first stage analysis in California

2022In relevant part, section 954 provides that an “accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission” or “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) “Joinder is ordinarily favored because it avoids the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122 , italics added.) Nevertheless, “‘[t]he determination that the offenses are “joinable” under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly give

2021In relevant part, section 954 provides that an “accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission” or “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) “Joinder is ordinarily favored because it avoids the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122 , italics added.) Nevertheless, “‘[t]he determination that the offenses are “joinable” under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly give

2022(People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 783 (Soper).) A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling falls outside the bounds of reason, based on facts known to the court at the time of the motion.

2021(People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 783 (Soper).) A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling falls outside the bounds of reason, based on facts known to the court at the time of the motion.

2022In relevant part, section 954 provides that an “accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission” or “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) “Joinder is ordinarily favored because it avoids the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122 , italics added.) Nevertheless, “‘[t]he determination that the offenses are “joinable” under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly give

2021In relevant part, section 954 provides that an “accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission” or “two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) “Joinder is ordinarily favored because it avoids the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122 , italics added.) Nevertheless, “‘[t]he determination that the offenses are “joinable” under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly give

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.’ [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal.Rptr. 604 ).]” We have previously noted that “ ‘[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,’ . . . ‘the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 ; People v. Rhoden

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.’ [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal.Rptr. 604 ).]” We have previously noted that “ ‘[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,’ . . . ‘the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 ; People v. Rhoden

2016We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court used the phrase “systematic exclusion” to express its finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the challenges were race-based in the first stage, rather than to articulate a more stringent standard than required. “‘In determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court’s remarks in context.’ (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 .)” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613 (Taylor).) “It is a basic presumpti

2015(Cf. People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 613– 614.) By contrast, if (as the Attorney General proposes) an appellate court can review the first-stage ruling when, as here, the trial court has made alternative rulings at both the first and third stages, then the trial court has no incentive to skip over the first-stage inquiry.

2016We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court used the phrase “systematic exclusion” to express its finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the challenges were race-based in the first stage, rather than to articulate a more stringent standard than required. “‘In determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court’s remarks in context.’ (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 .)” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613 (Taylor).) “It is a basic presumpti

2016We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court used the phrase “systematic exclusion” to express its finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the challenges were race-based in the first stage, rather than to articulate a more stringent standard than required. “‘In determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court’s remarks in context.’ (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 .)” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613 (Taylor).) “It is a basic presumpti

2016Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597 (Bell).) 13 Analysis Defendant argues that it is unclear whether the trial court found that he failed to make a prima facie case that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges on the basis

2016Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597 (Bell).) 13 Analysis Defendant argues that it is unclear whether the trial court found that he failed to make a prima facie case that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges on the basis

2014(See Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox (1989) 492 U.S. 469, 480 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 388 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 ].) The State asserts LSAC’s practice of flagging the LSAT scores of applicants who were given additional time as an accommodation fails the first stage of the analysis because it “violates the ADA, in particular 42 U.S.C. §§ 12189 and 12203, and the Unruh [Civil Rights] Act, pursuant to Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f).” 7 The State offers no argument in support of this assertion.

2014(See Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox (1989) 492 U.S. 469, 480 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 388 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 ].) The State asserts LSAC’s practice of flagging the LSAT scores of applicants who were given additional time as an accommodation fails the first stage of the analysis because it “violates the ADA, in particular 42 U.S.C. §§ 12189 and 12203, and the Unruh [Civil Rights] Act, pursuant to Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f).” 7 The State offers no argument in support of this assertion.

1988(Williams v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 447; People v. Kemp (1961) 55 Cal.2d 458, 477 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 359 P.2d 913]; People v. Poon (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 375 ].) Defendant claims that consolidation was prejudicial because it impaired his right to effective assistance of counsel by placing additional burdens on each of his defense attorneys, particularly on the attorney who handled the capital charges.

1988"The determination that the offenses are `joinable' under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly gives the trial *277 court discretion to sever offenses or counts `in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.'" ( Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 , 683 P.2d 699 ]; Coleman, supra, 116 Cal. App.3d at p. 135 .) Since the statutory requirements for joinder were met in the present case, appellant can establish error only on a clear showing of prejudice. ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 447; People v. K

1988“The determination that the offenses are ‘joinable’ under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly gives the trial court discretion to sever offenses or counts ‘in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 700 , 683 P.2d 699 ]; Coleman, supra, 116 Cal.App. 3d at p. 135 .) Since the statutory requirements for joinder were met in the present case, appellant can establish error only on a clear showing of prejudice.

1988"The determination that the offenses are `joinable' under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly gives the trial *277 court discretion to sever offenses or counts `in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.'" ( Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 , 683 P.2d 699 ]; Coleman, supra, 116 Cal. App.3d at p. 135 .) Since the statutory requirements for joinder were met in the present case, appellant can establish error only on a clear showing of prejudice. ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 447; People v. K

2019J. of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race- neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 , fn. omitted (Johnson).) The trial court denied each of defendan

2009In the first stage of an inquiry under *899 Batson/Wheeler, the burden rests on the defendant to “ ‘show[] that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 129 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 ]; accord, Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 196 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 ]; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 96 .) Contrary to defendant’s assertion that the trial court had required him to show “a strong likelihood” that the prosecution challenged L.F. with discriminatory purpose, the court corre

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.' [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal. Rptr. 604 ).]" We have previously noted that "`[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,' ... `the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.'" ( People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; *448 see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal. App.3d 55, 69 ; People v.

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.’ [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal.Rptr. 604 ).]” We have previously noted that “ ‘[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,’ . . . ‘the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 ; People v. Rhoden

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.’ [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal.Rptr. 604 ).]” We have previously noted that “ ‘[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,’ . . . ‘the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 ; People v. Rhoden

1984Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.’ [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222 ( 47 Cal.Rptr. 604 ).]” We have previously noted that “ ‘[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,’ . . . ‘the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 528 P.2d 752 ], quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 ; People v. Rhoden

2024(Talega, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 728 [at the first stage of the analysis, we review the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other supporting documents “only ‘to determine what conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is actionable’ ”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Oswit’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the breach of contract claim. 3.

2021(See Guz, supra, at p. 354 [discrimination]; Loggins, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [wrongful termination and retaliation].) “[B]y successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the [so-called McDonnell Douglas test] allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) In the first stage of the test, “ ‘the plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity [or was a member of a protected class],” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment

2021(See Guz, supra, at p. 354 [discrimination]; Loggins, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [wrongful termination and retaliation].) “[B]y successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the [so-called McDonnell Douglas test] allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) In the first stage of the test, “ ‘the plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity [or was a member of a protected class],” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment

2021(See Guz, supra, at p. 354 [discrimination]; Loggins, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [wrongful termination and retaliation].) “[B]y successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the [so-called McDonnell Douglas test] allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) In the first stage of the test, “ ‘the plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity [or was a member of a protected class],” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment

2021(See Guz, supra, at p. 354 [discrimination]; Loggins, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [wrongful termination and retaliation].) “[B]y successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the [so-called McDonnell Douglas test] allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) In the first stage of the test, “ ‘the plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “protected activity [or was a member of a protected class],” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment

2021As we will explain post, we agree that juror comparisons are relevant, but that is a separate issue from whether we consider the prosecutor’s stated reasons in the first stage analysis. 4 Defendant did not challenge the strike of C.J. at trial, and he does not appear to raise a claim related to C.J. on appeal. 9 the identified group, and that the victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong. [Citation.] A court may also consider nondiscriminatory reasons for a peremptory challenge that are apparent from and ‘clearly established’ in the record [citations]

2020(People v. Morgan (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 97, 98, fn. 6 .) Where the statutory requirements for joinder are met, a defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice to establish an abuse of discretion.

2016According to Calvary Chapel, any alleged illegality associated with the broadcasts are reserved for the second stage of the analysis under the anti-SLAPP statute, but has no bearing on Calvary Chapel’s burden to show the claims arose from protected activities 14 during the first stage of the analysis.4 (See Collier, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 54 [“‘[A]ny “claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s [secondary] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff's case