section 110-14 monetary credit in Illinois

1997The court declined to follow People v. Toolate, 274 Ill.App.3d 408 , 211 Ill.Dec. 143 , 654 N.E.2d 605 (1995), which held that the issue of a section 110-14 credit was waived on appeal based on a defendant's failure to raise the issue in the trial court at sentencing or in a post-trial motion.

1997The court declined to follow People v. Toolate, 274 Ill.App.3d 408 , 211 Ill.Dec. 143 , 654 N.E.2d 605 (1995), which held that the issue of a section 110-14 credit was waived on appeal based on a defendant's failure to raise the issue in the trial court at sentencing or in a post-trial motion.

2013Thus, despite the label of a fee, the $30 for the Children’s Advocacy Center is a “fine.” People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 84 , 953 N.E.2d 55 .

2011In People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 , -22- we held that the Children’s Advocacy Center fee should be characterized as a “fine.” Id. at ¶ 84; People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 600 (2006) (a charge is a fine, despite the legislature’s label of it as a fee, if it “does not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant”).

2019But as a member of the appellate panel that decided People v. Camacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 140604 , I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the records automation charges for the public defender’s office (55 ILCS 5/3- 4012 (West 2014)) and the state’s attorney’s office (id. § 4-2002.1(c)) are fees.

2018But as a member of the appellate panel that decided People v. Camacho , 2016 IL App (1st) 140604 , 407 Ill.Dec. 848 , 64 N.E.3d 647 , I disagree with the majority's conclusions that the records automation charges for the public defender's office ( 55 ILCS 5/3-4012 (West 2014) ) and the state's attorney's office ( id. § 4-2002.1(c) ) are fees.

2018The State’s brief offers no response to defendant’s ineffectiveness argument. ¶ 106 “Under Strickland, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both: (1) that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *** Under [this] theory, we must determine whether any error occurred.” Henderson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶¶ 196-97; In re Edgar C., 2014 IL App (1st) 141

2017The State's brief offers no response to defendant's ineffectiveness argument. ¶ 106 "Under Strickland , to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both: (1) that his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *** Under [this] theory, we must determine whether any error occurred." Henderson , 2016 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶¶ 196-97, 413 Ill.Dec. 239 , 77 N.E.3d 1046 ;

2017People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 457 (1997). ¶ 32 The State concedes that the following fines that were imposed upon defendant are subject to credit under section 110-14(a) of the Code: (1) the $10 specialty court charge (55 ILCS 5/5­ 1101(d-5) (West 2010)) (see People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 16 ); (2) the $4.75 drug court charge (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010)) (see Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 16 ); (3) the $50 county assessment (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c) (West 2010)1) (see Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 17 ); (4) the $12 state police operations charge (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(

2017People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 457 (1997). ¶ 32 The State concedes that the following fines that were imposed upon defendant are subject to credit under section 110-14(a) of the Code: (1) the $10 specialty court charge (55 ILCS 5/5­ 1101(d-5) (West 2010)) (see People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 16 ); (2) the $4.75 drug court charge (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010)) (see Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 16 ); (3) the $50 county assessment (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c) (West 2010)1) (see Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 17 ); (4) the $12 state police operations charge (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(

2013Thus, despite the label of a fee, the $30 for the Children’s Advocacy Center is a “fine.” People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 84 , 953 N.E.2d 55 .

2011In People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 , we held that the Children's Advocacy Center fee should be characterized as a "fine." Id. at ¶ 84; People v. Jones, 223 Ill.2d 569, 600 , 308 Ill.Dec. 402 , 861 N.E.2d 967 (2006) (a charge is a fine, despite the legislature's label of it as a fee, if it "does not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant").

1997Cf. Hare, 119 Ill.2d 441 , 116 Ill.Dec. 664 , 519 N.E.2d 879 (declining to interpret section 110-14 as limited to persons who receive only a fine upon conviction or excluding persons who have also received a sentence credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial); Smith, 258 Ill.App.3d at 268-69 , 196 Ill.Dec. 450 , 630 N.E.2d 147 (declining to interpret section 110-14 credit as limited only to the period of incarceration before and during trial); People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 462-63 , 217 Ill.Dec. 729 , 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996) (declining to interpret unified code of corrections section

1997Cf. Hare, 119 Ill.2d 441 , 116 Ill.Dec. 664 , 519 N.E.2d 879 (declining to interpret section 110-14 as limited to persons who receive only a fine upon conviction or excluding persons who have also received a sentence credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial); Smith, 258 Ill.App.3d at 268-69 , 196 Ill.Dec. 450 , 630 N.E.2d 147 (declining to interpret section 110-14 credit as limited only to the period of incarceration before and during trial); People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 462-63 , 217 Ill.Dec. 729 , 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996) (declining to interpret unified code of corrections section

2006The Jamison court noted that the plain language of section 110-14 provides that the credit is limited to Afines@ and does not apply to any other amount such as costs or fees, but it Adoes not explicitly provide for credit against such an >additional penalty.= @ Jamison, 365 Ill.

2006We note that when the legislature has chosen to exclude an amount from presentence credit under section 110-14 it has explicitly done so. [Citations.] Had the legislature intended to exclude section 5-9-1(c-9) from the $5-per- day credit, the legislature could have specifically made such an exclusion.@ Jamison, 365 Ill.

2018However, "[g]ranting credit is a simple ministerial act that promotes judicial economy by ending any further proceedings over the matter." People v. Brown , 2017 IL App (1st) 150203 , ¶ 36, 418 Ill.Dec. 31 , 89 N.E.3d 865 (citing Woodard , 175 Ill. 2d at 456 -57 , 222 Ill.Dec. 401 , 677 N.E.2d 935 ).

2017App. 3d 910 , 914-15, 252 Ill.Dec. 928 , 743 N.E.2d 1084 (2001) (where defendant appealed from sentence entered upon revocation of his probation, the court was without jurisdiction to consider alleged errors in the underlying guilty plea proceeding). ¶ 9 The Buffkin defendant appealed the dismissal of his postconviction petition but did not assert any error in that dismissal; instead, he sought presentence credit under section 110-14 and challenged the imposition of a DNA analysis fee.

2017App. 3d 910 , 914-15, 252 Ill.Dec. 928 , 743 N.E.2d 1084 (2001) (where defendant appealed from sentence entered upon revocation of his probation, the court was without jurisdiction to consider alleged errors in the underlying guilty plea proceeding). ¶ 9 The Buffkin defendant appealed the dismissal of his postconviction petition but did not assert any error in that dismissal; instead, he sought presentence credit under section 110-14 and challenged the imposition of a DNA analysis fee.

2017App. 3d 1003 , 1005-06, 216 Ill.Dec. 874 , 666 N.E.2d 42 (1996), which held that a counsel's failure to request the $5 per diem credit pursuant to section 110-14 of the Code ( 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2014)) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

2017App. 3d 1003 , 1005-06, 216 Ill.Dec. 874 , 666 N.E.2d 42 (1996), which held that a counsel's failure to request the $5 per diem credit pursuant to section 110-14 of the Code ( 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2014)) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

2017The State's brief offers no response to defendant's ineffectiveness argument. ¶ 106 "Under Strickland , to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both: (1) that his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *** Under [this] theory, we must determine whether any error occurred." Henderson , 2016 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶¶ 196-97, 413 Ill.Dec. 239 , 77 N.E.3d 1046 ;

2016Dec. 11, 2014); People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 16 , 47 N.E. 997 ; cf. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d at 88 , 885 N.E.2d at 1049 (2008) (A claim for monetary credit under section 110-14 of the Procedure Code (725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2014)) may be raised at any time and even on appeal in a postconviction proceeding.). ¶ 38 Here, because it is the sentencing judgment and not a separately issued mittimus which defendant seeks to modify and because defendant failed to file a direct appeal challenging the judgment, this court lacks jurisdiction to grant him additional sentence credit. - 13 -

2015People v. Williams, 2011 IL App (1st) 091667–B, ¶ 19.

2014People v. Neil Ackerman, 2014 IL App (3d) 120585 1 Because a VCVA Fund fine is not subject to the provisions of section 110-14 (725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2010)), the defendant is not entitled to a credit against this $8 fine. 12 ¶ 34 JUSTICE WRIGHT, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part. ¶ 35 Like the majority, I conclude that the judge’s written order should have allowed 312 days of credit for time served, rather than 310 days.

2013Kuhns, 372 Ill.

2013People v. Johnson, 2011 IL 111817 . ¶ 26 III.

2013For example, the State relies on a recent case, People v. Vinokur, 2011 IL App (1st) 090798 , which did not involve an application for monetary credit under section 110-14 but did involve a lack of standing under the Act.

2010In People v. Price, 375 Ill.

2010People v. Long, 398 Ill.