section 10 remedy clause in Oregon

2023Clarke, 343 Or at 610 .

2013Among other things, the court quoted with approval the portion of Hale that described the proper analysis of the adequacy of a remedy under Article I, section 10, as depending on whether the existing remedy “is a substantial one;” indeed, the Clarke court added its own emphasis to the words “substantial one.” Id. at 602 .

2013In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 72 , 987 P2d 463 (1999), for instance, this court sweepingly declared of the right to a jury trial guaranteed in Article I, section 17, that “whatever the right to ‘Trial by Jury’ meant in 1857, it means precisely the same thing today.” In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 118 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), to pick another example, the court announced that the purpose of the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, “is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constit

2013In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 72 , 987 P2d 463 (1999), for instance, this court sweepingly declared of the right to a jury trial guaranteed in Article I, section 17, that “whatever the right to ‘Trial by Jury’ meant in 1857, it means precisely the same thing today.” In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 118 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), to pick another example, the court announced that the purpose of the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, “is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constit

2013The particular term used in reference to the inadequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10, traces back to West v. Jaloff, 113 Or 184 , 232 P 642 (1925), in which the court rejected the defendant’s proposed construction of a statute that conferred limited immunity from liability on ambulance drivers because the construction would give the plaintiff “an emasculated remedy wholly inadequate under many conditions.” Id. at 195 .

2013The particular term used in reference to the inadequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10, traces back to West v. Jaloff, 113 Or 184 , 232 P 642 (1925), in which the court rejected the defendant’s proposed construction of a statute that conferred limited immunity from liability on ambulance drivers because the construction would give the plaintiff “an emasculated remedy wholly inadequate under many conditions.” Id. at 195 .

2026State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 610 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997).

2026State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 610 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997).

2026State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 610 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997).

2026State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 610 , 932 P2d 1145 , cert den, 522 US 994 (1997).

2024As we will explain, Oregon’s common law has long held that a person has a remedy against the server of alcohol for injuries that the person suffered as a result of consuming alcohol involuntarily, meaning after the point that the person has lost the “sense of reason and volition.” See Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or 92 , 35 P2d 672 (1934) (setting that standard).

2024As we will explain, Oregon’s common law has long held that a person has a remedy against the server of alcohol for injuries that the person suffered as a result of consuming alcohol involuntarily, meaning after the point that the person has lost the “sense of reason and volition.” See Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or 92 , 35 P2d 672 (1934) (setting that standard).

1995See Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387 , 788 P.2d 435 (held statutory products liability state of repose did not violate the remedy guarantee clause in Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, even though it eliminated the plaintiff's remedy before the plaintiff suffered an injury), cert. den. 498 U.S. 819 , 111 S.Ct. 65 , 112 L.Ed.2d 39 (1990). [4] ORS 18.560 provides: "(1) Except for claims subject to ORS 30.260 to 30.300 [(the Oregon Tort Claims Act)] and ORS chapter 656 [(the Oregon Workers' Compensation Act)], in any civil action seeking damages arising out of bodily injury, including

1995See Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387 , 788 P.2d 435 (held statutory products liability state of repose did not violate the remedy guarantee clause in Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, even though it eliminated the plaintiff's remedy before the plaintiff suffered an injury), cert. den. 498 U.S. 819 , 111 S.Ct. 65 , 112 L.Ed.2d 39 (1990). [4] ORS 18.560 provides: "(1) Except for claims subject to ORS 30.260 to 30.300 [(the Oregon Tort Claims Act)] and ORS chapter 656 [(the Oregon Workers' Compensation Act)], in any civil action seeking damages arising out of bodily injury, including

2018On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the statute in question, ORS 656.018(1)(a), violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, because it deprived them of "recovery on their common-law negligent wrongful death claim." Id.

2007In Juarez v. Windsor Rock Products, Inc., 341 Or 160 , 144 P3d 211 (2006), the Supreme Court refused to overrule its prior cases rejecting a common-law wrongful death cause of action. 8 See Storm, 334 Or at 222 n 4, (“Since at least 1891, [we] ha[ve] adhered to the view that no right of action for wrongful death existed at common law.”); see also Kilminster v. Day Management Corp., 323 Or 618, 627 , 919 P2d 474 (1996) (“Oregon has no common law action for wrongful death.”).

2013Specifically, we need not decide whether, under Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or 359 , 298 P3d 1 (2013), the $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages provided plaintiffs with a substantial remedy within the meaning of Article I, section 10.

2013Specifically, we need not decide whether, under Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or 359 , 298 P3d 1 (2013), the $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages provided plaintiffs with a substantial remedy within the meaning of Article I, section 10.

2013The government cannot avoid a constitutional command by ‘balancing’ it against another of its obligations. *** In this instance, the government cannot create a secret court by pleading that it must act in secret in order to avoid infringing the witness’s secrecy interest or constitutional right against self incrimination.” Id. at 305 .

2012This court has also explained that the terms of Article I, section 10, are unqualified and that a court may not balance, for example, a witness’s “secrecy interest” against the command of Article I, section 10. 303 Or at 304 .

2013In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 72 , 987 P2d 463 (1999), for instance, this court sweepingly declared of the right to a jury trial guaranteed in Article I, section 17, that “whatever the right to ‘Trial by Jury’ meant in 1857, it means precisely the same thing today.” In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 118 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), to pick another example, the court announced that the purpose of the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, “is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constit

2013In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 72 , 987 P2d 463 (1999), for instance, this court sweepingly declared of the right to a jury trial guaranteed in Article I, section 17, that “whatever the right to ‘Trial by Jury’ meant in 1857, it means precisely the same thing today.” In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 118 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), to pick another example, the court announced that the purpose of the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, “is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constit

2013In Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or 503 , 154 P 106 (1915), the court took a similar approach to the adequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10.

2013In Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or 503 , 154 P 106 (1915), the court took a similar approach to the adequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10.

2013The use of the term in the Article I, section 10, context has been justly criticized for its implication that "strength and vitality are gender-specific." Ackerman v. OHSU Medical Group, 233 Or App 511 , 532 n 10, 227 P3d 744 (2010). 7 The particular term used in reference to the inadequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10, traces back to West v. Jaloff, 113 Or 184 , 232 P 642 (1925), in which the court rejected the defendant's proposed construction of a statute that conferred limited immunity from liability on ambulance drivers because the construction would give the plaintiff "an emas

2013The use of the term in the Article I, section 10, context has been justly criticized for its implication that "strength and vitality are gender-specific." Ackerman v. OHSU Medical Group, 233 Or App 511 , 532 n 10, 227 P3d 744 (2010). 7 The particular term used in reference to the inadequacy of remedies under Article I, section 10, traces back to West v. Jaloff, 113 Or 184 , 232 P 642 (1925), in which the court rejected the defendant's proposed construction of a statute that conferred limited immunity from liability on ambulance drivers because the construction would give the plaintiff "an emas

2001See, e.g., Thomas v. Bowen, 29 Or 258, 264 , 45 P 768 (1896) (Article I, section 10, furnishes adequate remedy for any infringement of right to preservation of good name); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or 402, 408-09 , 100 P 937 (1909) (city ordinance limiting recovery for injury to instances of gross negligence leaves “reme-diless” person injured by ordinary negligence in violation of Article I, section 10).

2001See, e.g., Thomas v. Bowen, 29 Or 258, 264 , 45 P 768 (1896) (Article I, section 10, furnishes adequate remedy for any infringement of right to preservation of good name); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or 402, 408-09 , 100 P 937 (1909) (city ordinance limiting recovery for injury to instances of gross negligence leaves “reme-diless” person injured by ordinary negligence in violation of Article I, section 10).

2026This is the first time we have reviewed ORS 31.710(1) for a remedy clause violation since the statute was amended by the Oregon legislature following the Supreme Court’s decision in Busch v. McInnis Waste Systems, Inc., 366 Or 628 , 468 P3d 419 (2020).

2026This is the first time we have reviewed ORS 31.710(1) for a remedy clause violation since the statute was amended by the Oregon legislature following the Supreme Court’s decision in Busch v. McInnis Waste Systems, Inc., 366 Or 628 , 468 P3d 419 (2020).

2026The remedy clause in Article I, section 10, provides that “every man shall have a remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.” The Supreme Court has explained that the analysis under Article I, section 10, “focuses on the state of the common law at the time that the statute in question was enacted, not when the constitution was adopted.” Bonner v. American Golf Corporation of California, Inc., 372 Or 814 , 821, 558 P3d 812 (2024) (citing Horton, 359 Or at 180 ).

2026The remedy clause in Article I, section 10, provides that “every man shall have a remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.” The Supreme Court has explained that the analysis under Article I, section 10, “focuses on the state of the common law at the time that the statute in question was enacted, not when the constitution was adopted.” Bonner v. American Golf Corporation of California, Inc., 372 Or 814 , 821, 558 P3d 812 (2024) (citing Horton, 359 Or at 180 ).

2023Brentano, 150 Or App at 541-42 . 9 We note that in Atkinson v. Fairview Dairy Farms, 190 Or 1 , 222 P2d 732 (1950), the court rejected a similar argument that the legislature’s elimination of a tort claim against a third party for an injury covered by the workers’ compensation law violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10.

2023Citing City of Corvallis v. State of Oregon, 304 Or App 171, 180-81 , 464 P3d 1127 (2020), the state also asserts that plaintiff’s argument does not supply a basis for facially invalidating ORS 30.265(6)(a) because “that argument does not extend to the full range of cases or circumstances to which the OTCA’s workers’-com- pensation immunity may apply[.]” STANDARD OF REVIEW Although this case was resolved on summary judgment, the facts are undisputed and the questions on appeal are solely ones of law.

2023Citing City of Corvallis v. State of Oregon, 304 Or App 171, 180-81 , 464 P3d 1127 (2020), the state also asserts that plaintiff’s argument does not supply a basis for facially invalidating ORS 30.265(6)(a) because “that argument does not extend to the full range of cases or circumstances to which the OTCA’s workers’-com- pensation immunity may apply[.]” STANDARD OF REVIEW Although this case was resolved on summary judgment, the facts are undisputed and the questions on appeal are solely ones of law.

2023Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or App 672, 677 , 410 P3d 336 (2018) (noting Horton “significantly changed the legal framework for analyzing constitutional limitations on the legislature’s ability to substantively alter or adjust a person’s remedy for injuries to person, property, and reputation”).

2023Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or App 672, 677 , 410 P3d 336 (2018) (noting Horton “significantly changed the legal framework for analyzing constitutional limitations on the legislature’s ability to substantively alter or adjust a person’s remedy for injuries to person, property, and reputation”).