section 319 right of subrogation in Pennsylvania

2024The Supreme Court reversed and held that the employer’s right to subrogation in Section 319 of the Act is clear and unambiguous, written in mandatory terms, and 14 “by its terms, admits of no express exceptions, equitable or otherwise.” Id. at 1151 .

2024Also relevant is Thompson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (USF&G Co.), 781 A.2d 1146 (Pa. 2001), in which our Supreme Court held that equitable principles do not apply to an employer’s right of subrogation under Section 319 of the Act, absent an employer’s bad faith.

2018First, Tortfeasors alleged that Insurer's attempt to enforce its subrogation rights in an action filed directly against the alleged third-party tortfeasors was prohibited by this Court's decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Domtar Paper Co. ("Domtar Paper"), 631 Pa. 463 , 113 A.3d 1230 (2015), which reaffirmed that "the right of action against a third-party tortfeasor under Section 319 of the WCA remains in the injured employee, and that the employer['s]/insurer's right of subrogation under Section 319 must be achieved through a single action brought in the name of the injured employee

2018First, Tortfeasors alleged that Insurer's attempt to enforce its subrogation rights in an action filed directly against the alleged third-party tortfeasors was prohibited by this Court's decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Domtar Paper Co. ("Domtar Paper"), 631 Pa. 463 , 113 A.3d 1230 (2015), which reaffirmed that "the right of action against a third-party tortfeasor under Section 319 of the WCA remains in the injured employee, and that the employer['s]/insurer's right of subrogation under Section 319 must be achieved through a single action brought in the name of the injured employee

2016In examining an employer’s right to subrogation under Section 319 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 671, our Supreme Court has emphasized the threefold rationale supporting subrogation rights: “[T]o prevent double recovery for the same injury by the claimant, to énsure that the employer.is not compelled to make, compensation payments made necessary by the negligence of a third party, and to prevent ■ a • third party from escaping liability-for. his negligence.” Poole v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Warehouse Club, Inc.), 570 Pa. 495 , 810 A.2d 1182, 1184 (2002) (internal citation omitted).

2016In examining an employer’s right to subrogation under Section 319 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 671, our Supreme Court has emphasized the threefold rationale supporting subrogation rights: “[T]o prevent double recovery for the same injury by the claimant, to énsure that the employer.is not compelled to make, compensation payments made necessary by the negligence of a third party, and to prevent ■ a • third party from escaping liability-for. his negligence.” Poole v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Warehouse Club, Inc.), 570 Pa. 495 , 810 A.2d 1182, 1184 (2002) (internal citation omitted).

2002The Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that an employer’s subrogation right under Section 319 is absolute, and not subject to ad hoc equitable exceptions. 2 Thompson , 566 Pa. at 430-33 , 781 A.2d at 1152 -54 (citing Winfree v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 520 Pa. 392 , 554 A.2d 485 (1989)).

2002The Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that an employer’s subrogation right under Section 319 is absolute, and not subject to ad hoc equitable exceptions. 2 Thompson , 566 Pa. at 430-33 , 781 A.2d at 1152 -54 (citing Winfree v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 520 Pa. 392 , 554 A.2d 485 (1989)).

2021Co. v. Bressi, 421 A.2d 653, 654 (Pa. 1980).

2021Co. v. Bressi, 421 A.2d 653, 654 (Pa. 1980). 17 Though Employer waived its right to immediately collect a portion of its accrued lien ($10,606), it expressly reserved a right to subrogate Claimant’s future benefits and medical expenses until the balance of recovery – $217,117 – was exhausted, which, practically speaking, would operate to reimburse Employer for the amount of the accrued lien that it agreed to waive.11 Thus, Employer’s right to recover the entirety of its accrued lien was not terminated by the TPSA but was merely deferred.

2022Appeal Bd. (Pennsbury Excavating, Inc.), 948 A.2d 926, 931 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).3 In Gillette, our Supreme Court found that while there was “no question” that the employer was entitled to subrogation under Section 319 of the Act, the dispute had been properly filed before the trial court in that instance because it entailed a wrongful death cause of action, which cannot be adjudicated by a WCJ. 937 A.2d at 435-36 .

2018See Gillette v. Wurst, 594 Pa. 544 , 937 A.2d 430 , 436 (2007) (holding that Section 319's right of subrogation has the following three purposes: (1) to prevent double recovery for the same injury by the claimant; (2) to ensure that the employer is not compelled to make compensation payments made necessary by the negligence of a third party; and (3) to prevent a third party from escaping liability for his negligence).

2018Id. at 1112 ( citing Domtar Paper, 113 A.3d at 1240 ; Scalise v. F.M.

2018Id. at 1112 ( citing Domtar Paper , 113 A.3d at 1240 ; Scalise v. F.M.

2018Accordingly, the Domtar Paper Court "reaffirm[ed] that the right of action against a third-party tortfeasor under Section 319 of the WCA remains in the injured employee, and that the employer['s]/insurer's right of subrogation under Section 319 must be achieved through a single action brought in the name of the injured employee or joined by the injured employee." Domtar Paper, 113 A.3d at 1240 .

2018Accordingly, the Domtar Paper Court "reaffirm[ed] that the right of action against a third-party tortfeasor under Section 319 of the WCA remains in the injured employee, and that the employer['s]/insurer's right of subrogation under Section 319 must be achieved through a single action brought in the name of the injured employee or joined by the injured employee." Domtar Paper, 113 A.3d at 1240 .

2024“Furthermore, both this Court and our Pennsylvania Supreme Court ha[ve] held that the right of subrogation under Section 319 of the Act is both automatic and absolute.” Id. (citing Kidd-Parker, 907 A.2d at 37 ; Brubacher Excavating, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp.

2024“Furthermore, both this Court and our Pennsylvania Supreme Court ha[ve] held that the right of subrogation under Section 319 of the Act is both automatic and absolute.” Id. (citing Kidd-Parker, 907 A.2d at 37 ; Brubacher Excavating, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp.

2022Per Thompson III, an employer’s subrogation rights under Section 319 are “not affected by the way in which the claimant and third-party tortfeasor, or the fact-finder in their action, characterize the nature of the third-party recovery.” Thompson III, 801 A.2d at 638 .

2022To that end, this Court held in Thompson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (USF&G Company), 801 A.2d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (Thompson III), that Thompson’s damages for pain and suffering were subject to subrogation under Section 319.

2006Penske relies upon Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Branch Motor Express, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 262 , 334 A.2d 847 (1975), where a truck driver became totally disabled due to an accident in the course of his employment.

2006Penske relies upon Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Branch Motor Express, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 262 , 334 A.2d 847 (1975), where a truck driver became totally disabled due to an accident in the course of his employment.

2001Co., 288 Pa. 85 , 135 A. 858, 860 (1927)).

2001Co., 288 Pa. 85 , 135 A. 858, 860 (1927)).

2001In addition, the Commonwealth Court itself had held in Kelly v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (A-P-A Transport Corp.), 107 Pa.Cmwlth.223, 527 A.2d 1121 (1987) that equitable considerations do not outweigh the mandatory language of § 319.

2001In addition, the Commonwealth Court itself had held in Kelly v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (A-P-A Transport Corp.), 107 Pa. Cmwlth.223, 527 A.2d 1121 (1987) that equitable considerations do not outweigh the mandatory language of § 319.

2024See id.

2024See id.

2022Appeal Bd. (Pennsbury Excavating, Inc.), 948 A.2d 926, 931 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).3 In Gillette, our Supreme Court found that while there was “no question” that the employer was entitled to subrogation under Section 319 of the Act, the dispute had been properly filed before the trial court in that instance because it entailed a wrongful death cause of action, which cannot be adjudicated by a WCJ. 937 A.2d at 435-36 .

2020Judski Assocs.), 543 A.2d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (finding no merit in a claimant’s assertion that collateral estoppel barred an employer’s Section 319 subrogation claim).

2018(Givner), 39 A.3d 287, 294 (Pa. 2012) 2 We also granted review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in finding that Mountain Country Meats did not waive its rights under section 319 by waiting thirteen years to assert a purported right to reimbursement of medical expenses.