section 315 statute of limitations in Pennsylvania

1993In Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co., 386 Pa. 179 , 125 A.2d 365 (1956), we held that the limitation period of Section 315 of the Occupational Disease Act then in force, 77 P.S. § 1415, commenced when a claimant knew by competent medical diagnosis that a disability was caused by an *506 occupational disease.

1993In Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co., 386 Pa. 179 , 125 A.2d 365 (1956), we held that the limitation period of Section 315 of the Occupational Disease Act then in force, 77 P.S. § 1415, commenced when a claimant knew by competent medical diagnosis that a disability was caused by an *506 occupational disease.

2021In order to toll the limitations period of Section 315, the claimant must prove that payments of compensation were made within three years of filing the claim petition and that such payments were made by the employer with the intent that they be in lieu of workers’ compensation under an equitable estoppel theory.8 Westinghouse, 8 As our Supreme Court explained: Equitable estoppel arises in the workers’ compensation arena when an employer, “by [its] acts, representations, or admissions, or by [its] silence when [it] ought to speak out, intentionally or through (Footnote continued on next page…)

2003In order to toll the limitations period of Section 315, a claimant must prove that (1) “payments of compensation” were made within three years of filing the claim petition, and (2) that such payments were made by the employer with the intent they be “in lieu of workmen’s compensation.” See Schreffler v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kocher Coal Company), 567 Pa. 527, 540 , 788 A.2d 963, 971 (2002) (plurality opinion).

2000Bellefonte, 627 A.2d at 256 (Doyle, J. dissenting).

1996In Bellefonte Area School District v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Morgan), 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 304 , 627 A.2d 250 (1993), affirmed per curiam 538 Pa. 618 , 645 A.2d 1321 (1994), this Court clarified the applicability of Section 315 of the Act to medical benefits as follows: Article III, Section 315 bars all claims for compensation in the absence of the parties’ agreement on the compensation payable under Article III or an appropriate petition filed under Article TV.

1995Id. at 360-361, 509 A.2d at 947.

1993See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Niemann, 24 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 377, 356 A.2d 370 (1976) (where the claimant's later-disabling neck injury suffered in an assault by a patient had not been diagnosed for some twenty months, the date of injury triggered the limitations period of Section 315, and a claim filed outside the then applicable sixteen-month period was untimely). [6] Eddy and Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), 97 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 356, 509 A.2d 945 (1986), emphasize the distinction between the discovery rules in the notice provi

1976The Superior Court has in fact stated that ‘[a] review of the cases in which the defendant has been estopped to avail itself of the limitations provision of §315 reveals that the statements relied on must reasonably lull the claimant into a sense of false security.’ Fulton v. Philadelphia Rustproof Co., 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 467, 470-471 , 190 A.2d 459, 461 (1963).

1976The Superior Court has in fact stated that ‘[a] review of the cases in which the defendant has been estopped to avail itself of the limitations provision of §315 reveals that the statements relied on must reasonably lull the claimant into a sense of false security.’ Fulton v. Philadelphia Rustproof Co., 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 467, 470-471 , 190 A.2d 459, 461 (1963).

1993See also Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Niemann, 24 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 377, 356 A.2d 370 (1976) (where the claimant's later-disabling neck injury suffered in an assault by a patient had not been diagnosed for some twenty months, the date of injury triggered the limitations period of Section 315, and a claim filed outside the then applicable sixteen-month period was untimely). .

1993See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Niemann, 24 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 377, 356 A.2d 370 (1976) (where the claimant's later-disabling neck injury suffered in an assault by a patient had not been diagnosed for some twenty months, the date of injury triggered the limitations period of Section 315, and a claim filed outside the then applicable sixteen-month period was untimely). [6] Eddy and Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), 97 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 356, 509 A.2d 945 (1986), emphasize the distinction between the discovery rules in the notice provi

2012Berwick, supra at 1070 (quotation marks deleted).

2012Berwick, supra at 1070 (quotation marks deleted).

1995Young, 97 Pa.Commw. at 367, 509 A.2d at 950. [11] The Commonwealth Court noted that "the date of injury would have been his last day of work on November 27, 1982." Eddy, 130 Pa. Commw. at 308 , 568 A.2d at 280 (footnote omitted). [12] This Court, noting that Section 315 is a statute of repose, recognized that while not desiring to minimize the salutary purposes of the Act, statutes of limitation and repose are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law.

1993Cf. Eddy v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Transit Inc.), 130 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 306, 568 A.2d 279 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 525 Pa. 606 , 575 A.2d 570 (1990) (explaining that in specific loss cases, ‘the date of injury [for Section 315 purposes] is the date when the claimant is notified by a doctor of the loss of use of the member or faculty for ‘all practical intents and purposes’ and that the injury is job related in nature’), id., 130 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 310, 568 A.2d at 281 (citing Universal Cyclops Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Cherr

2025Id. at 521-22 (emphasis added).

2017However, simply because a discovery rule is applicable to Section 315 does not provide a basis for application of a discovery rule to Section 301(f), particularly where diagnosis and knowledge that a condition is work-related are irrelevant to the triggering event of the Section 301(f) limitations period, which is the last date of workplace exposure. 148 A.3d at 521-522 .

2021In order to toll the limitations period of Section 315, the claimant must prove that payments of compensation were made within three years of filing the claim petition and that such payments were made by the employer with the intent that they be in lieu of workers’ compensation under an equitable estoppel theory.8 Westinghouse, 8 As our Supreme Court explained: Equitable estoppel arises in the workers’ compensation arena when an employer, “by [its] acts, representations, or admissions, or by [its] silence when [it] ought to speak out, intentionally or through (Footnote continued on next page…)

2015Ko-vach, 883 A.2d at 591; Schreffler v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kocher Coal Co.), 567 Pa. 527 , 788 A.2d 963, 971 (2002) (plurality opinion); Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Emig), 829 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).

2020In concluding the petition was time-barred under Section 315, we explained: Section 315 [] imposes a three-year limitations period, measured from the date [] of injury. [Section 315 of the Act,] 77 P.S. §602. [P]ayments of medical expenses may toll the Section 315 limitations period where those 6 As an aside, in Harley Davidson, 829 A.2d at 1252-53 , this Court reiterated that a claimant must do more than establish the receipt of medical benefits to toll the repose period under Section 315. 8 payments were made “in lieu of” workers’ compensation benefits.

2020Discussion On appeal,3 Claimant raises one issue: “[w]hether the [Board] erred in affirming [the WCJ’s] decision, as [Claimant’s] [P]etition was not time-barred under Section 315 [], because [Employer’s] payment of work-related medical bills tolled Section 315’s three-year statute of limitations for filing a [P]etition.” (Claimant’s Br. at 4.) For support, Claimant relies on Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Emig), 829 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), arguing that where an employer has knowledge of a claimant’s injury and pays for medical treatment, the statute of repos

2025However, we previously rejected such a per se rule as being “illogical” and inconsistent with Section 311, which, like Section 18 315, contains a “reasonable diligence” requirement,10 in East Hempfield Township v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Stahl), 189 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

2016Claimant cites Price v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Metallurgical Resources), 533 Pa. 500 , 626 A.2d 114 (1993), in which our Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitations of Section 315 of the Act 7 for filing a claim for compensation does not begin to run in occupational disease cases until the claimant knows or should know that he is disabled as a result *521 of an occupational disease, which is presumed to occur only :when the claimant receives a competent medical diagnosis that his illness is work-related.

2016Claimant cites Price v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Metallurgical Resources), 533 Pa. 500 , 626 A.2d 114 (1993), in which our Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitations of Section 315 of the Act 7 for filing a claim for compensation does not begin to run in occupational disease cases until the claimant knows or should know that he is disabled as a result *521 of an occupational disease, which is presumed to occur only :when the claimant receives a competent medical diagnosis that his illness is work-related.

2005See Campbell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).

2005See Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).

2002See Roadway Express, Inc., 708 A.2d at 135 (In a specific loss claim the date of a claimant’s accident is irrelevant.

2002See Roadway Express, Inc., 708 A.2d at 135 (In a specific loss claim the date of a claimant's accident is irrelevant.