section 259 statutory requirements enumerated in New York

2017"It is well settled th[at] parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i" ( Matter of MacKenzie v Evans , 95 AD3d 1613, 1613-1614 [2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Kenefick v Sticht , 139 AD3d 1380, 1380 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]) and the determination does not evince "irrationality bordering on impropriety" ( Matter of Silmon v Travis , 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Jones v

2017“It is well settled th[at] parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1613-1614 [2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Kenefick v Sticht, 139 AD3d 1380, 1380 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]) and the determination does not evince “irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Jones v New Y

2017“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]; see generally Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790-791 [1994]).

2017“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]).

2017“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]; see generally Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790-791 [1994]).

2017“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]).

2017“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]; see generally Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790-791 [1994]).

2016“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board [of Parole] complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 65 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]; see generally Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790-791 [1994]).

2013It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Dalton v Evans, 84 AD3d 1664, 1664 [2011]; Matter of Wright v Alexander, 71 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2010]).

2013It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Dalton v Evans, 84 AD3d 1664, 1664 [2011]; Matter of Wright v Alexander, 71 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2010]).

2017The Board is “not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors” but, rather, may “placet ] greater emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the other statutory factors” (Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1614 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Huntley v Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 [2010]).

2016The Board is “not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors” but, rather, may “place [ ] greater emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the other statutory factors” (Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1614 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Huntley v Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 [2010]).

2016Initially, it is well established that parole release decisions are discretionary and will be not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]; Matter of Hill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d 1130, 1130 [2015]).

2016It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]; Matter of Hill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d 1130, 1130 [2015]).

2017"It is well settled th[at] parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i" ( Matter of MacKenzie v Evans , 95 AD3d 1613, 1613-1614 [2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Kenefick v Sticht , 139 AD3d 1380, 1380 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]) and the determination does not evince "irrationality bordering on impropriety" ( Matter of Silmon v Travis , 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Jones v

2017“It is well settled th[at] parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1613-1614 [2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 19 NY3d 815 [2012]; see Matter of Kenefick v Sticht, 139 AD3d 1380, 1380 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]) and the determination does not evince “irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Jones v New Y

2014The record reveals that, in denying petitioner’s request for parole release, the Board considered the relevant statutory factors including the serious nature of petitioner’s crime, his extensive criminal history, lengthy prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments, postrelease plans and the sentencing minutes (see Matter of Martinez v Evans, 108 AD3d 815, 816 [2013]; Matter of Mentor v New York State Div. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1246 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012], cert denied 566 US—, 132 S Ct 2437 [2012]; see also Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2014]).

2014The record reveals that, in denying petitioner’s request for parole release, the Board considered the relevant statutory factors including the serious nature of petitioner’s crime, his extensive criminal history, lengthy prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments, postrelease plans and the sentencing minutes (see Matter of Martinez v Evans, 108 AD3d 815, 816 [2013]; Matter of Mentor v New York State Div. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1246 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012], cert denied 566 US—, 132 S Ct 2437 [2012]; see also Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2014]).

2017Turning to the Board’s denial of his request for parole release, such decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Ward v New York State Div. of Parole, 144 AD3d 1375, 1376 [2016]; Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]).

2017Turning to the Board’s denial of his request for parole release, such decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Ward v New York State Div. of Parole, 144 AD3d 1375, 1376 [2016]; Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]).

2012It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as it is shown that the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2012]; Matter of Mentor v New York State Div. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1245-1246 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 2437 [2012]). * Notably, in making its decision, the Board is not required to articulate each statutory factor considered nor give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d a

2012It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as it is shown that the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2012]; Matter of Mentor v New York State Div. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1245-1246 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 2437 [2012]). * Notably, in making its decision, the Board is not required to articulate each statutory factor considered nor give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d a

2014Parole release decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [2013]; Matter of Vaughn v Evans, 98 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2012]).

2014Parole release decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [2013]; Matter of Vaughn v Evans, 98 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2012]).

2011It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Smith v New York State Div. of Parole, 81 AD3d 1026, 1026 [2011]; Matter of Ruiz v New York State Div. of Parole, 70 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2010]).

2011Initially, it is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Dalton v Evans, 84 AD3d 1664, 1664 [2011]; Matter of Smith v New York State Div. of Parole, 81 AD3d 1026, 1026 [2011]).

2012It is well settled the parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [2012]; Matter of Sanchez v Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]).

2012It is well settled the parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [2012]; Matter of Sanchez v Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]).

2017Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 139 AD3d 1289, 1289 [2016]; Matter of Furman v Annucci, 138 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2016], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 1188 [2016]).

2016We affirm. “[P] aróle decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Ruiz v New York State Div. of Parole, 70 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2010]; see *1308 Matter of Furman v Annucci, 138 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2016], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 1188 [2016]).

2017“Parole decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as respondent complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Almonte v New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 AD3d 1307, 1307 [2016] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter of Wiley v State of N.Y.

2017“Parole decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as respondent complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Almonte v New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 AD3d 1307, 1307 [2016] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter of Wiley v State of N.Y.

2012It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2012]; Matter of Matos v New York State Bd. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2011]). * We find no merit to petitioner’s assertion that the Board based its decision solely upon the serious nature of the crime.

2012It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2012]; Matter of Matos v New York State Bd. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2011]). * We find no merit to petitioner’s assertion that the Board based its decision solely upon the serious nature of the crime.

2012It is well settled the parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [2012]; Matter of Sanchez v Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]).

2012It is well settled the parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [2012]; Matter of Sanchez v Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]).

2010Initially, we note that parole decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Veras v New York State Div. of Parole, 56 AD3d 878 , 879 [2008]; Matter of Wise v New York State Div. of Parole, 54 AD3d 463, 464 [2008]).

2010It is well settled that parole decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i are satisfied (see Matter of Veras v New York State Div. of Parole, 56 AD3d 878 , 879 [2008]; Matter of Wise v New York State Div. of Parole, 54 AD3d 463, 464 [2008]).

2005The factors that respondent must consider are enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i (1) (a) and (2) (c) (A); however, it need not articulate each statutory factor in its decision nor give each such factor equal weight (see Matter of Parmes v Travis, 17 AD3d 885, 886 [2005]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).

2005Respondent was not required to give equal weight to the statutory factors enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i or to specifically articulate each factor considered in its determination (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).

2013It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Dalton v Evans, 84 AD3d 1664, 1664 [2011]; Matter of Wright v Alexander, 71 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2010]).

2013It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Dalton v Evans, 84 AD3d 1664, 1664 [2011]; Matter of Wright v Alexander, 71 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2010]).

2017Here, the Board considered the proper statutory factors, including the serious nature of petitioner’s crime and his criminal history, prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plan, as well as the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument and the sentencing minutes (see Matter of Hill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d 1130, 1130 [2015]; Matter of Borges v Stanford, 127 AD3d 1491, 1491-1492 [2015]).

2017Here, the Board considered the proper statutory factors, including the serious nature of petitioner’s crime and his criminal history, prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plan, as well as the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument and the sentencing minutes (see Matter of Hill v New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d 1130, 1130 [2015]; Matter of Borges v Stanford, 127 AD3d 1491, 1491-1492 [2015]).

2017Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 139 AD3d 1289, 1289 [2016]; Matter of Furman v Annucci, 138 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2016], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 1188 [2016]).

2017Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 139 AD3d 1289, 1289 [2016]; Matter of Furman v Annucci, 138 AD3d 1269, 1270 [2016], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 1188 [2016]).

2017Turning to the Board’s denial of his request for parole release, such decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Ward v New York State Div. of Parole, 144 AD3d 1375, 1376 [2016]; Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]).

2017Turning to the Board’s denial of his request for parole release, such decisions are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Ward v New York State Div. of Parole, 144 AD3d 1375, 1376 [2016]; Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320 [2015]).

2016Judicial intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Fischer v Graziano, 130 AD3d 1470, 1470 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2016Judicial intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Fischer v Graziano, 130 AD3d 1470, 1470 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Delacruz v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413, 1413 [2014]).

2015“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i” (Matter of Gssime v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1630, 1631 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 847 [2011]; see Matter of Delacruz v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413, 1413 [2014]).