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55 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rebich v. Milesgreen2 sentences2026Where the appeal is one that is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35(a), “the discretionary application procedure must be followed, even when the party is appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a).” Rebich, 264 Ga. at 468 . 2023Second, a discretionary application is required when the “underlying subject matter” is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a); “the discretionary application procedure must be followed, even when the party is appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).” Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 ( 448 SE2d 192 ) (1994). | 12 | 16 |
Todd v. Toddgreen2 sentences2026See Todd v. Todd, 287 Ga. 250 , 251-52(1) ( 703 SE2d 597 ) (2010). parties in divorce cases that challenge interlocutory custody rulings must comply with the interlocutory appeal procedure). 2024See Todd v. Todd, 287 Ga. 250, 251-252 (1) ( 703 SE2d 597 ) (2010). | 6 | 6 |
Todd v. Toddgreen2 sentences2026See Todd v. Todd, 287 Ga. 250 , 251-52(1) ( 703 SE2d 597 ) (2010). parties in divorce cases that challenge interlocutory custody rulings must comply with the interlocutory appeal procedure). 2024See Todd v. Todd, 287 Ga. 250, 251-252 (1) ( 703 SE2d 597 ) (2010). | 6 | 6 |
Avren v. Gartengreen2 sentences2014Ledford v. Mobley, 321 Ga. App. 761, 762 ( 743 SE2d 461 ) (2013). “[A]n application for appeal is required when the underlying subject matter of the appeal is listed in OCGA 5-6-35 (a), even though the party may be appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).” Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 192 (7) ( 710 SE2d 130 ) (2011). 2014Ledford v. Mobley, 321 Ga. App. 761, 762 ( 743 SE2d 461 ) (2013). “[A]n application for appeal is required when the underlying subject matter of the appeal is listed in OCGA 5-6-35 (a), even though the party may be appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).” Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 192 (7) ( 710 SE2d 130 ) (2011). | 5 | 5 |
Voyles v. Voylesgreen2 sentences2025Because the mother is not challenging any custody ruling in this appeal, she is not entitled to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11).6 3 OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11). 4 See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017). 5 We note that the superior court explicitly did not include this finding in the written transfer order. 2025Because the mother is not challenging any custody ruling in this appeal, she is not entitled to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11).6 3 OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11). 4 See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017). 5 We note that the superior court explicitly did not include this finding in the written transfer order. | 3 | 4 |
Dias v. Boonegreen2 sentences2026See also Dias, 320 Ga. at 789 (“[I]f the underlying subject matter is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35(a), a party must follow the discretionary application process in order to appeal immediately.”). 2025See Dias v. Boone, 320 Ga. 785 , 794 (2) ( 912 SE2d 547 ) (2025). | 2 | 2 |
Pine Tree Publishing, Inc. v. Community Holdings, Inc.green2 sentences2013“In situations where a final judgment has been entered, default cannot be opened unless and until the final judgment has been set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d).” Pine Tree Publishing v. Community Holdings, 242 Ga. App. 689, 690 ( 531 SE2d 137 ) (2000). 2013“In situations where a final judgment has been entered, default cannot be opened unless and until the final judgment has been set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d).” Pine Tree Publishing v. Community Holdings, 242 Ga. App. 689, 690 ( 531 SE2d 137 ) (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Capricorn Systems, Inc. v. Godavarthygreen2 sentences2013Capricorn Systems v. Godavarthy, 253 Ga. App. 840, 841 ( 560 SE2d 730 ) (2002) (discretionary appeal procedure applied where appellant claimed error as to attorney fees award and made no claims of error as to other, directly appealable issues). 2013Capricorn Systems v. Godavarthy, 253 Ga. App. 840, 841 ( 560 SE2d 730 ) (2002) (discretionary appeal procedure applied where appellant claimed error as to attorney fees award and made no claims of error as to other, directly appealable issues). | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. Davisgreen2 sentences2013See generally Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga. App. 265, 268-269 (1) & n. 17 ( 733 SE2d 798 ) (2012) (holding that clear and unambiguous language of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) authorizes direct appeal of any .order in proceeding in which child’s legal custody, physical custody or visitation is an issue, and noting that it is for the legislature to narrow scope of this right of direct appeal). 2013See generally Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga. App. 265, 268-269 (1) & n. 17 ( 733 SE2d 798 ) (2012) (holding that clear and unambiguous language of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) authorizes direct appeal of any .order in proceeding in which child’s legal custody, physical custody or visitation is an issue, and noting that it is for the legislature to narrow scope of this right of direct appeal). | 2 | 2 |
Tom Brown v. E. Howard Carson, Jr.green2 sentences2026See Carson v. Brown, 348 Ga. App. 689, 690 ( 824 SE2d 605 ) (2019) (“After reviewing the application for a discretionary appeal, we granted it after concluding that [the applicant] had a right to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(7), which provides, in relevant part, for direct appeals to this Court from all judgments or orders granting or refusing to grant mandamus.”) (punctuation omitted). 2026See Carson v. Brown, 348 Ga. App. 689, 690 ( 824 SE2d 605 ) (2019) (“After reviewing the application for a discretionary appeal, we granted it after concluding that [the applicant] had a right to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(7), which provides, in relevant part, for direct appeals to this Court from all judgments or orders granting or refusing to grant mandamus.”) (punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Savage v. Newsomegreen2 sentences2025See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510 , 510–11 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); Savage v. Newsome, 173 Ga. App. 271, 271 ( 326 SE2d 5 ) (1985). 2025See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510 , 510–11 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); Savage v. Newsome, 173 Ga. App. 271, 271 ( 326 SE2d 5 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Cohrangreen2 sentences2025See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510 , 510–11 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); Savage v. Newsome, 173 Ga. App. 271, 271 ( 326 SE2d 5 ) (1985). 2025See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510 , 510–11 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); Savage v. Newsome, 173 Ga. App. 271, 271 ( 326 SE2d 5 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2024See also Hooper v. Taylor, 230 Ga. App. 128 (1) ( 495 SE2d 594 ) (1998). 2024See also Hooper v. Taylor, 230 Ga. App. 128 (1) ( 495 SE2d 594 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Laff Lines, Ltd. v. DiMaurogreen2 sentences2024Because the judgment is not final, a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) is not authorized[.]” Laff Lines, Ltd. v. Dimauro, 186 Ga. App. 24, 25 ( 366 SE2d 375 ) (1988) (emphasis in original). 2024Because the judgment is not final, a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) is not authorized[.]” Laff Lines, Ltd. v. Dimauro, 186 Ga. App. 24, 25 ( 366 SE2d 375 ) (1988) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Mark Winchell v. Natalie Moore Winchellgreen1 sentence2023Winchell, 352 Ga. App. at 313 (3), n.10. | 1 | 1 |
Russo v. Manninggreen1 sentence2023See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 155-156 ( 312 SE2d 319 ) (1984) (“A judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is appealable only by application for discretionary appeal.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Peach Trader Inc.green2 sentences2022Jones v. Peach Trader, 302 Ga. 504, 511 (III) ( 807 SE2d 840 ) (2017). 2022Jones v. Peach Trader, 302 Ga. 504, 511 (III) ( 807 SE2d 840 ) (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Buttramgreen2 sentences2021Compare CitiFinancial Svcs., Inc. v. Holland, 310 Ga. App. 480, 481 ( 713 SE2d 678 ) (2011) (pending claim for attorney fees renders appeal interlocutory), with Hill v. Buttram, 255 Ga. App. 123, 124 ( 564 SE2d 531 ) (2002) (reservation of OCGA § 9- 15-14 attorney fees issue does not extend time for filing notice of appeal). 4 forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). 2021Compare CitiFinancial Svcs., Inc. v. Holland, 310 Ga. App. 480, 481 ( 713 SE2d 678 ) (2011) (pending claim for attorney fees renders appeal interlocutory), with Hill v. Buttram, 255 Ga. App. 123, 124 ( 564 SE2d 531 ) (2002) (reservation of OCGA § 9- 15-14 attorney fees issue does not extend time for filing notice of appeal). 4 forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). | 1 | 1 |
Smoak v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2021Moreover, “[c]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 ( 471 SE2d 60 ) (1996). 2021Moreover, “[c]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 ( 471 SE2d 60 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Woodruff v. Choategreen2 sentences2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi 2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi | 1 | 1 |
Christopher Capehart v. Mayah Capehart Mitchellgreen2 sentences2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi 2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Millergreen2 sentences2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi 2021See also Capehart v. Mitchell, 358 Ga. App. 86 , 88 (2) ( 851 SE2d 846 ) (2020) (holding that because an appeal from an order setting aside a final child custody modification order “does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody[], . . . under the rule discussed in Voyles, this case is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)”). 6 Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574, 576 (1) (a) ( 780 SE2d 25 ) (2015) (holding that an order reserving the issue of attorney fees “was not a final judgment because it did not adjudicate all the pending claims”), citing Mi | 1 | 1 |
CITIFINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. Hollandgreen2 sentences2021Compare CitiFinancial Svcs., Inc. v. Holland, 310 Ga. App. 480, 481 ( 713 SE2d 678 ) (2011) (pending claim for attorney fees renders appeal interlocutory), with Hill v. Buttram, 255 Ga. App. 123, 124 ( 564 SE2d 531 ) (2002) (reservation of OCGA § 9- 15-14 attorney fees issue does not extend time for filing notice of appeal). 4 forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). 2021Compare CitiFinancial Svcs., Inc. v. Holland, 310 Ga. App. 480, 481 ( 713 SE2d 678 ) (2011) (pending claim for attorney fees renders appeal interlocutory), with Hill v. Buttram, 255 Ga. App. 123, 124 ( 564 SE2d 531 ) (2002) (reservation of OCGA § 9- 15-14 attorney fees issue does not extend time for filing notice of appeal). 4 forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). | 1 | 1 |
| Rowland v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., a Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
Self v. Bayneumgreen2 sentences2020See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) ( 619 SE2d 679 ) (2005) (“Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6- 34 or § 5-6-35.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995) (“Since the underlying subject matter is divorce, [the appellant] was required to file an application for appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).”); Ray M. 2020See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) ( 619 SE2d 679 ) (2005) (“Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6- 34 or § 5-6-35.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995) (“Since the underlying subject matter is divorce, [the appellant] was required to file an application for appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).”); Ray M. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Estate of Maysgreen2 sentences2020See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) ( 619 SE2d 679 ) (2005) (“Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6- 34 or § 5-6-35.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995) (“Since the underlying subject matter is divorce, [the appellant] was required to file an application for appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).”); Ray M. 2020See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) ( 619 SE2d 679 ) (2005) (“Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6- 34 or § 5-6-35.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995) (“Since the underlying subject matter is divorce, [the appellant] was required to file an application for appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).”); Ray M. | 1 | 1 |
| Grogan v. City of Dawsonvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Georgia v. Ronald Wyttenbachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ledford v. Mobleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edge v. Edgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alexander v. DeKalb Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fabe v. Floydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ballew v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pruett v. Commercial Bankgreen2 sentences2023OCGA § 9- 11-62 contains no provision for avoiding bond by filing an indigence affidavit[.] 5 confers no jurisdiction on this Court, the same rule does not apply to motions for reconsideration.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 313 (3), n.10.4 We conclude that the trial court’s order setting a supersedeas bond pending Athens Heart’s motion for new trial is not a final order subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).5 Rather, a party who is ordered to pay a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial can seek to immediately appeal that order through the 4 In reaching it 2023OCGA § 9- 11-62 contains no provision for avoiding bond by filing an indigence affidavit[.] 5 confers no jurisdiction on this Court, the same rule does not apply to motions for reconsideration.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 313 (3), n.10.4 We conclude that the trial court’s order setting a supersedeas bond pending Athens Heart’s motion for new trial is not a final order subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).5 Rather, a party who is ordered to pay a supersedeas bond pending a motion for new trial can seek to immediately appeal that order through the 4 In reaching it | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Curl
green
2 sentences2025However, because child custody is frequently litigated within the larger framework of a divorce case, some confusion has developed as to whether a child custody order entered in a divorce case is subject to direct appeal under § 5-6-34 (a) (11) or requires a discretionary application under § 5-6-35 (a) (2).1 Further confusion 1 See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303 ( 680 SE2d 150 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in the context of a custody action implicating the UCCJEA but not within the context of a divorce case); Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 ( 679 SE2d 80 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in 2025However, because child custody is frequently litigated within the larger framework of a divorce case, some confusion has developed as to whether a child custody order entered in a divorce case is subject to direct appeal under § 5-6-34 (a) (11) or requires a discretionary application under § 5-6-35 (a) (2).1 Further confusion 1 See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303 ( 680 SE2d 150 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in the context of a custody action implicating the UCCJEA but not within the context of a divorce case); Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 ( 679 SE2d 80 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in | 3 | 2010–2025 |
Cameisha A. Barnes v. Jamar D. Barnes
green
2 sentences2026OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), it is not subject to a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11).” Barnes v. Barnes, 361 Ga. App. 279 , 281 ( 864 SE2d 119 ) (2021) (quotation marks omitted). 2026OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), it is not subject to a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11).” Barnes v. Barnes, 361 Ga. App. 279 , 281 ( 864 SE2d 119 ) (2021) (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ochiagha Onyemobi v. Ijeoma Onyemobi
green
2 sentences2026See OCGA § 5-6-34(b); Onyemobi v. Onyemobi, 375 Ga. App. 538 , 541 ( 916 SE2d 738 ) (2025) (holding that 1 While the divorce decree here determined, among other things, child custody, such determination does not transform this case into a “child custody case” subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11). 2026See OCGA § 5-6-34(b); Onyemobi v. Onyemobi, 375 Ga. App. 538 , 541 ( 916 SE2d 738 ) (2025) (holding that 1 While the divorce decree here determined, among other things, child custody, such determination does not transform this case into a “child custody case” subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Croft v. Croft
green
2 sentences2025However, because child custody is frequently litigated within the larger framework of a divorce case, some confusion has developed as to whether a child custody order entered in a divorce case is subject to direct appeal under § 5-6-34 (a) (11) or requires a discretionary application under § 5-6-35 (a) (2).1 Further confusion 1 See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303 ( 680 SE2d 150 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in the context of a custody action implicating the UCCJEA but not within the context of a divorce case); Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 ( 679 SE2d 80 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in 2025However, because child custody is frequently litigated within the larger framework of a divorce case, some confusion has developed as to whether a child custody order entered in a divorce case is subject to direct appeal under § 5-6-34 (a) (11) or requires a discretionary application under § 5-6-35 (a) (2).1 Further confusion 1 See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303 ( 680 SE2d 150 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in the context of a custody action implicating the UCCJEA but not within the context of a divorce case); Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 ( 679 SE2d 80 ) (2009) (addressing this issue in | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In re Interest of K.S. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Fischer green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Board of Regents v. Canas green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Lacy v. Lacy green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Martinez v. Martinez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Spivey v. Hembree green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Goodwin v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Willard v. Wilburn green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Crymes v. Smith green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| PLANTATION PIPE LINE COMPANY v. Strickland green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Rolleston v. Rolleston green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Wells v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Boatner v. Kandul green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.