]; Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of NY , 162 AD3d 955 , 957 [2d Dept 2018], lv dismissed 32 NY3d 1196 [2019]; Gallagher v Andron Constr.

2018Finally, in our view, extending the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) to this case "extends the reach of section 240 (1) beyond its intended purpose to any component that may lend support to a structure" ( Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C. , 22 NY3d 658, 663 [2014]).

2016Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500-501 [1993]). “[N]ot every object that falls on a worker . . . gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]; see Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 NY3d 658, 663 [2014]), as the protections of the statute “ ‘do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity’ ” (Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 NY3d 90, 97 [2015], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2016Evidence that a person is a hired employee, bringing him or her within the special protections of Labor Law § 240, includes the existence of a “voluntary undertaking of a mutual obligation—the employee agrees to perform a service in return for compensation” from the employer, who “may exercise authority in directing and supervising the manner and method of the work” and who usually “decides whether the task undertaken by the employee has been completed satisfactorily” (Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d 212, 215-216 [2008]).

2016Evidence that a person is a hired employee, bringing him or her within the special protections of Labor Law § 240, includes the existence of a "voluntary undertaking of a mutual obligation — the employee agrees to perform a service in return for compensation" from the employer, who "may exercise authority in directing and supervising the manner and method of the work" and who usually "decides whether the task undertaken by the employee has been completed satisfactorily" ( Stringer v Musacchia , 11 NY3d 212, 215-216 [2008]).

2014Because plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance in a nonconstruction, nonrenovation context, he is not entitled to the “ ‘extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)’ ” (Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2013]; see Chizh v Hillside Campus Meadows Assoc., 4 AD3d 743, 743-744 [2004], affd 3 NY3d 664 [2004]; Selca v Dutchess Heritage Sq.

2014Because plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance in a nonconstruction, nonrenovation context, he is not entitled to the “ ‘extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)’ ” (Signs v Crawford, 109 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2013]; see Chizh v Hillside Campus Meadows Assoc., 4 AD3d 743, 743-744 [2004], affd 3 NY3d 664 [2004]; Selca v Dutchess Heritage Sq.

2019The purpose of Labor Law [*2]§ 240(1) is the protection of workers from injury, and the statute " is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of [that] purpose'" ( Saint v Syracuse Supply Co. , 25 NY3d 117 , 124 quoting Panek v County of Albany , 99 NY2d 452, 457 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Goodwin v Dix Hills Jewish Ctr. , 144 AD3d at 746 ).

2016The purpose of Labor Law § 240 (1) is the protection of workers from injury, and the statute “ ‘is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of [that] purpose’ ” (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 521 [1985], quoting Quigley v Thatcher, 207 NY 66, 68 [1912] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “ ‘[Altering’ within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) requires making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure” (Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465 [1998]; see Saint v Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117 [2015]; Be

2026In Hoyos v. NY-1095 Ave. ofthe Americas, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 491 (Pt Dept 2017), the Court held that "[a]lthough the owner seeks to remove plaintiff from the protections of Labor Law §240(1), on the basis that plaintiff was not "working" at the time of the accident and he was in street clothes, those facts do not dictate whether an injury is within or without the protections of the Scaffold Law.

2026It is immaterial that plaintiff was on a coffee break at the time of his accident because "injuries sustained while a worker was on site, although . . . on a break, come within the protections of Labor Law § 240(1)" ( Hoyos v NY-1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC , 156 AD3d 491, 495 [1st Dept 2017]; see also Morales v Spring Scaffolding, Inc. , 24 AD3d 42, 48 [1st Dept 2005]).

2026It is immaterial that plaintiff was on a coffee break at the time of his accident because "injuries sustained while a worker was on site, although . . . on a break, come within the protections of Labor Law § 240(1)" ( Hoyos v NY-1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC , 156 AD3d 491, 495 [1st Dept 2017]; see also Morales v Spring Scaffolding, Inc. , 24 AD3d 42, 48 [1st Dept 2005]).

2017We have held that injuries sustained while a worker was on site, although entering or exiting the site, or on a break, come within the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) ( Amante at 516 ; Morales v Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 24 AD3d 42, 44 [1st Dept 2005]; Campisi v Epos Contr.

2017The accumulation of paint chips and dust on the platform on which plaintiff was working “was one of the usual and ordinary dangers at a construction site[,] to which the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) [do not] extend” (Cohen v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 11 NY3d 823, 825 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2015Thus, the plaintiff who tripped over the pipes and fell while descending a ladder was not entitled to “the ‘extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)’ ” (Cohen, 11 NY3d at 825 , quoting Nieves, 93 NY2d at 915 ; see Mc-Nabb v Oot Bros., Inc., 64 AD3d 1237, 1239 [4th Dept 2009] [section 240 (1) did not apply where the plaintiff tripped over an electrical cord while working on stilts because injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk]; Russell v Widewaters S. Bay Rd.

2015Consequently, the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) "do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity" (Ross, 81 NY2d at 501 ; see Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 10 NY3d 902, 904 [2008]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]).

2015Consequently, the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) “do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity” (Ross, 81 NY2d at 501 ; see Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 10 NY3d 902, 904 [2008]; Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]).

2026Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were not caused by an elevation-related or gravity-related risk encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1) ( see Rodriguez v Margaret Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care , 84 NY2d 841, 843-844 ; Christie v Live Nation Concerts, Inc. , 192 AD3d 971, 973 ; Garcia v Edgewater Dev.

2012Accordingly, the protections of section 240 (1) are not implicated (see Gasques v State of New York, 15 NY3d 869, 870 [2010]; Rodriguez v Margaret Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 NY2d 841, 843-844 [1994]).

2025"In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1), the single decisive question is whether plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" ( Chuqui v Amna, LLC , 203 AD3d 1018, 1020 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025"In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1), the 'single decisive question is whether plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential'" ( Chuqui v Amna, LLC , 203 AD3d 1018, 1020 , quoting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc. , 13 NY3d at 603 ).

2017This is not a situation where the plaintiff was injured after he had already completed an enumerated activity (Beehner v Eckerd Corp., 3 NY3d 751 [2004] [job completed, worker merely retrieving serial and model numbers from unit]), nor is it a situation where the task was not an enumerated activity, or even if it was, that it had not yet commenced (Simon v Granite Bldg. 2, LLC, 114 AD3d 749 [2d Dept 2014] [the plaintiff, hired to hang wall paper, was injured when the vehicle, in which he was riding, skidded on ice in garage]).

2017This is not a situation where the plaintiff was injured after he had already completed an enumerated activity ( Beehner v Eckerd Corp. , 3 NY3d 751 [2004] [job completed, worker merely retrieving serial and model numbers from unit]), nor is it a situation where the task was not an enumerated activity, or even if it was, that it had not yet commenced ( Simon v Granite Bldg. 2, LLC , 114 AD3d 749 [2d Dept 2014] [the plaintiff, hired to hang wall paper, was injured when the vehicle, in which he was riding, skidded on ice in garage]).