section 5-6-34(a) final judgment in Georgia

2022Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), appeals generally may be taken from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that “when multiple counts of an indictment are tried together and the trial court does not enter a written sentence on one or more of the counts, the case is still pending in the trial court and is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).” Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 681 ( 571 SE2d 806 ) (2002).

2022Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), appeals generally may be taken from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that “when multiple counts of an indictment are tried together and the trial court does not enter a written sentence on one or more of the counts, the case is still pending in the trial court and is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).” Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 681 ( 571 SE2d 806 ) (2002).

2025An order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.3 Here, although the trial court order purportedly disposed of the Coelho’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment, the result is an interlocutory order that leaves pending issues regarding the import of the trial court’s decision on the purported 2 (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Bandy v. Elmo, 280 Ga. 221 ( 626 SE2d 505 ) (2

2025An order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.3 Here, although the trial court order purportedly disposed of the Coelho’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment, the result is an interlocutory order that leaves pending issues regarding the import of the trial court’s decision on the purported 2 (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Bandy v. Elmo, 280 Ga. 221 ( 626 SE2d 505 ) (2

2025“A trial court’s ruling on the issue of removal or transfer of venue is not a directly appealable final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1), and thus, it is subject to the procedures governing interlocutory appeals.” See Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, 306 Ga. App. 160, 161 ( 701 SE2d 599 ) (2010); accord Patel v. Ga. Power Co., 234 Ga. App. 141, 142 (2) ( 505 SE2d 787 ) (1998).

2025“A trial court’s ruling on the issue of removal or transfer of venue is not a directly appealable final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1), and thus, it is subject to the procedures governing interlocutory appeals.” See Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, 306 Ga. App. 160, 161 ( 701 SE2d 599 ) (2010); accord Patel v. Ga. Power Co., 234 Ga. App. 141, 142 (2) ( 505 SE2d 787 ) (1998).

2022Pretermitting the validity of this contention as applied to this case, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below. . . .” In this case, the order appealed is styled “Final Order Denying Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.” But “‘[u]nder our rules of pleading, it is substance and not mere nomenclature that controls.’”8 “An order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining

2022Pretermitting the validity of this contention as applied to this case, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below. . . .” In this case, the order appealed is styled “Final Order Denying Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.” But “‘[u]nder our rules of pleading, it is substance and not mere nomenclature that controls.’”8 “An order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining

2010Blackburn, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Jeffries, 298 Ga. App. 141, 142 ( 679 SE2d 368 ) (2009). 2 OCGA §§ 40-6-391 (a) (1); 40-6-393 (a). 3 OCGA §§ 40-6-390 (a); 40-6-391 (a) (1). 4 OCGA § 40-5-121 (a). 5 See generally Rockdale Awning &c. v. Kerbow, 210 Ga. App. 119, 121 (2) ( 435 SE2d 619 ) (1993) (“This court has previously held that the grant of a motion for new trial is not a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and that, therefore, an application for interlocutory review is required to be filed in order to give this court jurisdic

2010Blackburn, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Jeffries, 298 Ga. App. 141, 142 ( 679 SE2d 368 ) (2009). 2 OCGA §§ 40-6-391 (a) (1); 40-6-393 (a). 3 OCGA §§ 40-6-390 (a); 40-6-391 (a) (1). 4 OCGA § 40-5-121 (a). 5 See generally Rockdale Awning &c. v. Kerbow, 210 Ga. App. 119, 121 (2) ( 435 SE2d 619 ) (1993) (“This court has previously held that the grant of a motion for new trial is not a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and that, therefore, an application for interlocutory review is required to be filed in order to give this court jurisdic

2025“A trial court’s ruling on the issue of removal or transfer of venue is not a directly appealable final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1), and thus, it is subject to the procedures governing interlocutory appeals.” See Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, 306 Ga. App. 160, 161 ( 701 SE2d 599 ) (2010); accord Patel v. Ga. Power Co., 234 Ga. App. 141, 142 (2) ( 505 SE2d 787 ) (1998).

2025“A trial court’s ruling on the issue of removal or transfer of venue is not a directly appealable final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1), and thus, it is subject to the procedures governing interlocutory appeals.” See Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, 306 Ga. App. 160, 161 ( 701 SE2d 599 ) (2010); accord Patel v. Ga. Power Co., 234 Ga. App. 141, 142 (2) ( 505 SE2d 787 ) (1998).

2022See Tyrones v. Tyrones, 300 Ga. 367 , 369 n.2 ( 792 SE2d 398 ) (2016) (noting that an order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) “where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2022See Tyrones v. Tyrones, 300 Ga. 367 , 369 n.2 ( 792 SE2d 398 ) (2016) (noting that an order is considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) “where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2026To answer the timing question in this case, we look first to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1)(B), which provides that “[a]ppeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from … : All final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” 4 Next, we look to OCGA § 5-6-37, which provides that in order to appeal a final judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal, and to OCGA § 5-6-38, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.” Here, the February 28 order was not

2021See, 9 e.g., Islamkhan v. Khan, 299 Ga. 548, 550 (1) (787 SE2d 731) (2016) (divorce decree was interlocutory order, not a final judgment, when order reserved issue of attorney fees that was expressly asked for in pleadings); Keck v. Harris, 277 Ga. 667, 667 (1) (594 SE2d 367) (2004) (trial court’s order denying constitutional challenge did not constitute a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) because a claim remained pending below); see also Tyrones v. Tyrones, 300 Ga. 367, 369 n.2 (792 SE2d 398) (2016) (“[An order] constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)

2025Although the voluntary dismissal arguably satisfied two of the criteria that must be met to constitute a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) – there were no issues that remained to be resolved in the trial court and the parties had no further recourse there – we cannot “ignore[] the full language of that Code section, which applies only to ‘judgments and rulings of the superior courts’ under subsection (a) and to ‘final judgments’ under subsection (a) (1).” Meister v. Brock, 268 Ga. App. 849, 850 (1) ( 602 SE2d 867 ) (2004).

2025Although the voluntary dismissal arguably satisfied two of the criteria that must be met to constitute a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) – there were no issues that remained to be resolved in the trial court and the parties had no further recourse there – we cannot “ignore[] the full language of that Code section, which applies only to ‘judgments and rulings of the superior courts’ under subsection (a) and to ‘final judgments’ under subsection (a) (1).” Meister v. Brock, 268 Ga. App. 849, 850 (1) ( 602 SE2d 867 ) (2004).

2024Such a case cannot be appealed as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)[.]”) (punctuation omitted); Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185 (4) ( 281 SE2d 604 ) (1981) (“An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is.”); Bass v. State, 284 Ga. App. 331, 332 ( 643 SE2d 851 ) (2007) (although the trial court announced at the sentencing hearing that certain counts would be merged with others, as to each guilty verdict, “the trial court did not either (a) enter a written sentence, or (b) enter a written notation that the c

2024Such a case cannot be appealed as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)[.]”) (punctuation omitted); Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185 (4) ( 281 SE2d 604 ) (1981) (“An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is.”); Bass v. State, 284 Ga. App. 331, 332 ( 643 SE2d 851 ) (2007) (although the trial court announced at the sentencing hearing that certain counts would be merged with others, as to each guilty verdict, “the trial court did not either (a) enter a written sentence, or (b) enter a written notation that the c

2022N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 631, 633-634 (1) ( 691 SE2d 396 ) (2010) (denial of petition to modify order terminating reunification services and placing children in the custody of relatives was subject to direct appeal as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)).

2015N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 634 (1) ( 691 SE2d 396 ) (2010) (a juvenile court’s order denying a motion seeking a custody modification based on changed circumstances in a deprivation matter was a final directly appealable judgment under OCGA §§ 5-6-34 (a) (1) and 15-11-3).

2017See Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 282 (4) ( 705 SE2d 839 ) (2010) (in divorce action, there was no final judgment until the reserved issues of attorney fees and guardian ad litem fees were resolved); see also Sotter v. Stephens, 291 Ga. 79, 82-84 ( 727 SE2d 484 ) (2012) (because the order reserved the amount of attorney fees to be assessed under OCGA § 13-6-11, it was not a final judgment); Stump v. Young, 307 Ga. App. 583, 584 ( 705 SE2d 684 ) (2011) (because the judgment made clear that the issues of attorney fees, costs, and interest remained to be resolved, it was not final).

2017See Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 282 (4) ( 705 SE2d 839 ) (2010) (in divorce action, there was no final judgment until the reserved issues of attorney fees and guardian ad litem fees were resolved); see also Sotter v. Stephens, 291 Ga. 79, 82-84 ( 727 SE2d 484 ) (2012) (because the order reserved the amount of attorney fees to be assessed under OCGA § 13-6-11, it was not a final judgment); Stump v. Young, 307 Ga. App. 583, 584 ( 705 SE2d 684 ) (2011) (because the judgment made clear that the issues of attorney fees, costs, and interest remained to be resolved, it was not final).

2016See Forrister v. Manis Lumber Co., 232 Ga. App. 370, 371 (1) ( 501 SE2d 606 ) (1998) (“Even if an order does not specify that it is a grant of final judgment, it nevertheless constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.” (Citations and punctuation omitted)).

2016See Forrister v. Manis Lumber Co., 232 Ga. App. 370, 371 (1) ( 501 SE2d 606 ) (1998) (“Even if an order does not specify that it is a grant of final judgment, it nevertheless constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.” (Citations and punctuation omitted)).

2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999).

2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999).

2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999).

2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999).

2025In this case, we are concerned only with OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), which authorizes a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below, except as provided by OCGA § 5-6-35 [providing for discretionary review of certain cases].” (Emphasis supplied.) As we explained in Spring-U Bonding Co. v. State, 200 Ga. App. 533 ( 408 SE2d 831 ) (1991), an order “constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the trial court’s final ruling on the merits of th

2025In this case, we are concerned only with OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), which authorizes a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below, except as provided by OCGA § 5-6-35 [providing for discretionary review of certain cases].” (Emphasis supplied.) As we explained in Spring-U Bonding Co. v. State, 200 Ga. App. 533 ( 408 SE2d 831 ) (1991), an order “constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the trial court’s final ruling on the merits of th

2020Indeed, “[w]hen a trial court fails to impose separate sentences for each count of which a defendant was found guilty, it has not entered a proper judgment.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 65 (1) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017); see also Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 681 ( 571 SE2d 806 ) (2002) (“[W]hen multiple counts of an indictment are tried together and the trial court does not enter a written sentence on one or more of the counts, the case is still pending in the trial court and is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).”). 16 Our law is equally clear, however, that “[t]he written sentenc

2020Indeed, “[w]hen a trial court fails to impose separate sentences for each count of which a defendant was found guilty, it has not entered a proper judgment.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 65 (1) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017); see also Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 681 ( 571 SE2d 806 ) (2002) (“[W]hen multiple counts of an indictment are tried together and the trial court does not enter a written sentence on one or more of the counts, the case is still pending in the trial court and is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).”). 16 Our law is equally clear, however, that “[t]he written sentenc

2020Rockdale Awning & Iron Co. v. Kerbow, 210 Ga. App. 119, 121 (2) ( 435 SE2d 619 ) (1993); Murray v. Rozier, 186 Ga. App. 184, 184 ( 367 SE2d 886 ) (1988).

2020Rockdale Awning & Iron Co. v. Kerbow, 210 Ga. App. 119, 121 (2) ( 435 SE2d 619 ) (1993); Murray v. Rozier, 186 Ga. App. 184, 184 ( 367 SE2d 886 ) (1988).

2026To answer the timing question in this case, we look first to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1)(B), which provides that “[a]ppeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from … : All final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” 4 Next, we look to OCGA § 5-6-37, which provides that in order to appeal a final judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal, and to OCGA § 5-6-38, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.” Here, the February 28 order was not

2026See OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(3). 6 375 Ga. App. at 123. 7 And our resolution of the jurisdictional issue presented here is consistent with our decision in Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196 (2001).

2026To answer the timing question in this case, we look first to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1)(B), which provides that “[a]ppeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from … : All final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” 4 Next, we look to OCGA § 5-6-37, which provides that in order to appeal a final judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal, and to OCGA § 5-6-38, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.” Here, the February 28 order was not

2026See OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(3). 6 375 Ga. App. at 123. 7 And our resolution of the jurisdictional issue presented here is consistent with our decision in Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196 (2001).

2025See also Cook-Rose, 320 Ga. at 571 (2) (“Indeed, . . . a voluntary dismissal is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), because that code section applies only to ‘judgments and rulings’ of certain courts and a voluntary dismissal is not such a judgment or order.”); cf Page v. Holiday Inns, 245 Ga. 12, 13 ( 262 SE2d 783 ) (1980) (calling a voluntary dismissal under what is currently OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) “an order by virtue of the statute” for the purpose 8 of allowing it to be corrected under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) but making plain that it is “not a judgment of the court.”) (emphasis suppli

2025See also Cook-Rose, 320 Ga. at 571 (2) (“Indeed, . . . a voluntary dismissal is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), because that code section applies only to ‘judgments and rulings’ of certain courts and a voluntary dismissal is not such a judgment or order.”); cf Page v. Holiday Inns, 245 Ga. 12, 13 ( 262 SE2d 783 ) (1980) (calling a voluntary dismissal under what is currently OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) “an order by virtue of the statute” for the purpose 8 of allowing it to be corrected under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) but making plain that it is “not a judgment of the court.”) (emphasis suppli

2025Nevertheless, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4) provides that direct appeals may be taken from “[a]ll judgments or orders granting . . . interlocutory or final injunctions.” Although neither party addresses the injunctive nature of the order from which Faaborg appeals, the substance and effect of this order is to enjoin Faaborg to perform specified acts — namely, removing debris and inoperable vehicles from his property.7 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Southwest Health & Wellness, LLC v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 622 (1) (a) ( 639 SE2d 570 ) (2006), disapproved of on other grounds by Song v. eGPS Solutions I, Inc

2025Nevertheless, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4) provides that direct appeals may be taken from “[a]ll judgments or orders granting . . . interlocutory or final injunctions.” Although neither party addresses the injunctive nature of the order from which Faaborg appeals, the substance and effect of this order is to enjoin Faaborg to perform specified acts — namely, removing debris and inoperable vehicles from his property.7 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Southwest Health & Wellness, LLC v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619, 622 (1) (a) ( 639 SE2d 570 ) (2006), disapproved of on other grounds by Song v. eGPS Solutions I, Inc

2025See also Cook-Rose, 320 Ga. at 571 (2) (“Indeed, . . . a voluntary dismissal is not a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), because that code section applies only to ‘judgments and rulings’ of certain courts and a voluntary dismissal is not such a judgment or order.”); cf Page v. Holiday Inns, 245 Ga. 12, 13 ( 262 SE2d 783 ) (1980) (calling a voluntary dismissal under what is currently OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) “an order by virtue of the statute” for the purpose 8 of allowing it to be corrected under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) but making plain that it is “not a judgment of the court.”) (emphasis suppli