section 1(d) grounds of unfitness enumerated in Illinois

2022The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds of unfitness enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 , 352-53 (2004).

2022The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds of unfitness enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2- 29(2), (4) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352-53 (2004).

2025The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). 705 ILCS 405/2- 29(2), (4) (West 2022); In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002).

2023“If the court makes a finding of unfitness, the court then considers whether it is in the best interests of the child that parental rights be terminated.” In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198 , 210 (2002). 23 ¶ 56 On appeal, Shannon argues that the trial court’s findings of unfitness pursuant to sections 1(D)(m)(i) and 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2020)) were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2026The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2024); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329 , 337 (2010).

2026The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2024); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329 , 337 (2010).

2025In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 495. ¶ 28 Although the State may rely on several grounds in its petition, a finding of unfitness on any one ground under section 1(D) is sufficient to the termination of parental rights.

2024Id. ¶ 20 While the circuit court found that all three of the above-cited grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, we will focus our analysis on the “reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility” ground, as parental unfitness can be based on any single ground listed in section 1(D) (id. at 495). ¶ 21 When a court is facing an allegation of parental unfitness under section 1(D)(b), the court “considers the parent’s efforts to visit and maintain contact with the child as well as other indicia, such as inquiries into the child’s welfare.” In re Richard H., 376 Ill.

2025Section 1(D)(m)(ii) further provides: “If a service plan has been established *** to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent and if those services were available, then, for purposes of this Act, ‘failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent’ includes the parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period following the adjudication under Section 2-3 or 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.”

2012App. 3d 1052, 1064 , 859 N.E.2d 123, 135 (2006)). ¶ 20 The Adoption Act states that a person shall be considered unfit to have a child under any of the grounds in section 1(D) including: “(m) Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act, or (iii) to mak

2026Additionally, “[a] parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 349 . ¶ 26 In this case, the trial court found that respondent was unfit on seven distinct grounds under section 1(D), namely, subsections (a) (abandonment), (b) (failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility), (c) (desertion for more than three months), (d) (substantial continued neglect), (g) (failure to protect the minor from their environment), (m)(i) (failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the con

2023The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). 705 ILCS 405/2- 29(2), (4) (West 2022); In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005). ¶4 A finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2003In that way, evidence of efforts made by the parents after passage of the time limit could still be presented.” In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2000).

2003In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1 , 10 (2000) (holding that the then 12-month limitations period in section 1(D) (m) applied to both the “reasonable efforts” and “reasonable progress” grounds); In re D.F., 332 Ill.

2025Section 1(D)(m)(ii) further provides: “If a service plan has been established *** to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent and if those services were available, then, for purposes of this Act, ‘failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent’ includes the parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period following the adjudication under Section 2-3 or 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.”

2025See In re J.W., 2024 IL App (1st) 231918, ¶ 20 (“any one ground, if properly proven, is sufficient to support a finding of parental unfitness”).

2025In In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181 (2001), our supreme court examined the “reasonable progress” ground for parental unfitness, beginning with the observation that “progress” is usually defined as movement or advancement toward a goal, and in this particular context, progress toward the goal of having the child returned to the parent.

2024“The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds of unfitness enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)).” In re J.C., 2020 IL App (2d) 200063 , ¶ 27. ¶ 44 “In order to reverse a trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness, the reviewing court must conclude that the trial court’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).

2019See In re R.M.B., 146 Ill.

2018See In re R.M.B. , 146 Ill.

2018See In re Lakita B. , 297 Ill.

2018See In re Lakita B., 297 Ill.

2017See In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.

2017See In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.

2004See In re E.O., 311 Ill.App.3d 720, 726 , 244 Ill.Dec. 165 , 724 N.E.2d 1053 (2000).

2004See In re E.O., 311 Ill.App.3d 720, 726 , 244 Ill.Dec. 165 , 724 N.E.2d 1053 (2000).

2000See, e.g., In re C.R., 221 Ill.App.3d 373 , 381, 163 Ill.

2000See, e.g., In re C.R., 221 Ill.App.3d 373 , 381, 163 Ill.

2024A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 72 (stating evidence of the completion of services outside the nine-month time frame is irrelevant to an analysis of unfitness under section 1(D)(m)). ¶ 63 Reasonable progress is an objective standard that exists when the trial court “can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.).

2022A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 72 , 144 N.E.3d 582 (stating evidence of the completion of services outside the nine-month time frame are irrelevant to an analysis of unfitness under section 1(D)(m)). ¶ 45 Further, this court has held that reasonable progress is an objective standard and that it exists when the trial court “can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis

2024In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.

2022A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 72 , 144 N.E.3d 582 (stating evidence of the completion of services outside the nine-month time frame are irrelevant to an analysis of unfitness under section 1(D)(m)). ¶ 45 Further, this court has held that reasonable progress is an objective standard and that it exists when the trial court “can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis

2022See In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004); In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d 720, 726 (2000).

2021In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239 , 259 (2004). ¶ 37 The State’s allegation of unfitness under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act does not contemplate a specific time frame, unlike the nine-month time frame attendant to allegations arising user section 1(D)(m).

2002However, the appellate court then extended this reasoning even further by concluding that “when the State alleges unfitness under section 1(D) (d) of the Act, the instances of ‘substantial neglect’ should be such that remediation would not be an appropriate option.” 321 Ill.

2002However, *Page 497 the appellate court then extended this reasoning even further by concluding that "when the State alleges unfitness under section 1(D)(d) of the Act, the instances of `substantial neglect' should be such that remediation would not be an appropriate option." 321 Ill.

2001Furthermore, because parental rights may be terminated upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of a single ground for unfitness (In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000); In re M.S., 302 Ill.

2001Furthermore, because parental rights may be terminated upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of a single ground for unfitness ( In re D.L. , 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000); In re M.S. , 302 Ill.