section 508(a) award of attorney fees in Illinois

2026See Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 715 (“Under section 508(b), a court has no discretion as to whether to award attorneys’ fees ***.”); Marriage of Putzler, 2013 IL App (2d) 120551, ¶ 39 (“[A] finding that a failure to comply with a court order was ‘willful’ is equivalent to a finding that noncompliance was without compelling cause or justification.”).

2025In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 715 (2005).

2026In re Marriage of Davis, 292 Ill.

2023See In re Marriage of Davis, 292 Ill.App.3d 802, 811 (4th Dist. 1997) (“A finding of contempt is sufficient to support a mandatory award of attorney fees but is not necessary.”); see also In re Marriage of Patel and Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 124 (“Nothing in section 508(b) requires a finding that the violations [of the court’s orders] were intentional.”) Kelly does not deny that the court found that she had violated its orders on the two occasions cited in Jacob’s motion, including one finding of contempt, and she does not challenge those findings on appeal.

2024An award of attorney fees under section 508(a) is discretionary (In re Marriage of Haken, 394 Ill.

2015See Price, 2013 IL App (4th) 120155, ¶ 39 (“[T]his court has concluded a party seeking contribution to attorney fees under section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act must no longer show an inability to pay or the other spouse’s ability to pay as no such requirement is contained in the statute.” (citing Haken, 394 Ill.

1998As noted, such a result would be inconsistent with Pagano II (see Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d at 184 , 607 N.E.2d at 1247 (declining to hold that fee hearing provision of section 508 may never be waived)) and Pagano I as well (see Pagano, 181 Ill.

1998As noted, such a result would be inconsistent with Pagano II (see Pagano , 154 Ill. 2d at 184 , 607 N.E.2d at 1247 (declining to hold that fee hearing provision of section 508 may never be waived)) and Pagano I as well (see Pagano , 181 Ill.

2021Because the trial court did not identify the conduct engaged in by respondent it found objectionable and required an award of fees, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to contribute $24,746 toward petitioner’s attorney fees. ¶ 118 We also point out that this court has held that an award of attorney fees under section 508(b) is “ ‘subject to a determination of reasonableness based on, inter alia, the time spent, the ability of the lawyers, and the complexity of the work.’ ” Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 360 (quoting In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. Ap

2021See Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 359-60 (holding that it was improper for the trial court to order the husband to contribute toward the wife’s attorney fees under section 508(b) of the Act where the evidence did not support a finding that the husband violated a court order by using credit cards and withdrawing money from the marital estate). ¶ 116 Section 508(b) also mandates the assessment of costs and attorney fees when the court “finds that a hearing *** was precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose,” including, but not limited to, “harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts need

2021Because the trial court did not identify the conduct engaged in by respondent it found objectionable and required an award of fees, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering respondent to contribute $24,746 toward petitioner’s attorney fees. ¶ 118 We also point out that this court has held that an award of attorney fees under section 508(b) is “ ‘subject to a determination of reasonableness based on, inter alia, the time spent, the ability of the lawyers, and the complexity of the work.’ ” Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 360 (quoting In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. Ap

2020Respondent cites In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1098 (1992), where the court stated that section 508(b) fees are subject to a determination of reasonableness.

1997It has been held the failure to file affidavits pursuant to section 610(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/610(a) (West 1994)) does not render a subsequent judgment void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ( Sexton, 84 Ill.2d at 320-21 , 49 Ill.Dec.at 713, 418 N.E.2d at 733 ); the failure to file notice in another state of a petition to change custody pursuant to section 511(c) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/511(c) (West 1994)) is procedural, not jurisdictional ( Bussey, 108 Ill.2d at 294-95 , 91 Ill.Dec. at 598 , 483 N.E.2d at 1233 ); the filing of a fee petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 508

1997It has been held the failure to file affidavits pursuant to section 610(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/610(a) (West 1994)) does not render a subsequent judgment void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ( Sexton, 84 Ill.2d at 320-21 , 49 Ill.Dec.at 713, 418 N.E.2d at 733 ); the failure to file notice in another state of a petition to change custody pursuant to section 511(c) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/511(c) (West 1994)) is procedural, not jurisdictional ( Bussey, 108 Ill.2d at 294-95 , 91 Ill.Dec. at 598 , 483 N.E.2d at 1233 ); the filing of a fee petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 508

2014The attorney can obtain a judgment for attorney fees from the attorney's own client or, pursuant to a petition for contribution, from an opposing spouse. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2010). ¶35 "The attorneys for the litigants in a dissolution proceeding are considered as parties in interest in an action for attorney fees to the extent that while such fees are generally awarded to the client, they properly 'belong' to the attorney." In re Marriage of Baltzer, 150 Ill.

2011The court noted that section 508 also allows the award of fees directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order and judgment in his or her own name, and that, although fees are generally awarded to the client, “they ‘belong’ to the attorney, who has standing to pursue an action for fees as the party in interest, without the participation of the client or former client.” Id.1 The court continued: 1 See also In re Marriage of Baltzer, 150 Ill.

2025Because this was not a contempt proceeding, we conclude Scott’s citation to the standard of review for a contempt finding is inapposite here, but we nonetheless agree that we will generally not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence (In re Marriage of Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶ 46 ) and the court’s decision whether to award attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005)). ¶ 80 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not award Scot

2020“A trial court abuses its discretion only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 173 . ¶ 71 In the case at bar, the trial court awarded fees pursuant to section 508(b) of the Marriage Act, which provides: “In every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds that the failure to comply with the order or judgment was without compelling cause or justification, the court shall order the party against whom the proceeding is brought to pay promptly the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing

2000See 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 1998); In re Marriage of Scott , 286 Ill.

1997See In re Marriage of Scott, 286 Ill.App.3d 1056, 1059 , 222 Ill.Dec. 594, 596 , 678 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1996); In re Marriage of Baggett, 281 Ill.App.3d 34, 38 , 217 Ill.Dec. 181, 184 , 666 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1996); Liss, 268 Ill.App.3d at 922-23 , 206 Ill.Dec. at 339 , 645 N.E.2d at 344 ; Florence, 260 Ill.App.3d at 121 , 198 Ill.Dec. at 355 , 632 N.E.2d at 685 ; but see In re Marriage of Sheetz, 254 Ill. App.3d 695, 700 , 194 Ill.Dec. 38, 42-43 , 627 N.E.2d 154, 158-59 (1993).

2026In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205 , ¶ 13. ¶ 124 The decision to order a contribution for attorney fees under section 508(a) is based on the criteria for the division of marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2022).

2024However, section 508 of the Act authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay a reasonable amount of the other party’s attorney fees. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2020). ¶ 61 In determining whether to award attorney fees under section 508 of the Act, “[t]he trial court must (1) consider[ ] the financial resources of the parties and (2) make its decision on a petition for contribution in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 19 .

2023See In re Marriage of Davis, 292 Ill.App.3d 802, 811 (4th Dist. 1997) (“A finding of contempt is sufficient to support a mandatory award of attorney fees but is not necessary.”); see also In re Marriage of Patel and Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 124 (“Nothing in section 508(b) requires a finding that the violations [of the court’s orders] were intentional.”) Kelly does not deny that the court found that she had violated its orders on the two occasions cited in Jacob’s motion, including one finding of contempt, and she does not challenge those findings on appeal.

2020In re Marriage of Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 67 ; In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005).

2024Section 508(b) requires the award of attorney fees in certain circumstances, including enforcement proceedings where the failure to comply was unjustified: “In every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds that the failure to comply with the order or judgment was without compelling cause or justification, the court shall order the party against whom the proceeding is brought to pay promptly the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party.” Id.

2024We also note that, although the trial court ultimately did sanction Scott for his contempt by awarding section 508(b) fees (see In re Marriage of Putzler, 2013 IL App (2d) 120551, ¶ 40 (section 508(b) fee awards are in the nature of sanctions, as they exist in part to “sanction[ ] unjustified violations of court orders”), those sanctions were not in themselves coercive and thus did not require a purge. - 15 - ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2020)), because his failure to pay maintenance as ordered was justified.

2003However, with respect to the petitioner’s request for section 508(b) attorney fees, the reviewing court examined the record and determined that “the record [was] devoid of any evidence of [the respondent’s] cause or justification for not complying with the order.” Baggett, 281 Ill.

2003However, with respect to the petitioner's request for section 508(b) attorney fees, the reviewing court examined the record and determined that "the record [was] devoid of any evidence of [the respondent's] cause or justification for not complying with the order." Baggett , 281 Ill.

1998See Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d at 184 , 607 N.E.2d at 1247 (declining to hold that the fee hearing provision of section 508 may never be waived and looking to the attorney’s exertion of undue influence upon the client or other breach of fiduciary duties).

1998See Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d at 184 , 607 N.E.2d at 1247 (declining to hold that the fee hearing provision of section 508 may never be waived and looking to the attorney’s exertion of undue influence upon the client or other breach of fiduciary duties).

2014See In re Marriage of Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 299 (1985). “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or, in view of all of the circumstances, exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores recognized principles of law, resulting in substantial injustice.’ ” In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, ¶ 37 (quoting In re Marriage of Bradley, 2011 IL App (4th) 110392, ¶ 26 ). -8- ¶ 45 Although attorney fees are generally the responsibility of the party who incurred them, section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act permits a trial court to order

2014See In re Marriage of Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 299 (1985). “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or, in view of all of the circumstances, exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores recognized principles of law, resulting in substantial injustice.’ ” In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, ¶ 37 (quoting In re Marriage of Bradley, 2011 IL App (4th) 110392, ¶ 26 ). ¶ 45 Although attorney fees are generally the responsibility of the party who incurred them, section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act permits a trial court to order a p

2026In re Marriage of Devick, 335 Ill. App. 3d 734, 741 (2002).

2026Devick, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 740.

2025Id. at 236 .

2025In re Marriage of Eberhardt, 387 Ill. App. 3d 226, 236-37 (2008).

2022Maka, 2017 IL App (1st) 153010, ¶ 24 .

2022See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Maka, 2017 IL App (1st) 153010, ¶ 24 (“It is well settled that a party that does not raise an issue in the trial court forfeits that issue and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.”).

2019See also In re Marriage of Talty, 166 Ill. 2d 232, 240 (1995) (holding that circuit court had authority under section 508(a) to award prospective attorney fees for defense of an appeal). ¶ 12 Finally, we determine that Canulli has forfeited the issue of whether Kane’s fee petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as he failed to provide any argument on this point in his opening brief.

2018See also In re Marriage of Talty , 166 Ill. 2d 232 , 240, 209 Ill.Dec. 790 , 652 N.E.2d 330 (1995) (holding that circuit court had authority under section 508(a) to award prospective attorney fees for defense of appeal). ¶ 12 Finally, we determine that Canulli has forfeited the issue of whether Kane's fee petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata , as he failed to provide any argument on this point in his opening brief.

2015See Price, 2013 IL App (4th) 120155, ¶ 39 (“[T]his court has concluded a party seeking contribution to attorney fees under section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act must no longer show an inability to pay or the other spouse’s ability to pay as no such requirement is contained in the statute.” (citing Haken, 394 Ill.

2015See Price, 2013 IL App (4th) 120155, ¶ 39 ("[T]his court has concluded a party seeking contribution to attorney fees under section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act must no longer show an inability to pay or the other spouse's ability to pay as no such requirement is contained in the statute." (citing Haken, 394 Ill.

2019The court noted that “[t]hese factors are not applicable to someone who was not a spouse in the marital relationship.” Id. ¶ 21 Put simply, for purposes of evaluating whether one is a “party” under section 508(a) of the Dissolution Act, we see no reason to distinguish between the boyfriend-intervenor in Pal and Canulli, an attorney who has exercised his statutory right to petition for fees under section 508(c).

2019As Kane incurred fees defending against Canulli’s appeal of his section 508(c) fee award in Kane I, Kane maintains that he is eligible to recover them from Canulli under section 508(a)(3), which allows the award of fees for “[t]he defense of an appeal of any order or judgment under this Act.” Id. § 508(a)(3). ¶ 19 In evaluating this issue, we find In re Marriage of Pal, 397 Ill.

2020Roach, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 748 .

1996In re Marriage of Roach, 245 Ill.

2021See 750 ILCS 5/508(c) (West 2018) (stating that such petition “constitutes a distinct cause of action,” that a pending petition “shall not affect appealability or enforceability of any judgment or other adjudication in the original proceeding” and that a hearing on such petition is not permitted unless contribution under section 503(j) has already been resolved); see also In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d at 345 (finding difficulties in viewing a section 508(c) award of attorney fees as final and enforceable prior to a final judgment dissolving the marriage). - 11 - Nos. 1-18-1558, 1-19-0847

2019In other words, once issues such as child support, property division, and maintenance are finally determined, “the judgment of dissolution is final and appealable, despite the continued pendency of the issue of attorney fees under section 508(c).” Id. at 344 .

2025In re Marriage of Mantei, 222 Ill.

2013Haken, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 161 (section 503 allowed the court to consider the unnecessary increase in attorney fees in determining a fee award under section 508(a); see Mantei, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 942 (court refused to make a contribution award where the parties’ refusal to compromise resulted in the high amount of attorney fees). ¶ 118 We conclude that the trial court’s denial of Amy’s request for a contribution to her attorney fees from Sunil was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 119 b.

2023In re Marriage of Goldberg, 282 Ill.App.3d 997, 1003 (1st Dist. 1996). ¶ 49 Kelly does not cite to any authority that states that it is improper for a court to sanction a party for violating a court order where the court did not make a contempt ruling, or that there is a minimum severity of the violation that the court must first find before it may award the opposing side attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 508(b).

2005In Goldberg, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of section 508(b) attorney fees because the trial court noted the husband’s reduced maintenance payments were “ ‘reasonable under the circumstances,’ ” and “ ‘there was no finding of wilful failure to comply with any prior Order or Judgments of this Court.’ ” Goldberg, 282 Ill.

2021Citing this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Magnuson, 156 Ill. App. 3d 691, 701-02 (1987), he argued that a precondition to entitlement for attorney fees under section 508(a) was that the party have an actual underlying obligation to pay the fees in the first instance.

2013Id. at 702 .